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 The focus of this study is to reconstruct meaning through an interpretation of 
change on who I am and what I am becoming, navigating through a pervasive space that 
encompasses temporal, personal/social, and place creating knowledge from the lived 
experience (Clandinin, 2013). The personal stories explored permit the reader an ability 
to construct broader frames of reference and discover important assumptions and 
theories that guide leadership actions (Mattingly, 1991). As the primary researcher, I 
sought to contribute to the body of research surrounding Army educational leadership 
practice, particularly by exploring gaps along the Army leader development model in 
relation to school leadership preparation, selection, education and fractured purpose. 
 I reviewed critical events that guided my past as both an Army leader and more 
recently, as an Army educational leader situated at a Center of Excellence containing 
two branch/proponent schools. I collected data primarily through field texts, calendar 
events, recollections, white papers, and recounting my own lived experiences. Findings 
explored my professional development as an Army leader, educational leader, and 
researcher along leadership and policy issues encompassing Army school leadership 
gaps. Theory is weaved throughout the study explaining what is going on in the 
practice. A rich account of my experience creating knowledge from the lived experience 






 Progressing beyond traditional leadership models constrained by 
institutionalized thinking continues to shape the Army’s attempted efforts in 
transforming Army education. Winston Churchill offered, “The further backward you 
look, the further forward you can see” (Cohen, 2002). Leadership and policy 
constructed specifically for developing successful Army schools has long been a 
neglected practice. The Army continues standing upon an organizational leadership 
model designed to ensure that those in charge execute missions in accordance with 
doctrine, orders, and training (Department of the Army, 2015a). Over the course of 
several years, Army leadership has struggled to implement a new Army learning model 
(ALC 2015). Answers to the Army’s struggle may be discovered within associated 
K-12 studies demonstrating successful education reform and district strategies. For 
example, the successful district and school leadership preparation element distinguishes 
itself by offering a critical component driving and influencing institutional change 
(Carter, Glass, & Hord, 1993). Driving and influencing institutional change requires 
educational leaders who perform functions congruent with both leadership and 
management roles. Studies further suggest that making informed decisions entails 
educational leaders acquiring appropriate knowledge and skills through education and 
experience. 
 My lived experience as a career Army man, navigating compliantly across space 
and time from 1985 to 1999, in many respects documents this problem; while I rose 
through the ranks, I was unaware of what good leadership entailed and how to inspire it 
(Etzioni, 1975). In 1994, one lieutenant colonel triggered my curiosity, and by 1999, 
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encouraged me to investigate critical thinking in leadership. In turn, I enrolled in a 
Master’s degree program in adult education. It was then that I began realizing how 
Army leadership could be taught to emerging leaders. I have spent the remainder of my 
career attempting to implement reflective and critical thinking toward improving 
educational and training experiences for officers attending Army schools. Reading 
history is one of many traits common among senior Army officers; therefore, a narrative 
inquiry taking the reader through my story should accentuate leadership’s role in 
transforming Army branch/proponent schools. The stories presented in this study offer 
my experiences growing as an Army leader, coupled with pockets of exploration into 
leadership’s role associated with Army institutional learning. Through an increased 
awareness developed in a non-Army-sponsored educational leadership course about 
effective educational leadership practices, policies, and procedures, I discovered critical 
insights suggesting some new approaches in which Army schools can better meet the 
goal of developing agile, adaptive leaders. 
 Observing the Army’s struggle to implement ALC 2015 over the past several 
years suggests that the Army could improve its approach developing, educating, 
preparing, and stabilizing leaders who supervise its Centers of Excellence (CoEs) and 
run its branch/proponent schools. In their report on successful school leadership, 
Leithwood, Day, Sammons, Harris, and Hopkins (2006) explain that, “what leaders do 
depends on what they think and feel” (p. 8). This helps explain why branch schools and 
Centers of Excellence are constructed and run like hierarchical, military organizations, 
and not as learning organizations (Webster-Right, 2009). Additionally, this supports an 
apparent gap in the Army’s leader development process for those selected to supervise 
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Centers of Excellence and run branch proponent/schools. Considering components 
associated with what successful school leadership looks like and what it takes to lead 




Background of the Study 
 The concept of Army education reform can be traced back to Elihu Root, 
Secretary of War from 1899 to 1904; “Roots formula for officer development called for 
rotation of duty assignments and intermittent periods of professional schooling” 
(Coumbe, 2010, p. 2). Some of the reforms included changes to the Army school 
network and significant upgrades to the branch schools. Education, training, and 
experience have defined U.S. Army officer development since the beginning of the last 
century (Coumbe, 2010), and continues to remain a prominent theme today as outlined 
in the Army Leader Development Strategy (ALDS, 2013). Post World War II, the 
Department of the Army Board on the Educational System for Army Officers developed 
a progressive educational system designed to prepare officers to effectively execute 
those duties associated with war and the art of command (Eddy Board Report, 1949). 
Today, the Army desires to develop agile, adaptive leaders who can win in a complex 
environment (Dempsey, 2009). 
Need for the Study 
 Understanding the Army leadership requirements model, along with how the 
Army develops leaders, facilitates the study by allowing the reader to become aware of 
gaps in leadership requirements associated with implementing Army school change 
(Department of the Army, 2013a; Department of the Army, 2015a). For it is not in how 
the Army develops leaders, it is to what purpose the Army develops leaders, which 
exposes gaps in competencies and behaviors. Exploring these gaps while navigating 
through a pervasive space of commonplaces encompassing temporal, social/personal, 
and place reconstructs meaning of my transformation, therefore, creating knowledge 
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from the lived experience (Clandinin, 2013). Later chapters demonstrate how Army 
leadership’s relational and consequential role nests within the struggle to fully 
implement a new learning concept with a particular focus on one Center of Excellence 
containing two branch schools. 
 Supervising a Center of Excellence or running a branch proponent/school poses 
a different organizational experience for those few Army leaders who are selected based 
on their potential to lead large, complex, Army organizations (Department of the Army, 
2014b; Department of the Army, 2005). Unlike their civilian counterparts, Army school 
leaders do not spend their career in a school-centered environment. In a sense, these 
senior leaders who begin their journey at the Colonel and general-officer-level are at a 
significant disadvantage. The Army recognizes a need to reshape its approach to the 
growth of emerging leader development as a result of a changing environment shaped 
over more than a decade of protracted war (Cerami, 2015). A large part of change is 
driven by the inherent value behind critical thinking and problem solving applicable to 
leaders positioned from small units to large complex units (Department of the Army, 
2013). 
 When faced with solving a complex problem in an unfamiliar environment, 
leaders fall back on what they know. It is no surprise that Army leaders placed in charge 
of a school lack appropriate knowledge and competence promoting effective school 
leadership. Furthermore, Kruger and Dunning (1999) suggest that leaders are merely 
robbed of the metacognitive ability to realize that their decisions are not congruent. 
Thus, it is with some risk that I venture to challenge the Army’s antiquated 
methodology of structuring, resourcing, and running its center-level schools. By 
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narrating my experiences, I hope to gain advocates and help readers understand the 
complexity of the task at hand while offering a means to allow the reader to develop 
his/her own explanation. 
Significance of the Study 
 While the importance of leader development in building progressive growth of 
an Army officer throughout a professional career (Department of the Army, 2015a) has 
been researched and documented, the process that the Army selects and prepares those 
chosen to supervise CoEs and run branch proponent/schools is not well-documented. As 
the Army continues to focus on learning as a competitive advantage over its adversaries 
(Department of the Army, 2011b), it is clear that leadership overseeing CoEs and 
running branch proponent/schools should comprise a high level of educational 
leadership expertise. Experiences narrated in this study may offer insights to optimize 
selection, preparation, education, and sustainability of those chosen to supervise CoEs 
and run branch proponent/schools. As my story unfolds, the knowledge gained from a 
study of educational leadership is intended to inform transformational change in the 
Army’s institutions by improving the professional practice. 
Procedures 
 As earlier noted, this study employs narrative inquiry to explore my lived 
experiences of my development as an Army leader and emerging scholar. Narrative 
inquiry “seeks to elaborate and investigate individual interpretations and worldviews of 
complex and human-centered events. It is more concerned with individual truths than 
identifying generalizable, and repeatable events” (Webster & Mertova, 2007, p. 89). A 
narrative framework provides a unique approach to organizing a vast amount of data in 
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relation to critical events, therefore, “making it a powerful research tool” (Webster & 
Mertova, 2007, p. 23). Narrowing the focus to “critical events revealed within the 
stories of experience” (p. 71) provides a rich account of significance demonstrating 
what is important in the research. More analysis of this methodology and reasoning is 
described in chapters four, five, and six where narrative acts as the theoretical lens of 
understanding through which I deliver my story. 
 Common places of temporality, sociality, and place support a conceptual 
framework to help justify research purpose through “what we might find or come to 
understand differently” (Clandinin, 2013, p. 35). This study chronicles my awakening 
of educational leadership and policy creating new knowledge gained by what Clandinin 
(2013) describes as “experiential knowledge.” Human beings continuously narrate their 
lives as they move forward. Stories change as time goes along, informed by different 
perspectives gained from education, experience, and training. This study honors those 
who wish to remain anonymous while carefully crafting events and places so as not to 
expose anyone carelessly. Ownership of the content belongs to both participants and 
inquirer viewed more specifically by Clandinin and Connelly (2000) as a responsibility 
in question to those that the inquirer interacts with through the experience with an 
awareness of how the study is interpreted by the reader. 
Summary 
 A storm is brewing causing tension in the environment while Army senior 
leadership searches for answers as to why seven subordinate Centers of Excellence and 
fifteen branch/proponent schools continue to struggle implementing Army Learning 
Concepts 2015 (ALC 2015; Department of the Army, 2011b). Army senior leadership 
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recognizes that an implementation struggle exists and has already began working to find 
out why. Clearly, this is evident from three recent efforts sanctioned to determine the 
state of implementation across seven Centers of Excellence and fifteen 
branch/proponent schools. Despite three directed investigations into the effort, none, 
thus far, have taken a look at the role that school leaderships have in directing and 
influencing change (Fullan, 2011). Therefore, a study following a narrative inquiry 
methodology situating leadership as the centerpiece within the struggle provides 
experiential knowledge derived from storying critical events, rather than a presentation 
of data sets, methods, and conclusions (Clandinin & Connelly, 2000). 
 A narrative design allows an observation of practice into the Army’s leadership 
development and program policy encompassing a school environment. Chapters four, 
five, six, seven, and eight of this study weave relational theories derived from 
successful public school leadership to resonate transferable experiential knowledge to 
the reader. A certain finesse navigating around the egos and strong personalities 
involved supports a methodology which avoids perception of any kind of direct 
criticism upon the Army’s leadership development model. For it is not in how the Army 
develops leaders, it is to what purpose the Army develops leaders, which provides a 
common place to explore new knowledge that I hope resonates and transfers 





Unfolding Leadership Development 
 The Army’s leader development approach, as explained in the Army Leader 
Development Strategy (2013) and supported in Leader Development Field Manual 
(FM) 6-22 (2015), defines people as the competitive advantage against the nation’s 
adversaries. Like many business organizations, the Army holds experience to be a 
foundational component of its leader development model (Schirmer, Crowley, Blacker, 
Brennan, Leonard, Polich, Sollinger, & Varda, 2008). Army careers follow a series of 
assignments increasing in responsibility and scope while progressively building 
experience derived from operational assignments. Army commanders at echelon are 
responsible for developing their subordinates along leader attributes and competencies 
described in the leadership requirements model (Department of the Army, 2013a, p. 7). 
 
Figure 1. As Depicted in ALDS (2013, p. 7) 
 Odierno, the Army Chief of Staff, and keynote speaker for the Army’s premier 
Senior Service College graduating class of colonels, stated, “The U.S. Army has 
historically been in the business of building leaders" (Odierno, 2013, p. 1). Here, the 
Army’s top leader suggests that the Army’s leader development model reasonably and 
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adequately prepares leaders for any Army leadership assignment. A study sponsored by 
the Bush School and supported by the U.S. Army Senior Service College in addressing 
the topic of gaps in military and civilian education in preparing emerging leaders noted, 
“Leadership development endures at the core of the Army profession” (Cerami, 2015). 
Development of a professional force remains paramount to leader development and 
reflects the attributes and competencies of which Army leaders must be capable. The 
Army is designed organizationally around a team construct focused along a set of 
collective missions. Another contributing factor supporting the Army leader 
development model is mission command (Department of the Army, 2012). Mission 
command is “the authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to 
enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent” (Department of the Army, 
2012, pp. 1-3). Because Army leaders experience transitions in their careers across 
organizational levels of the operational force, those few selected to run 
branch/proponent schools lack experience and exposure leading school-like structures. 
(Department of the Army, 2015a). 
 A key component toward understanding the Army leadership requirements 
model lies within the constructs of Ends, Ways, and Means (Department of the Army, 
2013a). In short, the ways include methods for developing leaders such as school, 
training, and self-development. The means comprise the resources such as will, time, 
people, and funding to achieve the ends. The ends represent the objectives to be 
achieved, and thereby suggests a place to explore potential gaps along the Army leader 
development model in relation to school leadership preparation, selection, education, 
and fractured purpose (Cerami, 2015). The ends is constructed around two elements. 
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The first element consists of the attributes that describe the leader’s internal 
characteristics. The second element describes what competencies become the 
observable behaviors and actions, which leaders must perform (Ceramis, 2015). Skills 
derive from competencies listed in Figure 1 (above), building knowledge and increasing 
abilities along values represented in attributes, which comprise key components of the 
Army’s leadership building strategy. The Army focuses on the development of its 
human capital who can think critically about the nature of conflict and adapt rapidly 
under austere conditions while understanding strategic implications in the broader sense 
(Army Human Dimension Strategy, 2015). Since descriptive components outlining key 
competencies form a foundational leadership development approach, it seems 
appropriate to discover leadership through lived experiences. Reflecting on the Army 
leadership requirements model objectives while studying key competencies and 
behaviors required for leading and managing successful school practices provides for an 
interesting journey. Army school leadership preparation, education, experience, 
selection, and stability affected by current policy becomes situated actions, which are 
described by Daiute and Lightfoot (2004), positioning how leaders are perceived 
through my lived experience and observed findings. 
A Neglected Domain 
 The Army’s model for developing leaders who can think critically, solve 
problems, and function in complex environments stems from a framework 
encompassing components of education, training, and experience where each is 
embedded individually into three domains defined as institutional, operational, and self-
development. The Army Leader Development Strategy (ALDS) interconnects the 
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components into the domains as such: 1) education in Army schools, units, and self-
development; 2) experience gained from a variety of developmental assignments, 
shared in the school and acquired from self-development; and 3) training through 
rigorous scenarios, whether simulated or real in the field (Department of the Army, 
2013a). The ALDS lists a set of stipulations as guideposts for leaders serving in a given 
domain; “Leaders in the institutional domain create the conditions for quality leader 
development by: 
 Having clear plans to promote achievement of desired learning outcomes. 
 Active monitoring, evaluation, and feedback to guide and refine leader 
development systems and practices. 
 Assessing individual readiness to learn before a classroom experience and 
facilitate “sense-making” afterwards. 
 Providing qualified, inspirational instructors who have been prepared to 
teach/facilitate in an adult learning environment. 
 Crafting current and relevant curriculum that promotes critical and creative 
thinking, interpersonal skill development, and communication skill 
development. 
 Providing access to information and technologies that can provide leaders with 
relevant practice in the classroom and in the field. 
 Providing individuals in resident Professional Military Education (PME) and 
Civilian Education System (CES) an opportunity to reflect and put into context 
what they have learned and experienced. 
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 Providing a robust capacity to create, archive, and deliver digitized learning 
products to individuals at the point of need, creating a continuum of learning 
opportunity that is available in all three domains” (p. 19). 
 The portfolio of Army leadership requirements demanded from the leaders 
supervising CoEs and running branch/proponent schools strongly advocates exploration 
into the relational and consequential roles of the Army leadership’s struggle to 
implement the Army Learning Model 2015 (Department of the Army, 2011a). The 
Army leadership development model suggests that leaders gain “training, education, 
and experience” (ALDS, 2013; p. 8) in each of the three domains described above. Yet, 
there appears to be a lack of acknowledgement or recognition for specific educational 
leadership requirements relating to education, preparation, experience, and selection to 
prepare those selected leaders for duty supervising and running branch/proponent 
schools, which frankly, is long overdue. 
 
Figure 2. ALDS (2013, p. 8) 
 Army senior leadership recognized that there is an implementation struggle 
existing and began working to find out why, as is evident from three recent efforts 
sanctioned to determine the state of implementation across seven Centers of Excellence 
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and fifteen branch/proponent schools. Despite three directed investigations into the 
effort, none thus far have taken a look at leadership’s role of directing and influencing 
change (Fullan, 2011). Storytelling is what human beings do: stories connect people to 
each other and serve a central part in communication (Lieblich, Mashiac, & Zibler, 
1998). The Army utilizes history found in published stories within its school courses to 
inform emerging leaders of successful and failed practice by reading shared 
experiences. Narratives in research can contribute to traditional scientific analysis, yet 
remain distinctly separate from the impersonal approaches found within traditional 
research (Lieblich et al., 1998). 
 U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Commanding General 
Martin Dempsey, spent four years crafting, socializing, and publishing a new learning 
concept designed to ensure that people would remain the Army’s competitive advantage 
(Dempsey, 2011). Army leadership tenure measured by a mark in time meant that 
Dempsey would not remain in the driver’s seat to direct and influence his plan for 
educational change (Liethwood et al., 2006). On April 29, 2011, Dempsey relinquished 
ALM 2015 implementation to new leadership with General Robert Cone assuming 
command of U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC news.org, 2011). 
By the summer of 2011, many of the CoEs and branch/proponent schools also changed 
leadership including the particular CoE and two branch/proponent schools that had been 
included in the study. That new leadership came on board soon after ALM 2015 was 
published in June of 2011. Over the next two years, very little movement occurred 
toward implementation. Four years after they published this new learning model, the 
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Army continues to struggle to fully implement educational change described in the 
Army Learning Concepts 2015 (Department of the Army, 2011a). 
 The new educational model was unveiled to senior-level Army leaders at a 
conference in October 2009 under the auspice of “Our Army’s Campaign of Learning,” 
followed by the formal release in January 2011 as “The Army Learning Concepts 2015” 
(Dempsey, 2009, 2011). The objective audience included all Army schools, but 
especially focused on lieutenants and captains attending Professional Military 
Education (PME) at their branch/proponent schools. As the branch/proponent schools 
located within the Centers of Excellence (CoE) began to apply components of the Army 
Learning Concepts 2015 (Department of the Army, 2011a), the concept itself merged 
under the guise of Army Learning Model 2015 (Department of the Army, 2011a), and 
senior leaders soon realized that the complexity of such a large task required more time 
and resources to implement. Thus, the Army adjusted the goal of full implementation to 
a revised date of 2017. 
 The initial timeline projected full implementation of the Army Learning Model 
as 2015. Yet, in May 2014, the 2015 date appeared to be slipping further away into as 
much as two years into the future. It then became uncertain whether even 2017 could 
produce a desired end state. Thus, in February of 2015, senior leaders across the Army 
gathered for a week-long conference to discuss a multitude of issues surrounding the 
progress of ALM 2015, as well as a recent addition labeled Army University. 
 In an effort to raise executive-level leadership awareness, the Army Learning 
Coordination Council (ALCC) was created as a semi–annual forum, so that executive-
level leadership could monitor the progress of ALM 2015’s implementation across the 
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CoEs. ALM 2015 at some point became referred to among the executive ranks as 
simply the Army Learning Model (ALM) and the name stuck. Fifteen branch 
proponent/schools positioned among seven Centers of Excellence reported varying 
levels of implementation (Hicks, 2015). The ALCC approved three formal studies 
beginning late in 2013 and concluding in early 2015. The Army Research Institute 
(ARI) conducted two studies: The first study focused on technology supporting ALM. 
The second study focused diffusion of innovation (Barnieu, Morath, Bryson, Hyland, 
Tucker, & Burnett, 2015). The third study was conducted by the ALM Task Force 
which reflected a summary of notes collected during individual visits to each CoE. 
Although each study noted some positive reform practices among the branch schools, 
there has been a lack of research focused on the center-level and branch/proponent 
school leadership’s capacity to drive change. Essentially, the outcome of this study 
demonstrates the Army’s leadership struggle to move them from concept-level to 
action-level implementation of ALC 2015. 
 Although numerous studies exist which dissect Army leadership development in 
the operational (warfighting) domain, none to date examine the Army’s leadership 
development role in the institutional domain. How the senior leaders that supervise 
Army Centers of Excellence and run branch/proponent schools relationally and 
consequentially impacts successful school leadership. The Army Leadership 
Development Strategy (ALDS) directs leader responsibilities across three professional 
fields: 1) operational domain relates to units and organizational structures formed to 
conduct Army missions, 2) institutional domain comprises the Army schools, and 3) 
self-development is the individual officer and soldier. The ALDS suggests that learning 
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takes place across all three domains, each supported by three designated components: 
training, education, and experience. 
 The Army Leader Development Strategy states, “Leader development is the 
deliberate, continuous, and progressive process—founded in Army values—that grows 
Soldiers and Army Civilians into competent, committed professional leaders of 
character” (Department of the Army, 2013, p. 3). ALDS further explains, “Leader 
development is achieved through the career-long synthesis of the training, education, 
and experiences acquired through opportunities in the institutional, operational, and 
self-development domains, supported by peer and developmental relationships” (p. 3). 
A descriptive summary of the Army’s leadership development model reveals a program 
designed to support leaders serving in the operational force (combat units). Unlike 
corporate America where senior leaders can be recruited from outside of the 
organization, the Army model is designed to develop and grow emerging leaders from 
within its ranks (Department of the Army, 2015a). 
 Unlike institutions serving public education, the Army does not require 
institutional leaders to demonstrate professional standards such as those developed by 
the American Association of School Administrators (AASA, 2010). Furthermore, 
Kowalski suggests, “all superintendents should have an adequate level of competency in 
all areas allowing them to transition among five roles as necessary” (2013, p. 25). Role 
conceptualizations relevant to those individuals in public education which serve in the 
position of superintendents have evolved over the past hundred and fifty years 
(Kowalski, 2013). Army culture, on the other hand, remains an organization fixed upon 
following orders from higher authorities, as explained in Etzioni’s (1975) analysis of 
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complex organizations, where he associates the military with compliance theory. Often 
staffs, in response to multiple priorities, create multiple methods and tools tracking 
progress along assigned objectives. The Army builds leaders to fight and win America’s 
wars and serves as one of the instruments of power available to the President of the 
United States (Obama, 2010). When faced with difficult change, people tend to fall 
back to what they know (Levin, 2010) and Army institutional leaders know how to 
manage large organizations to win America’s wars, but rarely are equipped to run 
learning institutions. 
Conclusion 
 History paints the Army as very successful in its ability to perform traditional 
Army missions, as is evident from its conception centuries ago on June 14, 1775. 
However there is very little comprehensive research published focusing on successful 
school leadership at the Centers of Excellence or Army branch proponent/school levels. 
Observing the Army’s struggle to implement a new learning model since the model’s 
conception in 2010 provides a foundational platform to explore Army leadership 
development and policy and to relationally and consequentially distinguish successful 
school leadership practice. Therefore, research exploring what successful school 
leadership looks like could provide a roadmap for educating professional practice. It 
would be an excellent way to develop, educate, prepare, and stabilize leaders selected to 
supervise Centers of Excellence and run branch proponent/schools. 
 Uncovering a leader development framework, informed through successful 
school leadership practice, provides a model towards which Army leaders can drive and 
influence change across Army schools. Since running a school is not the norm for Army 
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leaders, a look into what successful public school leadership looks like acts as a 
guidepost, enlightening Army leaders. A human centeredness situated along events as 
critical parts of people’s lives provides valuable data for the research (Webster & 
Mertova, 2007), weaving a path that describes successful school leadership practice. 
Some of these will include: understanding learning concepts, implementing new 
learning concepts, and the capacity to drive and influence change (Kowalski, 2013). 
Further support derives from Slayton and Mathis (2010), who suggest that leader 
development programs should stem from “three core ideas of presence, creating positive 
learning conditions and the skills necessary to teach adults” (p. 26). Army leaders tend 
to focus on gaining tactical and operational expertise, which often overshadows the 
balance between education and training (Coumbe, 2010). Although the Army Learning 
Model 2015 (Department of the Army, 2011a) describes bridging the gap between 
education and training, it does not address school leadership. 
 Understanding the Army’s leader development model and policy more deeply in 
a relational and consequential role associated with successful school leadership practice 
becomes what Clandinin (2013) describes as a research puzzle: “We begin in the midst, 
and end in the midst, of experience” (p. 43). My experience living alongside the 
professional relationships, the associated projects, the gained knowledge from graduate 
school, and daily work inside of the Army institutional complexity continues to shape 
an acute awakening in me of who I am and who I am becoming. It is the rich discovery 
of successful school leadership practice that grounds my journey focused on leadership 
and policy. Understanding why the Army leader development model was constructed 
around the building of teams to achieve operational outcomes guides an exploration of 
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potential gaps in Army educational leadership. Thus, exploring lived experiences 
uncovers common components between both public school and Army leader 
development, such as leader preparation, education, experience, selection, and stability 
of leaders. These components provide commonplaces along temporality (past, present, 
and future), sociality (inward/outward, backward/forward), and place (physical 






 The proposed study utilizes narrative inquiry as a research methodology which 
is non-traditional in that it does not require the standard five-chapter format: 
introduction, literature review, methodology, results, and conclusion (Creswell, 2014). 
Narrative inquiry follows a more skills-based format progressing through the use of 
story, organization of character, design, and situation. Clandinin and Connelly (2000) 
explain the design of narrative inquiry as connecting experience and story as the 
research approach. The dominant influence on their work was influenced by Dewey’s 
belief that “examining the experience is the key to education” (p. xiii). The research 
approach and design used for this study supported an Army school leadership 
experience through narrative inquiry to answer the research question, how does my 
lived experience provide insight into the ways in which Army school leadership might 
better meet the goals associated with implementing educational change? 
 Data is collected from multiple sources to look for patterns, narrative threads, 
and themes embedded within my story as well as across the community setting 
(Clandinin & Connelly, 2000; Leavy, 2009). Generating and analyzing life experiences 
causes the writing to take on different forms, traversing details of the inquiry as well as 
the academic life of the inquirer. Friction naturally occurs as retelling of the stories 
located within field texts, blueprints, and documents seamlessly weaves literature and 
theory throughout the study from beginning to end in an attempt to create smooth 
connections between experience, literature, and theory (Clandinin & Connelly, 2000). 
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 This study explores the awakening of an Army school leader searching to 
discover how successful school leadership drives and influences educational change. 
The lived experience accentuates new knowledge discovered in research of successful 
school leadership requirements alongside Army leadership requirements while 
reinforcing Dewey’s (1981) pragmatic view of knowledge. As the narrative unfolds in 
the following chapters, a story exploring the Army’s quest to transform its approach to 
education provides a wonderful opportunity to learn, and examine the raw data and 
unintentional experiments just waiting to be discovered. Experience gained and shared 
through such a study distinguishes the unique value of a narrative study toward 
informing the profession (Clandinin, 2013). People enjoy a good story, and the Army 
lives on history containing re-lived, retold stories as is evident in the rich tradition from 
its devotion to history, so narrative provides a viable method to offer Army leadership a 
look at itself in relation to educational leadership change at Army Centers of Excellence 
and branch/proponent schools. 
 When designing a narrative inquiry around implementation associated with The 
Army’s Learning Concept 2015, accounts of all of the characters in the narrative, the 
organization, and the researcher share a necessary role in the experience. Chronicle 
guideposts and accounts are described to create appreciation and provide substance to 
activities within the story as it unfolds (Clandinin & Connelly, 2000). Positioning 
myself at the center of the story demonstrates how the other characters are understood. 
Looking both inward and outward, my field texts describe experiential knowledge along 
personal and social aspects explained from theory supporting what Connelly and 
Clandinin express as: “the principal attraction of narrative as method is its capacity to 
 
15 
render life experiences, both personal and social, in relevant and meaningful ways” 
(Connelly & Clandinin, 1990, p. 10). 
 Thus, narrative inquiry begins with lived experience and life accounts 
(Clandinin & Connelly, 2000). In describing the story the researcher must labor through 
natural barriers considering how to present a problem or argument, how to integrate the 
literature review, and how to illustrate the methods, while at the same time weaving an 
exploration of time and lives through experience. Initially, the prologue explores the 
purpose of the Army leader development model in relation to K-12 leadership 
development, framing the Army’s struggle to implement educational change. Next, to 
better situate the reader, chapter one condenses the key concepts behind the desired 
attributes and competencies required by the Army leadership requirements model. The 
art and science behind telling my story includes blending the problem (that my story 
documents from 1985 to 1999 in chapter three) within the narrative while keeping the 
researcher up front. Chapter three exists to document the problem exploring my first ten 
years in uniform, narrating a professional frustration experienced in both Army 
education and Army leadership development. Chapter four begins to describe an 
awakening, which occurred as part of earning a Master’s degree in Adult Education 
coupled with a maturation of leadership through practice. Chapter five finds me in the 
first year of an educational leadership and policy studies graduate program at the 
University of Oklahoma; while at the same time beginning a new job as the deputy 
director of education and instructional programs situated at one of the Army’s seven 
Centers of Excellence. Chapter six provides a defining moment (in my second year, 
2014) where I come to understand the complexity and rigidity associated with Army 
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education budgeting and resourcing policy and procedures. Chapter seven explores my 
third year (2015) creating lines of effort to support the Center of Excellence strategy. 
Finally chapter eight explains reflections and implications from the journey while 
discovering the impact of becoming a resolute leader through a continuous exploration 
of learning and practice, ultimately becoming an expert in the field. The conceptual 
framework evolves as the inquirer uses continuous analytical reflection to question and 
make connections as the tale unfolds. The reflective process, moves the narrative from 
the present to the past tense and back again on numerous occasions. The 
“forward/backward” reflection (Clandinin & Connelly, 2000, p. 49) is complemented 
by a corresponding “inward/outward” reflective process (p. 49). Through this reflective 
process, the reader is permitted entry into the believed journey of the researcher as he 
ponders and analyzes the events described within the narrative. 
Positioning a Narrative Beginning (A Place to Start) 
 I began with pondering the problems that evolved through a process of writing 
scores of drafts. Thoughts connecting past to present while unfolding future possibilities 
caused me some restless nights as the stories of my own uniformed service reappeared 
and I began to see them through a new perspective. Most of the memories were pleasant 
and I embraced them knowing that the Army was always in a state of change. Some, on 
the other hand, were frustrating as I wanted to blame leadership’s role as relational and 
consequential to the struggle implementing educational change. The tales disturbing my 
sleep are not the actual occasions, but memories sifted through years of practice lived 
over the course of three decades. The tales told now resemble well-constructed 
metaphors (Leavy, 2009) for the actual events as I recall them. As representations or 
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depictions, these stories allow me and the reader to bring his or her aptitudes and 
knowledges to the interpretation (Leavy, 2009). 
 While writing my life as it illustrates the topic, other voices emerge from the 
various sources of data I collected, such as collected field notes, blueprints, and 
documents. Together, all create the research puzzle, the larger context within which my 
expedition exists. Perchance, others may make their own connections. Key issues relate 
to leadership education, preparation, training, and selection accentuated by my 
awakening of experiential knowledge reinforced through observed practice. My 
professional career spanning 30 years serves as the narrative setting of this study, 
flashing back to episodes from my past alongside events reconstructed from the data. 
Hence, my experiential knowledge begins to unfold supporting what Maxwell (1992) 
describes as “descriptive validity” (p. 285). The narrative further explores and serves as 
an interpretation of current Army leadership development practice as it relates to 
educational leadership requirements. Written reflections reinforce potential gaps in the 
Army’s leader development strategy. Crafted with single-minded purpose, the Army 
leader development strategy connects training, education, and experience derived from 
the institutional, operational, and self-development domains. These domains inherently 
link with leading Army units not schools. Therefore, a cross examination exploring 
K-12 institutional leadership competencies and attributes provide unique insights on 
education, preparation, certification, training, selection, and stability of successful 
school leadership (Carter et al., 1993). 
 Situated at one of the Army’s Centers of Excellence, my office serves, as what 
Leavy (2009) refers to as a proximate reality, aiding a connection across multiple 
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episodes to support the story while weaving in scholarly literature. The events written 
into my study reflect factual episodes etched from the data, field notes, blueprints, and 
documents. Through the use of narrative elements of plot, character, and setting, I 
weave an illustrative tapestry of an Army leadership experience relational to an 
educational leadership experience. Knowing how to effect change is dependent upon 
knowing precisely what one is faced with and understanding the consequential 
outcomes associated with educational change (McCauley, Moxley, & Van Velsor, 
1998). Although constructing a collection of parts, categorizations, and practices 
claimed during the data collection, “… by themselves, facts do not give us reality” 
(Cowan, 1988, p. 195). Therefore, events will not be documented and described in 
sequential order, the field notes represent syntheses of multiple interactions or truths 
during the study, merging to form categories and themes revealed in the data (Banks & 
Banks, 1998). 
 Informed by Dewey’s idea of experience being temporal, Clandinin and 
Connelly (2000) write, “There is always a history, it is always changing, and it is 
always going somewhere” (p. 2). Walking the trails at lunch, strolling or riding along 
the creeks and pastures of my ranch, or sitting upstairs at my desk away from activities 
of the home; all provide me a special place where I meditate and remove myself from 
the people, places, and things; comparing my observations and recordings against my 
own past experiences and knowledge. In these special places removed from the hectic 
day-to-day turmoil, I search for arrangements and relations between the present and the 
past that might yield fresh understanding surrounding the relational and consequential 
role of Army leadership. Narrative inquiry is designed to develop increased 
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understanding of self while gaining experiential knowledge in addition to the social 
context (Clandinin & Connelly, 2000). The complexity of processes, policy, and 
organizational structures that influence leadership serve to inform the threads that are 
woven into the study. 
 The struggle writing this narrative was deciding which critical events to utilize 
due to the enormous amounts of information available from both theory and my 
collected data. Therefore, I selected data which best informs answering the question: 
how does my lived experience provide insight into the ways in which Army school 
leadership might better meet the goals associated with implementing educational 
change? Reflecting upon this question time and time again, I realize that much is at 
stake. While now acting as the researcher, I have formally served many times as a 
military student where I wrestled to find relevance in what the Army school was 
teaching. When I became an instructor at an Army school as a captain and later as a 
lieutenant colonel, I was exposed to two very different instructional methodologies. 
Now in my current position, serving at an executive level of administration where I am 
responsible for curriculum development across 176 programs of instruction, faculty and 
professional development, program evaluation, and educational strategies, perfectly 
situated me to explore the problem proposed in the study. For it is not in how the Army 
develops leaders, it is to what purpose the Army develops leaders, which provides a 
common place to explore new knowledge. I remained committed, learning with my 
faculty and staff as we work to progress towards operating as a professional learning 
community. Therefore, we moved our staff and faculty along theories derived from 
DuFour et al. (2002, 2004), Marzano (2001), Lambert (2003), O’Hair et al. (2005), as 
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well as others whose research continues to inform our practice. We work hard to study 
and learn to improve our professional practice to deliver education so that our Army 
students benefit. The study includes interpreted stories of those efforts connecting 
leadership’s process and consequential role to learning. 
 Finally, the stories connecting leadership’s ability to drive and influence change 
while improving the student experience at the Center of Excellence and 
branch/proponent schools remains paramount to the research. Exploring how leadership 
drives and influences change through daily processes and practices within the school 
exposes gaps in current practice. Optimistically, my narrative connects processes and 
outcomes demonstrating leadership decisions and decision making relevant to how 
particular events and occasions are interlaced with the facts and interpretations. Thus, 
my attempt to produce a “sense of how things go, have been going, and are likely to go” 
(Clandinin & Connelly, 2000, p. 6) within the focus of the research topic. 
Sources of Data 
 Data for the study included detailed field notes, blueprints, and documents 
obtained from both theory, and observed practice characterizing a thirty-year career 
building on experiential knowledge. Field notes capture and explain commonplaces 
discovered within narrative inquiry, specifically as Connelly and Clandinin (2006) 
explain, “Events under study are in temporal transition” (p. 479). That is, the story 
“points the researcher toward the past, present, and future of people, places, and things, 
and events under study” (p. 479). Field notes become field text revealing data through 
stories, capturing the essence of my lived life, retelling, and revising the narrative as I 
go along (Carr, 1986). In order to narrow the vast amount of data available, critical 
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events composed through stories of experience provide what Webster and Mertova 
(2006) explain as “narrative sketches” (p. 71). Recalling critical events that contribute 
to understanding or influencing change further supports narrative as an “event-driven 
tool” (p. 71) combining a series of sketches into a coherent storyline. Field notes 
recording shared experience “collected through participant observation in a shared 
practical setting is one of the primary tools of narrative inquiry work” (Connelly & 
Clandinin, 1990, p. 5). Hogan (1988) writes, “empowering relationships develop over 
time and it takes time for characters to recognize the value that the relationship holds” 
(p. 12). Fortunately, I have spent the past ten years in senior-level positions, developing 
close, professional relationships with executive-level leaders linked to the topic of the 
study. 
 Blueprints represent a collection of my personal presentations, professional 
forum presentations, and frameworks mapping processes for executive-level leadership. 
I am often asked by executive-level leadership to review new strategies, seek to 
optimize programs and processes, and find innovative ways to resource our programs. 
Most of the products I build to communicate these efforts consist of sketches, charts, 
diagrams, and tables. I rarely write a descriptive paper addressing the problem and 
recommended solutions. The old adage that a picture is worth a thousand words is often 
validated when two to three charts can tell a story and get a decision. Blueprints save 
time up front with a quick, somewhat detailed sketch framing the problem and 
identifying viable solutions to receive guidance or a decision. Ideally, following the 
blueprint, a team of experts collaborate writing a detailed document to implement the 
strategy (Ewy, 2009). 
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 Documents include; published scholarly material, white papers, published 
meeting minutes, published Army education concepts, leader development strategies, 
Army policy publications, professional journals, books, and research studies such as 
those from the RAND Corporation and the Army Research Institute (ARI). These 
documents serve to explore unique relationships between researcher and critical events 
experienced. None of the material is privileged or confidential. 
 The path is open and I am free to walk knowing that I am situated with such an 
assortment of rich data, so that narrative inquiry leads me to the backroads of my mind 
allowing me as the researcher to generate and analyze my stories (Schwandt, 2007). As 
the researcher serving as Associate Dean for Education and Instructional Programs at 
one Center of Excellence (CoE) containing two branch/proponent schools, I am well-
positioned to identify critical events that contribute toward a storyline while reflecting 
on the past (Clandinin & Connelly, 2000). Because I am personally situated in the 
middle of the educational transformation, bias was lessened by my ever-present 
visibility within the community of practice. Detailed field notes translated to field texts 
scribed my experience of Army leadership relationally to educational leadership 
practice along competencies and attributes described in The Army Leader Development 
publication forming a foundational sketch of Army leadership requirements 
(Department of the Army, 2015a). Theory, coupled with my graduate coursework, 
provided a foundational sketch of K-12 educational leadership practice. Critical 
reflection of both the theory and practice served as guideposts while exploring potential 
gaps in the Army’s leader development model. I received personal invitations to present 
best practices to a larger Army audience. By narrating my experiences, I hope to gain 
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advocates and help senior Army leaders understand gaps in leader preparation, 
selection, education, and the fractured purpose associated with school leadership while 
offering a means to allow the readers to develop their own explanation with my storied 
experience as your escort. 
Data Analysis 
 Data from the field notes translate into field texts becoming stories of my 
experience; blueprints navigate the complexity inherent with leadership, policy, and 
process; and documents support evidence of consequences revealing friction between 
rigid systems and requirements. The threaded tales relating theory alongside critical 
events of practice become “important to making meaning” (Clandinin and Connelly, 
2000, p. 78). Narrative inquiry causes the researcher to endlessly engage in critical 
reflection about the accounts collected (Clandinin & Connelly, 2000; Ellis, 2004; 
Leavy; Lincoln, & Guba, 1985, 2009). Experience is both personal and social (Dewey, 
1938) complimenting narrative inquiry, which holds that people can only be understood 
in relation to social context. Documenting and reflecting upon critical events and how 
they fit together helped me construct an analysis framework bound by the following 
conceptual Army educational leadership themes: preparation, selection, education, and a 
fractured purpose. Connecting past and present in my quest for new understanding 
revealed an awakening of my own shortcomings as an Army leader. While reviewing 
critical events, I constantly compared them to my own beliefs (inward) while 
maintaining some conscious thought as to the values of the characters themselves 
alongside current theory (outward). Somewhat resembling what Merriam (1998) 
espoused as constant comparative analysis. 
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 In narrative research, attention is drawn toward trustworthiness and authenticity 
of the data collected through observable means such as study groups, focused 
interviews, and characters, as well as reviewing student/faculty journals, field notes, 
board meetings, and email correspondence, all of which the researcher codes and 
themes. The auditing process associated with the collection of data from multiple types 
of instruments and sources provides data reflecting dependability and conformability 
(Lincoln & Guba, 1985). Narrative inquiry allows the researcher to look at variables in 
a natural setting. Variables in this narrative study include: 1) practitioner direction, and 
influence; 2) studied leadership attributes, characteristics, and values; and 3) field texts. 
The study reveals interactions between variables described along critical events 
providing a rich assortment of data where strengths increase and weaknesses are 
overcome (Yin, 2003). The strength of observations describing what the characters 
actually do as opposed to what they say they do helps negate the weakness of published 
reports interpretive validity. 
Trustworthiness and Commonplaces 
 Narrative inquiry requires the researcher’s story to correlate with other 
characters’ stories and documents described earlier while constructing effective 
(trustworthy) expression for the research (Clandinin & Connelly, 2004; Lincoln & Guba 
1985). Lincoln and Guba (1985) propose meaning or congruency as a test of 
trustworthiness. Meaningful analysis more closely associates “individual truths than 
generalizable and repeatable events” (Webster and Mertova, 2007, p. 89). 
 In narrative-based research, validity is more concerned with the 
research being well-grounded and supportable by the data that has been 
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collected. It does not provide results that produce generalizable truth, 
“prescribing” how things are or ought to be (p. 90). 
 The research should yield results and explanations congruent and trustworthy to 
the degree to which personal values, truisms, theories, logical foundations, and 
methodology connect in the narrative. The phenomenon explored in narrative inquiry 
relates people’s experiences and understanding those experiences while thinking 
narratively (Clandinin, 2013). As the researcher, I wrote through my professional voice, 
my teacher voice, my administrator voice, and my human voice. When I read and edit 
what I write, I incorporate the voice of the reader balancing the inward/outward 
reflection on my part. When I reflect outward, I step back from my individual 
participation and grasp the experiences from a larger perspective. Stepping out allows 
me to distance myself during the reflection process, therefore decreasing the risk of 
becoming too involved, which could cause me to lose objectivity (Lincoln and Guba, 
1985). Conducting research, I travel a narrow path congruent with my association of 
impartiality, maintaining a relation close enough to appreciate the lives discovered 
while remaining objective. Moving with confidence between characters while 
maintaining a reflective stance (inward/outward) permits me to reliably interact with 
leaders and colleagues with whom I have earned a trusted reputation. The regarded 
position of narrative inquiry allows me as the researcher to serve as the primary 
instrument in the study rather than some lifeless device (Eisner, 1991; Frankel & 
Wallen, 1990; Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Merriam, 1988). Fairness and consistency remain 
critical with the researcher seeking credibility constructed upon logic, insight and 
influential utility (Eisner, 1991) and trustworthiness (Lincoln & Guba, 1985) “through a 
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process of verification rather than through traditional validity and reliability measures” 
(Creswell, 2014). 
 Part of what distinguishes narrative from other methodologies lies with 
understanding the narrative interpretation of the viewed phenomenon (Clandinin, 2013). 
Clandinin suggests thinking along three commonplaces: temporality, personal/sociality, 
and place. During the construction of the study, each commonplace requires careful 
navigation in, around, and through the complexity of space. Vaughn (2016) suggests, 
“the space of narrative is pervasive while the temporal, social/personal, and place issues 
move around as the larger space issue changes.” Temporality deals with the concept of 
backward/forward recalling events as they relate to now and the future. Personal/social, 
connects my lived experience with theory in terms of what a transformation the study 
might infer upon the practice, “we tend to our emotions, reactions, moral responses in 
settings familiar to us such as school, family, and culture” (Clandinin, p. 40, 2013). 
Place is what Connelly and Clandinin (2006) define as “the specific, concrete, physical, 
and topological boundaries of place or sequences of places where the inquiry takes 
place” (p. 480). As my story unfolds, in subsequent chapters, piecing together parts of 
the research puzzle, the reader should come to understand what Clandinin (2013) 
describes as “living in the midst, and ending in the midst, of experience.” 
Conclusion 
 The overarching goal of the study is to share experiential knowledge gained 
through exploring the Army leadership’s relational and consequential correlation in the 
struggle to drive and influence educational change and while answering the following 
research question: how does my lived experience provide insight into the ways in which 
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Army school leadership might better meet the goals associated with implementing 
educational change? For it is not in how the Army develops leaders, it is to what 
purpose the Army develops leaders, which provides a common place to explore new 
knowledge that I hope will resonate and transfer to strengthen Army educational 
leadership. 
 The Army Learning Concepts 2015 (ALC, 2011a) serves as a foundational 
document upon which to posit underlying assumptions that translate into educational 
leadership actions. Multiple theoretical lenses are woven into the study surrounding 
leadership development models with a particular focus on the preparation, selection, 
and education of successful district- and school-level leadership, highlighting a 
fractured purpose discovered within Army equivalents (Cerami, 2015). As I begin the 
journey to discover leadership’s effect in the struggle, it is my hope to clarify and 
increase my own understanding of the complexity associated with the problem and 





A Decade of Discovery and Disappointment 
 I still remember the excitement in 1984 as I was commissioned a second 
lieutenant in the Infantry, fulfilling my early pursuit of adventure yet knowing that it 
could springboard into a career or provide entry-level experience in another profession. 
After all, my ROTC faculty described the Army experience as building leaders with 
character that would easily migrate to industry if I decided that a career in the Army 
was not my chosen profession. Thus, I began my Army career as a young man 
navigating through terrain that would prove both difficult and rewarding. Little did I 
know then that those often-felt sensations of inadequacy were contributed to by 
leadership development gaps early in my career. Finally, through reliving the 
experience, telling, retelling and returning to experience (Clandinin, 2013), I began to 
appreciate the larger context of Army leader development. Essentially, I discovered that 
the Army ill-prepared me as an emerging leader with the necessary knowledge to 
navigate the multitude of leadership positions in which I would serve during the first ten 
years of my military career (Cerami, 2015). 
Wrestling with Transformational Change at an Army School 
 Reflecting back on training, education, and experience episodes during my 
career, the best learning experiences, those where I truly internalized the concept most 
often came with much hard work. This is why I particularly like Doyle’s (2011) simple 
yet meaningful description, “The one who does the work does the learning” (p. 7). 
Doyle’s research indicates that connections in the brain are reinforced causing increased 
learning with longer memory retention when you engage the learner in activities such as 
listening, writing, discussing, and reviewing content. Preparing captains to learn 
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adaptive problem-solving requires that institutional instructional practices become 
responsive to individual need, appropriately attuned to leader development within a 
constructive and social learning context. Today, the Army desires its institutions to 
produce adaptive and agile leaders who can perform within an environment of 
uncertainty and complexity (Department of the Army, 2011a). The key to introducing 
critical thinking and problem-solving came with a new learning concept designed by top 
brass for implementation at the school level. 
 In 2009, the Army was going through a base realignment and closure (BRAC) 
process and many Army posts were in the middle of absorbing an additional 
branch/proponent school, which would become one of two branch/proponent schools 
co-located on a single installation. The Army was transforming its schools along a new 
organizational construct of multi-branch/proponent schools called a Center of 
Excellence (CoE). The organizational change across the once single-branch/proponent 
school posts was influenced with a promise of efficiencies through a business model 
structured around an enterprise concept. Coupled with this organizational change, the 
Army was simultaneously transforming its educational approach toward a new model 
described as ALM 2015 (ALC, 2011). 
 As early as 2002, the mid-level schools that taught majors and the senior-level 
schools that focused on lieutenant colonels already practiced adult learning theories 
attributed to Kolb, Dewy and Knowles. It seems that the organizational culture of the 
military institutions at the lieutenant- and captain-level of the Army required a major 
paradigm shift to accomplish this new approach—one from a tradition-focused 
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curriculum based on teaching “what to think” to one teaching leaders “how to think” 
(Army Leader Development Panel, 2003). 
 Although learner-centered teaching is not a new concept among professional 
practitioners (McCombs & Miller, 2009), the concept offers a fresh approach for the 
Army as it begins to adopt and place emphasis on the learner as the centerpiece of 
professional military education. With this approach began a transformation among the 
Army institutions tasked with developing innovative solutions for improving leader 
development along a learner-centric professional military education approach 
(Dempsey, 2009). Tailoring instruction toward the individual learner offers a fresh 
perspective in Army education. In other words, past practice involved Army schools 
generally instructing skills followed by standardized exams resulting in limited long-
term retention of topical material. This antiquated methodology failed to produce 
leaders with aptitudes such as critical thinking, adaptability, and collaboration, therefore 
neglecting development of the very survival skills that these future leaders would need 
to succeed (Wagoner, 2010). 
 The Army Learning Concepts 2015 describes the importance of learner-centered 
teaching in the development of agile, adaptive leaders who can effectively navigate a 
complex operating environment. Although a clearly recognized requirement by the 
Army (Department of the Army, 2011a), three primary obstacles appear to inhibit 
effective implementation of the concept. First, educational leadership selection, 
preparation, and sustainability fails to provide qualified executives to run a school-like 
organization. Second, Army policy establishes such a rigid system filled with prescribed 
formats, processes, databases and timelines that the mere thought of an adaptable, agile 
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resource-enriched curriculum meeting operational requirements is just not feasible. 
Finally, the Army has a hierarchical military type organizational structure led by 
commanders who, although they may be qualified to lead large complex military 
organizations, are not educational experts. Amidst the vast literature surrounding 
successful educational leadership, there is much that the Army leadership development 
model does not yet recognize about effective educational leadership. 
 Broad understanding of how the Army operates its center-level institutions along 
current practice while attempting to transform along new learning strategies is not well 
documented. The vision behind the Army Learning Concept is simply creating change 
within our learning environment while transforming our organizations to develop 
leaders who can prevail in a competitive environment. The change must occur in both 
content and method of instruction. During the Kermit Roosevelt Exchange Lecture the 
following year, Dempsey once again addressed a need for rational and progressive tools 
to deal with complexity to help us understand indicators of change and to comprehend 
the problem before we look to solutions (Dempsey, 2010). This new environment 
required traits among young leaders who could demonstrate adaptive, resilient, and 
networked abilities to progress, move forward, and accomplish strategic outcomes 
established by the U.S. government. Thus, the Army began to develop an educational 
strategy that would transform its approach to education and training from a system 
structured around a course-based, quantity-oriented model to one that is outcomes-
based and learner-centric. 
 Despite Army transformation, the branch schools at the center-level institutions 
continue to struggle with fully implementing tenets described in Army Learning 
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Concepts 2015. Recent statistics indicate that the Army trains and educates over half-a-
million individual learners every year with fluctuations of up to 10 percent, placing 
extreme resourcing challenges on the schools (Department of the Army, 2011a). 
Augmenting this is the complexity surrounding criteria for leadership selected to run the 
schools and an education policy that fails to support the education strategy. Therefore, a 
rigid education policy prevents development of the agile, adaptive curriculum. 
 
Figure 3. Army Education Concept Versus Army Education Policy 
 Tension between Army education policy and Army education strategy exists 
because the education strategy is designed to create and deliver education at the point of 
need for self-development and improved relevancy at the branch proponent/school 
along with guidance described in Army Learning Model 2015 (Department of the 
Army, 2011b). Senior Army leaders want curriculum that can turn on a dime, 
representing the most up-to-date trends from the field, yet the policy and process 
driving the resourcing of branch proponent/school courses is tied to the Army’s 
budgeting process and policies. Therefore, there exists a tension between concept and 
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reality. This is where the hard work resides and where the generals and politicians must 
work to fix the bureaucracy cutting through the red tape and making the policy and 
process associated with resourcing education more agile and adaptive. 
A Place to Begin 
 My field notebook stands ever ready for opportunity, where my present career as 
Associate Director of Education and Instructional programs fits nicely within my 
pursuit of a post-graduate degree. The layers discovered between educational leadership 
and Army leadership provides an abundant domain of professional opportunity 
transforming my professional knowledge along a complex web of change. Friction is 
sure to follow the discovery of change heightened by higher learning while grappling 
with current Army policy and process. Conducting this study, I discovered that 
somewhere between the stars and the bars there lies a problem of understanding and 
implementation. The policy, the programs, and the initiatives become at times so 
overwhelming that the chance of quality learning appears very distant, at best, unless 
senior leaders in the Army institutions embrace the tenets described in the Army 
Learning Concepts 2015 (TRADOC Pam, 525-8-2, 2011). What I mean here is that the 
higher headquarters continue to outpace and out-staff the lower headquarters where the 
institutional schools exist. Army institutions must find the resources and time to 
implement the tenets within ALM 2015 (ALC, 2011) which consist of 1) learner-centric 
instructional methodologies, 2) curriculum and instruction which engage the learner, 3) 
adaptive, agile instructors and curriculum which meet future learning requirements, 4) 
increased rigor and relevance through routine assessment, and 5) leveraging 
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technologies while increasing a realistic learning environment both in the schoolhouse 
and in the field. 
Looking Back 
Basic Officer Leaders Course 
 My journey begins at the University of Oklahoma ROTC in late 1984, where 
several young, aspiring second lieutenants raised their right hands and swore an oath to 
serve and protect the United States of America. I was set to graduate from college and 
begin a seventeen-week-long Infantry Basic Officer Leader Course (IBOLC). The 
curriculum at that time was built around large group lecture and delivered through what 
was called “death by VGT” (Viewgraph Transparency). Today, that would be the 
equivalent of death by PowerPoint®. The classes were large and boring, reminding me 
of a university freshman psychology class. Clearly this was not following any of the 
adult learning methods just beginning to be popular among scholars, such as Knowles, 
et al. (1984), who described adult learners in an andragogy approach. Knowles (1984) 
emphasized that adults are self-directed and expect to take responsibility for learning 
decisions. Adult learning programs must accommodate this fundamental aspect. 
Andragogy makes the following assumptions about the design of learning: 1) adults 
need to know why they need to learn something, 2) adults need to learn experientially, 
3) adults approach learning as problem-solving, and 4) adults learn best when the topic 
is of immediate value. The Army’s basic officer leader course trained me at a very 
rudimentary level of tactics to lead small units as part of a larger Army unit structure 
against a conventional threat. Instruction was built upon large classroom methodology 
focusing lieutenants on what to think, not how to think. 
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 Teaching what to think relates to task-oriented training where a learning solution 
follows a set path along established tasks to be trained, under specific conditions, along 
verifiable standards to achieve a particular skill. Leaders observe training along a rigid, 
checklist of tasks requiring little more than a robotic response following prescribed 
procedures to achieve a desired training outcome. For example, a commander observes 
his unit execute lane training while looking for specific individual critical leader tasks 
and unit collective tasks to accomplish the scenario. This results in a train-to-task 
approach of following repeated actions until the performance reaches the desired 
standard. The prescribed task, condition, and standard results in little to no critical 
thinking and becomes a battle drill, a standard reaction to a given condition. The 
problem with this type of learning solution is that when the conditions change as they 
can in combat, and as they did in 2003 for the Army’s 5th Corps Commander, General 
Wallace, who admitted that he was fighting a fight against an enemy scenario which he 
had not practiced against (Blitzer, 2003). 
 Army leadership doctrine at the time was revamping along a “Be, Know, Do” 
philosophy (Department of the Army, 1983) as part of the Army’s larger effort labeled 
“A Decade of Modernization and Reform” (Romjue, 1993). At the same time, the Army 
was working to change its post-Vietnam image and structure toward meeting two 
predominant strategic challenges. The first challenge was the defense of North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) Europe. The second challenge was that the United States 
was simultaneously providing deployable forces that could defend United States 
interests worldwide. Thus, the Army was evolving toward an “Army of Excellence” 
(Wickham, 1987), demanding transformation of its leadership development to meet 
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demands along a more complex operating environment. Foss (1985) summarized 
changes to his Infantry Basic Officer Leaders Course (IBOLC) as adding one week to 
the course, making it seventeen weeks. Changes also included more field training that 
would now comprise 80 percent of the course. Of particular interest was the addition of 
a tactical leadership course aimed at teaching lieutenants “how to train, how to lead, and 
how to build teams” (p. 2). This was achieved by providing individual lieutenants 
multiple opportunities at various leadership positions while in a field environment. 
IBOLC students were placed in the traditional light infantry organizational structure 
built upon a nine-man squad with three to four squads comprising a platoon, four 
platoons comprising a company, followed by four companies comprising a battalion. 
Generally, an infantry lieutenant’s first assignment was as a platoon leader. IBOLC 
predominately focused training on light infantry, only one of five types of infantry 
organizations to which a lieutenant could be assigned. 
 In 1985, my first unit assignment was to a highly decorated World War II 
(WWII) unit, which proudly kept a lineage of heroes such as Audie Murphy, the highest 
decorated soldier of WWII (Brokaw, 2001). Just a year before my arrival, the unit had 
fielded the Bradley Fighting Vehicle (BFV). This was the Army’s newest high-
technology weapon system platform that would serve as the main mechanized combat 
vehicle over the next 20 plus years. The officer leader course from which I had recently 
graduated did not include any information or training on this vehicle. As a new platoon 
leader, I was not fully prepared to perform my core competencies in this type of unit. 
Although the Army introduced me to training exercises reinforcing what to think, it had 
not taught me how to think, which Wagner (2008) describes as the first survival skill. 
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Moreover, the Army had not trained me to employ, operate, or maintain this particular 
fighting system. The Army usually addresses such a training gap through a functional 
course, which is an additional course to learn a specific system or piece of equipment. 
Because the system was new in 1984, a functional course was not available at the time. 
 Another method the Army utilizes to instruct soldiers how to operate new 
equipment is through a process called new equipment fielding, but I missed this as well. 
By the time I finished all of my courses at my training duty station and arrived at my 
new unit, fielding was complete. The Army to this day still wrestles with when to send 
an officer to train on a new system or piece of equipment at the institution once the field 
receives a new piece of equipment. Part of the issue stems around when the institution 
will receive the new system or new piece of equipment, which usually follows a year 
after the first unit is equipped. The impact to the organization was that it had to spend 
money to send me to southern Germany for two weeks to attend a transition course. My 
lieutenant course did not even introduce me to the system, nor did the curriculum teach 
me how to employ it in combat. In fact, at the time, the Army did not have any written 
doctrine (how to fight) written for this new system. The gap in Army training meant that 
the school was not focused on outcomes-based learning. This caused me to lose 
valuable time with my unit and cost the Army extra money to train me because the 
school did not offer assignment-oriented training. The course instead remained focused 
on light and airborne operations (Kirkpatrick, 1950, 2008). 
First Assignment/The Cold War 
 Upon graduation from the university receiving a bachelor’s of science degree, I 
was also commissioned as a second lieutenant in the Infantry. The Cold War was in full 
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swing with a newly-elected President of the United States, Ronald Reagan, who was 
gearing up to dominate the Soviet Union. In fact, my first assignment as a new 
lieutenant was at the Audie Murphy Battalion in Kitzingen, Germany. This was my first 
trip outside of the United States, and it was somewhat intimidating to be immersed 
within a foreign country where I could not pronounce the names on street signs, 
einbaunstrasse (one-way traffic) let alone understand German. 
 The United States clearly defined the Soviets as a threat so my unit began 
preparing for a mission supporting West Germany in monitoring the border between 
West Germany and East Germany near Coburg, West Germany. Because the Soviets 
controlled East Germany, we, in essence, were fighting the Soviets. My basics officer 
leaders course did not teach me how to patrol borders and work with foreign law 
enforcement or military services. Nor did the foundational leader course I had taken 
explain the culture, politics, or sensitivity of diplomatic relations. 
The Captain Years 
 Returning to the United States from Germany in 1988, I was one of two infantry 
officers selected to attend the Field Artillery Officers Career Course at an Army post. 
This course was delivered mostly in moderate sized groups yet remained highly 
technical, focusing on manual gunnery with a small bit of fire support added for good 
measure. Although this course did not fully prepare me to lead at the next higher level 
of command, as a captain it did provide valuable knowledge that would prove useful as 
a brigade- and division-level staff officer. In a follow-on course at another Army post, I 
experienced one of the Army’s premier technical schools. This 5-week course was a 
maintenance officer’s course which prepared officers to lead and manage the 
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maintenance operations of large Army combat units. The course actually taught us how 
to supervise the repair of vehicles, conduct recovery operations of stuck vehicles, and 
order and track repair parts to fix broken or damaged vehicles and weapon systems. 
This was the first Army course that really prepared me to perform a specific job. 
 In 1992, after spending a mere seven years learning my profession, I was 
specifically selected by Army leadership to join a program called Project Warrior. This 
program selected rising stars to serve at one of the Army’s elite Combat Training 
Centers to be followed by a tour teaching at a Captains Career Course. Initially, I was 
sent to the National Training Center, located at Fort Irwin, California, in the heart of the 
Mojave Desert. With Desert Storm, August 1990 through March 1991, fresh in the 
minds of the country’s civilian and military leaders, the combat training centers (CTCs) 
became the Army’s premier training grounds for large Army combat units. These 
centers provided Army leaders to practice force-on-force tactical maneuver where two 
opposing forces would fight each other under an austere set of rules. The engagements 
were fought with laser devices serving as kill instruments for the force on force while 
actual live-fire maneuver was performed against an array of enemy plywood targets. 
This was the first time in my early, Army career that I found myself exposed to an 
intellectual side of the Army, and it was invigorating to say the least. 
 During this assignment, I became a novice research scientist studying the 
intricacies of battle, leadership, culture, human capital, environment, and a very 
adaptive enemy. During the unit’s rotation (force on force and live fire maneuver over a 
14-day period), I collected data from observations, one-on-one interviews and focus 
groups consisting of unit leaders and soldiers (Guest, Namey, & Mitchell, 2013). As a 
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Lieutenant and Captain, I was a product of the institutions antiquated model which 
taught me what to think, not how to think. As I gained experience serving in numerous 
leadership positions, I did learn how to critically think. I discovered through the 
personal observation of over 250 force–on–force battles over a thirty month period that 
those who succeeded in leading soldiers in battle were those who could adapt and 
critically think through complex problems. 
 My new discovery, that the profession of arms could include intellectual 
stimulation, further reinforced the utility derived from a community of practice shared 
among observer controller teams (Wenger & Snyder, 2002). One afternoon, our senior 
trainer joined one of my teams professional discussions where he started to draw on a 
white - board explaining Bloom’s Taxonomy (Bloom, 1984). This caused us to think 
about the unit’s experience during a rotation as a deliberate learning experience. We 
could actually determine a unit’s training level through data collected prior to the unit’s 
arrival. Based upon leadership’s goals, our teams would focus on lessons learned and on 
coaching to help the rotational player unit attain a higher level of learning through 
cognitive learning goals (Bloom, 1984). It was the first time I associated learning 
outcomes, measures of performance, and measures of effectiveness with individual and 
organizational performance (Joint Publication, 2011). This impact on the organization is 
referred to in Kirkpatrick’s (1994) model of training and evaluation as level four. 
 The experience gained during almost three years in the desert of southern 
California at the Army’s premier battle lab would prove useful when I was reassigned to 
the Infantry School, at Fort Benning, Georgia, to teach the Captains’ Career Course. At 
Fort Benning, I attended the Army’s Basic Instructor Course (ABIC), where I was 
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taught how to mechanically present material through a method of talk, pause, and call. 
This was supported with the use of viewgraph transparencies (VGTs) covering subjects 
studied the previous evening. All of a sudden, it was dawning on me that all of the 
goodness I had learned with the discovery and application of Bloom’s Taxonomy, as 
well as learning to coach officers and soldiers in how to think versus what to think at 
the National Training Center, was being lost in the ABIC instruction at Fort Benning. 
 Fortunately, many of the instructors assigned to my team had also served at a 
combat training center, so we took the collective experiences we learned and began to 
apply the techniques of critical thinking and Blooms to our classes. Simply, we had 
discovered how to infuse learning outcomes with the learning objectives and tied these 
to a learning level described by Blooms (1984). Blooms referred to here, classifies six 
competency levels. The model is most often labeled on a triangle with the first level 
beginning at the base comprising Knowledge, followed next by Comprehension, 
working up levels to Application, to Analysis, to Synthesis, and finally Evaluation. This 
caused us to further refine our instructional methods from VGT-heavy utilization 
migrating to the utilization of white board sketching and facilitation. This evolution 
caused a more in depth topical discussion resulting in increased learning. The students 
began to take more ownership for their own learning following a learner centric 
instructional methodology (Armstrong, 2012). 
 The knowledge acquired through this experience began to replace an emptiness 
felt earlier in my career but, there had to be more out there, and I was determined to find 
it. But what was it? During my second year teaching at Fort Benning, I was selected for 
promotion to major and nominated to attend the Army’s Command and General Staff 
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Officer Course CGSOC). This meant that I was on glide path to serve in higher levels of 
responsibility and leadership. I was now a corporate man adopted by the organizational 
leadership and would be professionally managed differently than sixty percent of my 
peers. Less than 50 percent of a year group of officers were selected to attend CGSOC, 
so resident attendance became a discriminator for promotion to the next higher grade. 
Another discrimination against those who did not attend resident CGSOC occurred in 
their non-selection of lieutenant colonel-level command, which meant no chance of 
promotion to colonel. If I could maintain course, unlimited opportunities awaited in 
terms of assignments and promotions. 
 Despite a successful career up until that point, I was still searching for that 
promise of leadership development in the institution followed by strong mentorship in 
the field. It be some time before I realized that the Army heavily depended upon field 
units and self-development as the primary means of leadership development. 
Leadership instruction was only cursory, at best, with very few academic hours devoted 
to the subject in the lieutenant or captains courses. The 1983 capstone leadership 
manual, FM 22-100 (Department of the Army, 1983) described leadership as the key 
component bringing together, people, organization and doctrine together to make the 
Army function. Three primary focus areas included: 1) learning what a leader must be, 
know, and do; 2) how to coach, mentor and teach subordinates; 3) and how to develop 
cohesive, disciplined and well-trained units for combat. Understanding the focus areas 
meant that the leader must demonstrate sound character and beliefs (corporate man), 
must know the duties associated with the assigned job thoroughly, and provide direction 
and motivation to his subordinates (Department of the Army, 1983). Now, with this bit 
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of background I want you to picture the uniform of an officer during this era. I will 
narratively sketch a picture of an infantry lieutenant arriving at his first assignment. 
 The uniform is the Battle-Dress Uniform or BDU. Sewn on the right collar is the 
rank, second lieutenant. On the left collar is the branch insignia, infantry. On the right 
sleeve of the uniform is sewn a combat patch of the unit served with in combat; on the 
left sleeve is sewn the current serving unit patch. Above that patch is sewn a Ranger tab 
and on the left front above the pocket of the uniform blouse is sewn a U.S. Army name 
tape. Above the U.S. Army tape is airborne wings, combat infantryman’s badge and 
above the right breast pocket is sewn a name tape. Foreign jump wings is above the 
name tape. With this sketch you begin to understand how the Army posits a compliance 
(Etzioni, 1975) authority from the mere uniform worn by its leaders. The uniform, 
alone, symbolizes the Army leader creating a persona that with the badges, awards and 
rank comes an appropriate level of experiential knowledge to lead. At senior levels, 
even the branch insignia can play important roles letting everyone at the table know 
which members represent the combat arms. After all, combat arms, particularly the 
Infantry branch, containing four, four-stars and Armor branch with three, four-stars 
together they represent 80 percent of the four-star population (Army General Officer 
Public Roster by rank, 2012). Three stars, denoted in the same roster, suggests twenty 
Infantry and six Armor branch officers making up more than one third of the fifty listed. 
Needless to say, those that serve careers within the combat arms are likely to lead the 
Army enterprise level. 
 Reflecting on my days as a lieutenant and captain, I now begin to realize what 
Fullan (2011) described as a 10-year period to become an expert. Most of my 
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assignments were less than 18 months, each lasting nowhere near the necessary time to 
develop expertise. This idea of time in practice to build expertise is explored in my later 
chapters as I unfold potential gaps in Army leadership development relating to Army 





A Second Decade Transformed by Practice 
The Major Years 
 After three years teaching tactics and operations to captains as a career course 
instructor, I was selected to attend the Army’s Command and General Staff Officers 
Course (CGSOC), a graduate-level, one-year course at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. It 
was during CGSOC that I was first exposed to adult learning theories, such as Kolb’s 
(1984) Experiential Learning Model. Kolb’s model was, incidentally, the instructional 
method that the Army had begun to employ at the mid-grade institution. CGSOC 
faculty were beginning to apply this adult learning model across the courses, however, 
the faculty which I was exposed to only gave it a cursory mention. Here again was 
another Army school that told us what to think. I was beginning to wonder why the 
Army seemed to struggle in its efforts to transform education. 
 During my attendance at CGSOC, I also applied and was accepted into Kansas 
State University’s (KSU) Adult Education Master’s Program. The KSU program 
revealed true adult education methods, techniques and approaches, which began to open 
my mind and would soon change how I thought about and designed training for my 
soldiers. At the time, I could not have envisioned the incredible influence that the KSU 
program would have forging transformational change in how I approached training and 
education in the Army. In fact, I became increasingly critical of the Army touting 
discovery learning while practicing didacticism. I saw first-hand that change can take 
years to implement, if it does at all (Fullan, 2011). Even so, my Master’s program 
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would serve me well as both a senior leader in the operational force and later as an 
instructor and Director of a graduate-level program at CGSOC. 
 While attending CGSOC I was heavily recruited by two divisions, (Army 2-star-
level organization) one at Fort Carson, Colorado and the other at Fort Riley, Kansas. I 
would eventually decide to go to the latter, where I would serve two years and have my 
first born son. It was a tremendous time in my life both professionally and personally. 
Graduation found my wife and I moving to our next assignment, transitioning to what 
the Army leader development field manual describes as organizational level four, 
“leading functions” (Department of the Army, 2015b, pp. 1-9). Because senior 
leadership at Fort Riley recruited me, I received a pinpoint assignment as a battalion 
operations officer moving past several majors already positioned at the fort. Of course, 
this was not popular with many of the majors and did not resonate well with the gaining 
colonel as he had someone else in mind. This was all transparent to me and I eagerly 
joined the 956-man combat organization (battalion), which was beginning a year-long 
training cycle in preparation for a replicated combat exercise at the National Training 
Center (NTC), Fort Irwin, CA. I was beside myself with excitement as I was freshly 
armed with new knowledge in adult education based upon Knowles’ five assumptions 
of adult learners (1984) and was excited to apply this new knowledge to our training 
strategy. Plus, I would get to prove the value behind quality learning at my beloved 
NTC. The NTC was renowned as the Army’s premier training center and there was no 
better environment available to test my experiential knowledge. Looking back I was 
experiencing what Clandinin (2013) described as “the nexus of a person’s personal 
practical knowledge, and the landscapes, past, and present, on which a person lives and 
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works” (p. 53). My story was evolving, telling who I was and who I was becoming from 
over ten years of experience, training, and education. 
 The year of training and preparation came with long, exhausting hours in 
garrison coupled with weeks of extended training in the field. Our rotation date was set 
for March, so that meant that our field exercises would begin in the heat of summer 
culminating in the Kansas winter. The home station training went extremely well and I 
was put in charge of one of three training lanes where I earned recognition by the 
general as having the top training lane in the division. Of course, I related this to my 
former experience as an observer controller at the NTC, instructor at the career course, 
and mostly to my application of adult education methodologies which I incorporated 
into the design of my training lane (Kolb, 1984; Knowles, 1984). Operationally, I was 
beginning to demonstrate expertise explained by Fullan (2011) where he suggests that it 
takes “ten years of deep development to become an expert in anything” (p. 46). Fullan 
further explains that people learn through practice, having experienced a variety of 
scenarios over time and should continue to seek growth in themselves as well as others 
(Colvin, 2008; Dweck, 2006). I found myself at a turning point in my career where I 
began to apply components of theory acquired from education, expert knowledge 
learned from years of experience, and valuable lessons learned from years of training. I 
finally felt like I was contributing to the professional practice. 
 Although I did not realize it at the time, reflecting back on the collective events 
culminating in a pivotal episode of a successful training rotation, the organization was 
experiencing four facets of trust explained by Forsyth, Adams, and Hoy (2011): 
reliability, competence, honesty, and openness. Reliability grew out of our sense of 
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teamwork, as we depended upon each other to perform individual and collective tasks 
making the unit successful as a whole. Competence was demonstrated in soldiers and 
leaders performing their assigned duties to established standards. Honesty resulted from 
shared values and character telling soldiers where they needed to improve while always 
seeking to improve myself. I never asked a soldier to do something that I had not 
already done. A lot of times that meant going first on the live-fire range letting soldiers 
see leadership perform the task. Or sometimes that meant going through the chow line 
last, so that soldiers could go first. It also meant that soldiers knew that I remained 
consistent holding people accountable against high standards of conduct. Open 
communication and shared decision making improved performance. It represented 
timely, accurate information resulting in better moral and soldiers who understood what 
was expected of them. Sincerity came in the form of a leader walking the unit perimeter 
at night, going out to the lone pair of soldiers on guard duty and simply having a 
conversation or bringing them a warm cup of coffee. All of these facets were what good 
leaders were supposed to do. I was building collective trust (Forsyth et al., 2011) before 
I knew such a concept existed. 
 New Army leader development doctrine was published in 1999 (Department of 
the Army, 1999) changing leader development from a focus at the battalion and lower 
units toward addressing all three organizational levels. Army organizational levels 
include: tactical, operational and strategic. My education, training and experience were 
collectively maturing causing a fundamental change in how I approached my 
professional practice. I was becoming a; Be, Know, Do leader described by Army 
leadership doctrine. Be and know represent attributes such as, Character found within 
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prescribed Army values, discipline and warrior ethos; Resilience derived from fitness, 
and bearing; Intellect gained through demonstrating judgement, and expertise. Do 
demonstrates skills, and competencies defined within leading, developing, and 
achieving individual and organizational goals. Returning to support an earlier statement 
from the Prologue on Army leadership: For, it is not in how the Army develops leaders, 
it is to what purpose the Army develops leaders which exposes gaps in competencies 
and behaviors. The gaps do not address those leaders chosen to head tactical-, 
operational- or strategic-level Army organizations. For Army leadership doctrine makes 
it plainly clear that the purpose of leadership development is to prepare those chosen, to 
lead traditional Army organizations and not tailored for those chosen to supervise 
Centers of Excellence or run branch/proponent schools. Although I was at a point in my 
career where I began to appreciate the value of education and understanding how adults 
learn I was still wrestling with the Army education system. 
 Why weren’t other leaders who attended the same Army schools that I did seem 
to lack an appreciation for how soldiers learn? Looking back now on previous 
assignments leading up to this experience, coupled with graduate school, it was as if the 
Army had groomed me for the very purpose of leading a mechanized infantry battalion 
in a combat-like experience. Was this the proof that I needed to know that the Army 
leadership development model was working? While I was at the top of my game, none 
of my peers came close to my skills and tactical knowledge. My Bradley crew was a top 
gun in the brigade, the battle plans which I constructed earned me notoriety from within 
the tight circles of the post’s senior leadership. So what could explain what was 
happening at this moment in my career, which resulted in so much success? I was 
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demonstrating the facets described in the Army leader development model while at the 
same time exhibiting a growth mindset (Dweck, 2006), embracing challenges, and 
working hard to overcome setbacks. I wanted to make a difference in the lives of my 
soldiers, I wanted to provide them the most challenging training experience possible 
ultimately improving their chances of survival in combat. Leadership influenced by 
education, experience, and training began to show consequential and relational results 
toward improved unit performance. 
 My unit’s performance at the NTC was noted by the observer controllers as well 
as the senior leadership of Fort Riley where I earned numerous accolades and awards. 
In short, our rotational exercise was so impressive that I found myself in a new job 
shortly after returning from the National Training Center experience. My new office 
was positioned just outside of the Commanding General’s office where I served as his 
Secretary to the General Staff. During the next year, my first son was born and I began 
to have a new perspective on life, career, and priorities. The new job would last a year 
and I would be asked if I wanted to serve as a brigade executive officer which was a 
lieutenant colonel position and I was only a major. It was a hard decision as I knew if I 
decided not to take the highly prestigious position I would find myself in transition to 
another career field to remain competitive. 
 One Friday afternoon, shortly after my first son was born, the Commanding 
General asked me to go home and discuss the opportunity with my wife and let him 
know my decision on Monday. I returned to work on Monday and told the general that I 
was honored, but would like to, instead, go to Fort Leavenworth, KS fulfilling my 
desire to teach. Needless to say, he was not happy, but eventually supported me in the 
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transition to Fort Leavenworth, KS. Of course, my branch assignments officer and other 
senior leaders were concerned that it was not a good career decision, but I had made the 
decision and it would not change (Department of the Army, 214b). As fate would have 
it, I reported to Fort Leavenworth and found that my teaching position was traded for an 
executive officer position to the Dean of Academics. Although I was initially upset, the 
assignment became a blessing in disguise, and would provide a necessary experience 
and increased knowledge about education administration and policy that I would use 
some twelve years later (Kruger, Dunning, 1999). The assignment introduced me to 
Army education administration and policy and I found it extremely fascinating. 
 During this time, the school at Fort Leavenworth was in transformation, 
virtually changing its instructional approach following Kolb’s experiential learning 
model (Kolb, 1984). The school was reconstructing the major’s course, and leadership 
were in the planning stages of creating a brand new school structure. Needless to say it 
was a busy two years. During my assignment I was introduced to yet another faculty 
development course which was much different than the one I had attended years earlier 
at Fort Benning. The faculty development course taught at Fort Leavenworth reinforced 
the theory I learned four years earlier in my adult education program and I was excited 
that Fort Leavenworth was migrating to this adult learning model. Finally, an Army 
course was being constructed around grounded adult learning theory (Dewey, 1938; 
Knowles, 1990; Kolb, 1984). The year-long CGSOC that I had attended in the late 
1990s was transforming to an adult educational experience. It would take two years of 
pilot courses followed by several more years of hard work to evolve into a steady state. 
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Due to the long war, even the faculty that had once been predominately military were 
beginning to become predominately civilian. 
 After September 2011, I would depart Fort Leavenworth taking an assignment 
as a human resource director for the United State Army Europe (USAREUR) Finance 
Command. Talk about learning to be creative, agile, and adaptive: the assignment 
would prove rewarding and open doors that I could not have imagined. In the job I 
found myself exposed to higher levels of leadership and culture. Germany had changed 
in the fourteen years since I had last been assigned. My previous assignment fifteen 
years earlier was in the predominant farmland of Bavaria while this assignment found 
me in the big university town of Heidelberg. I began to get interested once again in 
going back to school to work toward a doctoral in education. However, with the 
possibility of deployment coupled with incredibly long hours associated with war 
planning and preparation I decided to wait. 
 The assignment as a human resource director made me get into the Army 
regulations where I studied Army personnel policy from promotions, career tracks, 
selection boards, and more. It was eye opening to say the least and I learned the 
intricacies of what it took to get promoted up to the colonel level. Career tracks, timing, 
capturing the right language in performance reports, and general officer support began 
to contribute to selection at the major level and became essential at the lieutenant 
colonel and colonel levels. Again this assignment would come with a hard decision as I 
was hand-picked to go to work for a general officer, assuring promotion to colonel. But 
at the same time, a friend from the Pentagon called and asked me to compete for one of 
the Army’s new career fields as a strategic plans and policy officer. The decision would 
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upset some commanders in Germany making for a somewhat rough departure, but a 
departure none-the-less. In May of 2005 I was heading for new and rewarding 
challenges. 
The Lieutenant Colonel Years 
 Soon, I found myself moving a family of four from Hockenheim, Germany to 
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania to attend the prestigious, Strategic Arts Program, at the 
Army’s Senior Service College. For the first time in 20 years, I was experiencing an 
Army course, which was modeled along the most current adult learning theories. This 
tough and highly demanding program was offered to less than 150 students a year. The 
process for selection required an application reviewed by an Army-level board 
approved by a senior flag officer. This school reinvigorated my enthusiasm for learning 
and demonstrated that the Army, at least at the senior levels, understood quality 
education (Matheny, 2005). 
 Upon graduation from The Strategic Arts Program at Carlisle, I was assigned to 
be an instructor at the Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 
in the Department of Joint and Multinational Operations. The first year on the faculty, I 
served as a Division Chief of the Special Operations Division and Instructor. This same 
college, which I had attended just six years earlier was now fully embracing adult 
education methods of instruction. Of course, there were still small pockets of resistance 
where a few instructors utilized vast quantities of slides as crutches to facilitate 
learning. In my second year at the college, I was selected to serve as the Director of 
Strategic Studies, which was an Army-level resident program housed at Fort 
Leavenworth, Kansas within the Command and General Staff Officer’s Course 
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(CGSOC), a year-long resident course primarily for selected Army Majors, other branch 
services, foreign military officers, and a few other federal agency officers. The method 
of instruction was built upon small groups comprising at least one of the top mentioned 
attendees. The student groups were taught by a team of five instructors representing 
each of the five college departments. These departments included: Department of Joint 
Multinational Operations (DJIMO), History, Tactics, Logistics, and Leadership. 
Transition to a Department of the Army Civilian 
 As the Command and General Staff College unveiled its premier Land Power 
University in 2007, I, too, transitioned from a uniformed service member to a coat-and-
tie service member as a new Department of the Army Civilian. Fortunately, I kept the 
same responsibilities as director of strategic studies and faculty member. The Command 
and General Staff College opened the doors to a new campus named after the famous 
Captains Lewis and Clark. The Army’s change in direction demonstrated a move 
toward supporting improved education for its mid-grade leaders, which was clearly 
demonstrated through the investment of resources building this new campus. The Lewis 
and Clark Center cost approached $159 Million dollars, which included state-of- the-art 
world class rooms, digital capabilities, and instructional technologies consisting of 410, 
000 square feet of space containing 96 classrooms, 800 faculty and staff, an auditorium 
seating 2,000 and the capacity to hold 1,500 students (Roberts, 2010). Additionally, the 
faculty comprised a permanent, civilian faculty, many of whom had doctorate degrees, 
integrated into a faculty consisting of a number of uniformed military officers 
representing all of the services and numerous foreign countries. The Army recognized 
the utility of creating a civilian faculty base that was selected for its experience and 
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education which brought a new level of maturity and continuity to the college’s 
programs. Finally, after 24 years affiliated with the Army I was beginning to observe 
and actively participate in quality learning. 
 My professional experience while serving as the Director of Strategic Studies 
and faculty member provided me with a strong foundation of what quality Army 
education could look like. The school at Fort Leavenworth actually resembled a 
university-like construct. The campus supported both structure and good organizational 
leaders who understood education. This experience would later prove useful as I was 
offered an opportunity to impact change at one of the Army’s Centers of Excellence 
where initial military training and professional military education are trained and taught. 
Interestingly transparent to me as I departed Fort Leavenworth’s premier learning 
institution whose cutting edge instructional methodologies, technology and professional 
development which I had come to appreciate would prove useful in my new job. The 
Army’s senior leadership was beginning in 2009 to message transformation such as that 
implemented years earlier at CGSOC into its foundational-level schools situated across 
seven Centers of Excellence (CoE) and sixteen branch/proponent schools. 
Army in Transformation 
 During a November 2009 Association of the United States Army’s Chapter 
President’s Dinner in Washington DC Martin Dempsey, described his vision to infuse a 
new educational approach across all 17 Center of Excellence Army schools. The 
concept behind the change addressed a competitive learning environment where leaders 
adapt to change, learn faster than the competition, and fully understand the scope of the 
problem (Dempsey, 2009). The basis of this fresh thinking spawned a study that would, 
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in three short years, produce the creation of the Army Learning Concepts 2015. The 
vision behind the concept is simply creating change within our learning environment 
while transforming our organizations in developing leaders who can prevail in a 
competitive environment. The change must occur in both content and method of 
instruction. 
 During the Kermit Roosevelt Exchange Lecture the following year, Dempsey 
once again addressed a need for rational and progressive tools to deal with complexity, 
to help us understand indicators of change, and to comprehend the problem before we 
look to solutions (Dempsey, 2010). This new environment required traits among young 
leaders who could demonstrate adaptive, resilient, and networked abilities to progress 
strategic outcomes established by the U.S. government. Thus, the Army began to 
develop an educational strategy, which would transform its approach to education and 
training from a system structured around a course–based, quantity oriented model to 
one that is outcomes-based and learner-centric. 
 The new approach to learning offered a model designed to deliver professional 
military education built around five major components: 
 1) Learner-centered approach 
 2) Engaging curriculum and instructional delivery 
 3) Adaptive curriculum which incorporates the newest ideals and techniques 
from applications discovered in the field and in industry 
 4) Relevant topics with increased rigor 
 5) Networked design that offers opportunity to learn beyond the brick and 
mortar of the schoolhouse. 
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Even as the Army mandated change across its training and educational institutions 
leaders at the institutional level continued grappling with two major Army 
transformation initiatives effecting both organizational structure and educational theory. 
 The first of these efforts was the Army Learning Concept 2015 (Dempsey, 2009; 
2011) followed closely by the Army’s transformation toward a University Construct 
(Braverman, 2012). Simply, this new approach consisted of transforming from 
instructional methodologies that were course based and quantity oriented, to one that is 
outcomes-based and learner centric (Dempsey, 2011). In the face of sequestration, 
dwindling budgets, and force reductions it is imperative that institutions demonstrate 
that their product provides value to the Army’s mission. Despite Army transformation, 
the Centers of Excellence continues to practice instructor led, predetermined length 
courses ignoring individual learner need. Recent statistics indicate that the Army trains 
and educates over half of one million individual learners every year with fluctuations of 
up to 10 percent placing extreme resourcing challenges on the schools (TRADOC Pam 
525-8-2, 2011). Augmenting this remained the complexity and myriad of mandatory 
subjects embedded within the programs of instruction (POI) which became overloaded, 
leaving little time for reflection and necessary repetition to master core competencies. 
 Fresh on the heels of a Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC, 2005) effort, the 
Army published a plan to transform education and training at its CoEs and 
branch/proponent schools. Late winter of 2009 I found myself transitioning from 
instructor/director at Fort Leavenworth to lead strategist located at one of the Centers of 
Excellence. The Army CoE and branch proponent schools were in the midst of 
transformational change as Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) efforts were 
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underway causing a number of installation closures and realignments across all military 
services. One of the purposes of BRAC associated with education and training resulted 
in significantly reducing the footprint of Army schools (Defense Report, 2005). Not 
only was the Army in organizational transition consolidating schools while closing 
some installations the CoEs and branch/proponent schools hardly had time to reset and 
would find themselves wrestling with implementing educational change while in the 
midst of moving to another installation or preparing to receive another school within the 
same installation footprint which traditionally served only one school. The 
consolidation of branch/proponent schools would surface equality issues among both 
military and civilian employees. Although the effect of BRAC is not the purpose of the 
study it is relational to employee perceptions, leadership decisions and contributed 
somewhat to concerns of trust between two merging communities and a desire to find a 
single identity resulting from the consolidation (Forsyth et al., 2011). Although the 
BRAC report was presented to the President of the United States in May 2005 with an 





Year One  
 My first year in the position of deputy director for education and instructional 
programs at one of the Army’s seven Centers of Excellence, I faced three extraordinary 
challenges. The first was a scheduled Army Enterprise Accreditation System (AEAS) 
visit just eight months away. Second, involved both branch/proponent schools 
implementing phase one of the new Army Learning Model (ALC, 2011). Finally, I was 
to ensure the development of training and education course resourcing requirements and 
integrate and synchronize along procedures described in Army policy (TRADOC 
Regulation 350-18, 2010; TRADOC Regulation 350-70-9, 2012). The Army links 
several key systems at scheduled intervals during the fiscal year as part of budgeting 
and resourcing branch/proponent school’s programs of instruction (POI). The Army’s 
fiscal year begins in October and runs through the end of September. So the third 
challenge was already four months along with deadlines approaching over the next two 
months. Since a path along this challenge was pretty much set I decided to spend any 
effort here just learning roles, responsibilities and procedures. This challenge will be 
described in more detail in the next chapter as I learned how to affect it during the 
second year. 
 Although creating vision and associated objectives to drive and influence change 
was not new to me, leading instructional change was new territory. I was about to 
discover that implementing change in a school was much different than implementing 
typical Army organizational change. After all, the Army, as a practice, constantly task 
organizes adapting structure based upon mission requirements (Department of the 
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Army, 2012a). Like any new leader, I had to learn the organization get to know the 
people and discover what if any processes were in place to track work and determine 
efficiencies. Therefore, my first 75 days were dedicated to what I will call “onboarding” 
that is understanding the situation before me. Or more famously addressed by coach, 
Vince Lombardi who said, “The will to win is not as nearly important as the will to 
prepare to win” (Bradt, 2012). 
 This chapter explores an educational awakening encouraged by a return to 
higher education where I enrolled in one of the University of Oklahoma’s Education, 
Administration, Curriculum, and Supervision (EACS) courses in Visionary Leadership 
with Mackey. The course would reinforce the thought, before changing anything, I 
needed to understand the organization and listen to the people. By that I mean I had to 
get to know the employees, discover the processes and programs in place, determine 
accountability and explore what was working and what was not working and why 
(Kotter, 1996; Fullan, 2011; Begley, 2003). 
 As I begin crafting the pages of this study, reflecting inward/outward 
(Clandinin, 2013) upon my memories coupled with the multitude of field notes 
collected over the last several years I find it fascinating how the Education 
Administration Curriculum and Supervision (EACS) program design purposefully 
contributed to my awakening of instructional leadership and policy. It is my hope that 
this chapter creates a clear sketch connecting studied theory and application of practice 
(Kowalski, 2013) while exploring gaps in Army leadership preparation for those senior 





 As an active participant, I began my exploration trying to understand why the 
Center of Excellence was struggling to implement components of the Army’s Learning 
Model methodology (2011). Just a few months prior to my arrival in this position, I 
began a post graduate program at a tier one university. Although excited to begin this 
program, I was not sure that I could take on earning a terminal degree, so I entered the 
program under the auspice of the superintendent certification program. I began with a 
single course in the fall of 2012 and by mid spring of 2013 I found myself wanting to 
increase knowledge and understanding in the subject area of educational leadership. 
One of my professors encouraged me to apply for the Educational Administration, 
Curriculum, and Supervision doctoral program believing it was more appropriate for my 
area of need and interest. By mid-June of 2013 I submitted my application, interviewed 
with the faculty, and was accepted. I quickly discovered that the graduate program, 
which I began in the fall of 2012, provided exactly what I needed to build a 
foundational construct supported by research and underlying principles found in 
transformational leaders of change (Fullan, 2011). 
Exploring Commonplaces: First 75 Days 
January, 2013: Getting to Know the People 
 As I began formulating a plan to prepare for the Army Enterprise Accreditation 
System (AEAS) visit, improve implementation of the Army Learning Model (ALC, 
2011), and improve integration and synchronization of course resourcing requirements, 
I went to visit one of my senior mentors. I remember the first item that I shared with 
him was the overwhelming sense of responsibility, coupled with the enormous task of 
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implementing change (Kotter, 1996). Leading 138 employees responsible for 178 
programs of instruction containing over 30,000 resident academic hours serving an 
annual student load of 20,000 officers and soldiers was a tremendous responsibility. 
Although I was delighted to take on the challenge, I could not shake from my mind the 
weight of responsibility placed upon my shoulders. When I shared these thoughts with 
my senior mentor, he grinned and told me that is exactly why we chose me. He added 
that he was delighted that I took the responsibilities associated with the position so 
personally and the gained stature with such humbleness. We closed the discussion with 
some small talk and he wished me well in my new endeavor while reminding me that he 
would stand by my side, advising me to always take care of the people and they, in turn, 
would take care of me. 
 Returning to my office, I began to schedule meetings with my subordinate first 
line supervisors and their leads so that I could begin to learn what their organizational 
structure looked like, and what roles and functions each employee performed. Over the 
next few weeks I would also begin to schedule external stakeholder meetings with 
school leadership, branch/proponent leadership and other agencies on post. I had to get 
to know the stakeholders which my organization served. I wanted to understand their 
expectations, concerns, and how I could improve our service. Essentially, information 
gathered from across the organization and stakeholder engagements would prove 
helpful in determining where to focus my attention. This process would span 
incremental assessments along thirty, sixty and ninety day blocks where I kept detailed 
notes of discussions highlighting common concerns. The collective list of topics written 
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into my green book would later serve as objectives along a three-year action plan (Ewy, 
2009). 
 The Army routinely changes leadership positions in key developmental billets 
every twelve to 24 months. My observations and first-hand experiences with Army 
leadership transitions over the past 30 years demonstrates that newly assigned leaders 
come into the leadership position with a deliberate plan to assess the state of the 
organization. Once the assessment is completed the leader develops an action plan to 
achieve the new or revised vision and supporting goals. To assist leadership transitions 
the Army published the “Army Leadership Transitions Handbook” which describes a 
five phased transition model (Leadership Transition Handbook, 2008). My goal during 
the first thirty days in the new assignment was to determine the health of the 
organization, how good were the relationships between management and employees, 
and how good were the relationships outside of the organization. I wanted to know what 
kind of reputation the organization had with the schools and branch/proponent 
leadership. As part of my transition plan I developed a few questions which I would use 
to spawn conversation during my daily walks through the facility. The questions 
included: what are the organizations priorities? What role do you play in the 
organization? What is the organizational vision? What processes or procedures does the 
organization follow? How many programs of instruction is the organization responsible 
for? How good are the products that are produced? Is the workload balanced? Do 
people follow policy? Do you receive clear guidance? Is the organization effective? 
How often do you visit the classroom? Do you have enough people to do the work? Do 
you have the right talent in your workforce? Of course I would not ask all fourteen 
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questions every time that I spoke with an individual but rather would ask three or four 
questions each day over the course of a week. I would take careful note of responses 
and I began to annotate the frequency of responses against each category. Over time, 
this resulted in a pattern distinguishing the highest frequency of responses creating a list 
of top categories. With 138 employees to get to know, I spent an incredible amount of 
time each day trying to personally get to know every employee and as I did so I began 
to identify my list of twenty to twenty-five key people that would later serve as part of 
my coalition supporting change. Kotter (1996) describes building a “coalition, people 
with a commitment to improved performance” (p. 6) as a successful part of driving 
change. 
 The second week in the new position my boss confided in me that executive-
level leadership was pressuring him to drive and influence change because they 
believed the organization was ineffective (Thies, 2000). He told me that I was hired 
because I had a proven track record of fixing problems in complex organizations while 
creating and driving necessary processes to influence change (Fullan, 2011; Kotter, 
1996). With high expectations from executive-level leaders, I began to formulate a plan 
to determine what was broken. As part of collecting the necessary information, I would 
find myself spending a lot of time among the employees asking Socratic questions, such 
as; what evidence do you have to support your argument?, can you give me an example 
of that?, another way of looking at that is…., does that seem reasonable?, and listening 
to individual responses. 
 A typical day during the first thirty days began with a walk through the 
organization visiting with individual civilian and military employees. I would listen to 
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their stories while learning the names of my 138 employees. By noon, I was back in my 
office sorting through gathered field texts (Clandinin, 2013), eating a sandwich at the 
desk and quickly scanning twenty to thirty new emails for any critical requirements and 
checking appointments. After lunch at my desk, I would go see the director and give 
him a quick update and see if he had anything that needed my immediate attention. 
Next, I would go back to the office and spend a couple of hours reading Army policy, 
spanning sixteen associated regulations that govern Army educational practice and 
budgeting. I also spent time studying the Center of Excellence organizational 
governance and structure. So, my first thirty days were spent getting to know people in 
the organization, exploring internal and external procedures and learning who could 
serve as my champions to drive and influence change (Kotter, 1996: Fullan, 2011). This 
idea to get to know every employee came at a great cost, as I found myself spending 
nights working as late as 10:00 p.m. just to catch up on email and other work related 
requirements. 
 Initially, my long-term goal for improving the organization included the 
following efforts. Year one: pass accreditation, fix lesson plans, and improve relations 
with stakeholders. The second year, mature processes, balance the workload fixing 
accountability, and improve external stakeholder relations. The third year, attain a 
cyclic methodology to review, and revise our curriculum over a 3-year period and 
continue managing priorities while improving organizational efficiencies. Little did I 
know that numerous mandated directives such as staff reductions (Staff and Faculty 
development), mandated restructure of the Center, and Army University would take 
center stage during the third year. 
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 During my first thirty days, I failed to uncover any evidence of established 
operating procedures. It was also at this time that I began to take a hard look at the 
competency level of my lead instruction training and education division chief. He was 
one of those people that could recite policy verbatim by paragraph and line number 
which I must admit, in the beginning, was quite impressive. However, he could never 
demonstrate or provide information on the status of any program of instruction, or any 
other projects for which he had oversight responsibility. In fact, when asked, he could 
not tell me how many programs of instruction (POIs) existed between our two 
branch/proponent schools, let alone the priority of work or status of curriculum. I would 
later find out that he was the primary obstacle against implementing educational 
change. Although I made him insignificant, he would later become a cancer in the 
organization constantly festering trouble. I should have followed Fullan’s (2011) 
formula and fired him, exercising “the moral imperative realized” (p. 30). Dealing in the 
past with soldiers following a more compliant model, this obstacle would have been 
handled with Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), which provides leaders with a 
judiciary tool for disciplinary actions. Department of the Army civilians, on the other 
hand, must be dealt with a different set of rules and a union. Needless to say, it takes a 
concentrated effort, lots of paperwork and enormous amounts of precious time to deal 
with disciplinary actions, especially when the civilian is smart enough to work the 
system doing just enough to get by. With goals to meet and most of the organization 
excited with new direction, I made the individual insignificant by simply moving him to 
another division with much less responsibility and gave him a new boss. With 
accreditation just nine months away, I had to establish formal processes to review our 
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curriculum and finish analyzing why our organization was seeming to fail (Thies, 
2000). Once constructed, the data would reveal the need to address several key issues as 
well as realigning our organizational structure, balancing workload and responsibilities 
while distributing accountability across the workforce. 
February, 2013: Analyzing Findings 
 The next 15-days would be spent analyzing data, developing processes and 
assigning specific work providing a better distribution of work away from those few 
who had been working hard shifting a balance of responsibility and workload across the 
force holding mid-grade leaders accountable. While researching scholarly business 
articles, I found a particularly interesting one which suggested explanations as to what 
causes structures to be ineffective (Thies, 2000). As I studied the interrelated 
components explained in the article, I decided to place my assumptions into Figure 4, 
below, and found the results quite interesting at the time. I knew that the data lacked a 
scholarly approach, but it was in a rudimentary way connecting some variables to 
symptoms. Developing a research study to look at Army schools as effective structures 




Figure 4: When Structures are Ineffective (Mercer Delta Consulting, 2000) 
 A good research study could validate findings while meeting the “standards of 
quality or verification” outlined by Creswell, (1998, pp. 193-215). I would learn in the 
fall of 2014 in a course with Urick, further explained in the summer of 2015 with 
Crowson, that my thoughts of such a method could be supported through a good 
research design. I was in the midst of chaos with multiple explanations suggesting 
solutions to the problems at hand. I had to get the organization moving forward. What I 
had uncovered thus far clearly demonstrated that the organization was far behind 
schedule in workload and the people were not happy. 
 I began to understand Kahneman’s (2011) book “Thinking, Fast and Slow” 
where he asked a question to a recognized brilliant scholar at Hebrew University in 
Jerusalem, “Are people good intuitive statistician”? The brilliant scholar replied “yes.” 
Kahneman describes a debate which ultimately revealed “that a qualified no was a 
better response” (p. 5). He and the scholar further pursued the conversation at lunch 
which evolved into years of study on the “pervasive influence of intuitive impressions 
on our thoughts and behaviors” (p. 4). 
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Mid-February to March 1, 2013: Building the Coalition  
 The next fifteen days I continued to walk the building every morning spending 
time talking and listening to people, but now my purpose was beyond getting to know 
the individual employees. Every time I had casual conversation with people, I would 
share my ideas for change while figuring out who was really on board and who might 
become my key leaders in the center: the leaders that would motivate and help drive a 
new vision (Fullan, 2011). Additionally, I would find those change agents within the 
workforce to champion the evolution of change along Kotter’s 8 - Step Change Model 
(Kotter, 2012). I needed a forcing function to bring together branch/proponent school 
leadership along with the Director of Academics to review the status of curriculum, 
provide guidance and make decisions. 
 Every day while out amongst the workforce I carried my trusty little green book 
along carefully noting concerns that I heard. Soon my notes would reveal two important 
items. First, they would reveal my coalition of 21 employees those who shared my 
enthusiasm for excellence. This core group of employees, my coalition, I would soon 
find myself spending more time listening to what they thought the organization needed 
to improve. Their thoughts and discussion created the necessary energy and products to 
get the organization moving. Eventually I would use these same 21 employees to 
socialize my vision and drive change in the organization (Fullan, 2011; Kotter, 1996). 
Second, my field notes brought to light and narrowed my list of fourteen questions to 
ten reoccurring topics I labeled as categories. I knew that I could not adequately address 




 I decided to ask a close colleague of mine for some ideas to help me focus on 
the most important topics but, how could I determine what was the most important. He 
immediately grinned leading me to Pareto’s 80/20 rule (Juran, 1975). He explained that 
what I had to determine was the significant few over the trivial many. Basically 
identifying 80 percent of the trouble comes from 20 percent of the problems. Since I 
had kept detailed field notes, I decided to give it a try and to my amazement a short list 
of topics which I renamed categories emerged. I quickly realized that focusing on the 
top two categories actually supported generating solutions to achieve all three 
challenges identified earlier during the first two months: accreditation, implementation 
of phase one of ALM, and updating POI for submission into the Army budgeting and 
resourcing forums. As I began exploring the organization seeking way-points and 
indicators suggesting problems, I relied upon new knowledge gained from EACS 
courses, past experience, and scholarly research to inform proposed solutions. 
Searching the pages within my field notes collected, I was able to determine eleven 
recurring themes. Following procedures from Pareto and looking again into my notes 
taken from discussion and recollection I was able to score the categories to come up 
with the significant few. This would allow me to graphically show the impact of the top 
concerns. Once populated with data, the Pareto chart postulates that focusing on 20 
percent of the complaints results in fixing 80 percent of the problems. It is the 
significant few that need to be addressed. 
 Pareto is typically used in problem solving to help identify choices that can be 
made and can help prioritize efforts. When faced with a problem that can be categorical 
broken into pieces the Pareto model can be useful to determine the frequency of 
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occurrence among the categories. The process helps identify the significant few to focus 
resources against.  
Method/Results 
 Once I decided to utilize the Pareto model, I listed the ten topics labeled 
categories into the Pareto chart. Next I placed the frequency of each category recorded 
during numerous conversations associated with each of the twenty-one individual’s 
responses. This resulted in recording ten categories in rank order into a column beside 
each individual scored. Once all of the individual responses were recorded, I sorted the 
data in descending order. Next, I calculated the cumulative count, followed by the 
cumulative percent. Once the data was ready to build a chart I followed procedures 
building and labeling both the vertical and horizontal axis. Measuring the frequency of 
each category I plotted the bars, added a title, and analyzed the data. The Pareto chart 
(below) clearly demonstrates the top two categories, 1) lack of process, and 2) lack of 
prioritization. The discovery of the significant few (two) led to several whiteboard 
sessions refining my key contacts from twenty-one people to a focused group of five 




Figure 5: Trended Topics Demonstrating Significant Few (Juran, 1975) 
 Leveraging information derived from the Pareto model I was finally able to put 
some science behind what my intuition was telling me needed to be fixed. I was 
beginning to build an appreciation for theory while applying it toward practice. Both 
theory and practice were coinciding along two very important topics. Now I had the 
evidence necessary to show executive leadership what needed to get fixed. Next, I 
would focus on marketing a plan to get the school brigade commanders and 
branch/proponent commandants on board (Fullan, 2011) before delivering an action 
plan to the Center of Excellence (CoE) commanding general for approval (Ewy, 2009). 
March 4, 2013: The Final Stretch 
 With my sights set on process and prioritization I still needed to understand the 
workload capacity of my organization, and how much work could we get accomplished 
over the next eight months. I did not want to write checks I could not cash, so I took the 
Army’s estimated time values (ETVs) which is fair market value for labor performed 
(TRADOC Pam 350-70-9, 2012). The calculation for curriculum development results in 
man hours against three possible categories: 1) review is seven hours of work estimated 
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per academic hour, 2) revise is ten hours of work estimated per academic hour, and 3) 
developing new curriculum equates to eighteen hours of work estimated per academic 
hour. Once I built charts sketching the workload capacity to meet new or updated 
requirements for each targeted POI the workload calculations provided me a means to 
explain to executive-level leadership the man years it would take to get the workload 
accomplished. I would find out later that the branch/proponent generals previously did 
not understand the workload capacity and their effect to it when they directed change in 
the POI. 
 Since I was already short a year heading into the accreditation visit in October, I 
set a goal for one year to get all of the resident officer programs of instruction revised to 
meet the Army learning model requirements. When I presented this to my boss he asked 
me something to the effect of, “how does this all relate to getting after process and 
prioritization.” I told him, “That is a great question. Mapping progress of the process 
will be presented during monthly school board meetings to demonstrate the work 
aligned to priorities set by the branch/proponent generals and approved by the CoE 
general.” My boss again said, “That is great, but the schools do not have published 
priorities.” I further explained, “That is why we are going to take an educated guess at 
each branch/proponent general’s priorities, align them to our organizational priorities 
and show them all how we are going to achieve the workload in just fifty-two weeks.” 
 The next thing that I had to do was create a formal board process along 
approved priorities and get all of the generals to agree on the plan. Why didn’t a board 
already exist? Reflecting on the work three years ago I now find it odd that no such 
system existed within the CoE. After all, the Army is famous for accountability and 
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reporting. A person only has to review the Army publishing directorate to see evidence 
of 533 Army regulations archived (Army Publishing Directorate, 2016). Mature 
organizations generally follow established procedures along true and tried processes 
matured by time. At least this was what I was familiar with and had experienced 
throughout my 24 years on active duty and nine years as a Department of the Army 
civilian. I could hardly believe the disarray in which I found the current state of affairs. 
 Part of the leadership’s distraction from educational leadership was caused by 
the incredible amount of work generated by outside agencies such as the higher 
headquarters. The higher the headquarters the higher the number of people assigned to 
the organization. More people assigned meant more work generated. The higher 
headquarters was simply creating work quicker than the lower headquarters to get it 
done. It seemed that every new leader wanted the organization to take a new direction 
almost as though they wanted to see how much work they could get other people to do, 
as if they were creating work for the sake of work (Hewitt, 2002). Focusing on the large 
amount of work influenced previous leadership to ignore the fundamental processes 
fundamental to running and maintaining the branch/proponent schools. 
 What I discovered in my audit of the organization was the absence of 
management tools holding people accountable for work. People were simply doing what 
they thought was important, not necessarily what was important to the organization. 
There was no vision, no leadership driving a collaborative effort (Fullan, 2013). It was 
suddenly clear why the organization was not progressing the vision of the new Army 
learning model. Thus, my work began creating a plan to transform the organization 
toward implementing the new learning model (ALC, 2011). 
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March 15, 2013: Leveraging Education and Opportunity 
 The program at the University of Oklahoma began to change how I understood 
and approached problems. My ability to solve complex problems began to mature as I 
applied what I learned. As I began to frame an action plan for the two branch/proponent 
schools I leveraged knowledge gained from my studies, seminar engagements and 
novice research. The plan included the creation of teams consisting of subject matter 
experts, curriculum developers, instructors and assessment experts to revise the officer 
courses over a 52-week period. I presented the overall plan among all the stakeholders 
garnering support from each school commandant (superintendent), aligning my 
priorities to theirs, and culminating in March 2013 with a decision brief to the 
commanding general. 
 At 1500 hours (3:00 pm) on the 15th of March 2013 I entered the private office 
of the commanding general where I sat next to him, surrounded by other executive-level 
leaders who anxiously awaited my presentation. The mood was light, and the general 
was finishing a can of Vienna sausages with only juice remaining in the can. He looked 
at me with a grin, paused and offered me a sample to which I replied, “thanks, sir, I just 
finished my own can prior to coming over.” The ice was broken, and he asked what I 
had to show him. I carefully laid out a meticulously crafted, ambitious plan to get at the 
revision of his officer PME over the next 52 weeks while infusing the content with this 
ALM (ALC, 2011) methodology. In just a little over an hour, he approved the plan that 
had taken me almost five weeks to construct. “Now, it was approved by the 
commanding general, so who was going to stand in the way?” I thought. 
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May 2013: First Board 
 In May of 2013, we conducted our first monthly school board to determine the 
progress of the programs of instruction in accordance with the plan presented in March 
to the Center of Excellence commander. In attendance was the colonel in charge of the 
branch school and the colonel in charge of the directorate responsible for curriculum 
development. The rest of the board members included course managers, lead curriculum 
developers, chief of assessments and a few instructors. For the first time school 
leadership was presented with a status of the courses. The meeting began with a review 
and confirmation of the branch/proponent generals published priorities. Next the 
programs of instruction (POI) following the published priority laid out in detail lesson 
by lesson how the teams were revising the curriculum. For example, the captains career 
course POI contained 146 lessons spanning twenty-four weeks of instruction at over 
900 academic hours. In order to manage the large amounts of information, a tracking 
system was devised, demonstrating progress along each lesson. Additionally the name 
of each instructor and curriculum developer who was responsible for the lesson plan 
was placed on the charts, providing ownership and placing accountability to each 
product. The monthly forum provided senior leadership visibility and the status of 
lessons and offered leadership the ability to contribute guidance and make decisions in a 
formal setting. 
 In the following months, I experienced only minor impediments from a small 
cluster of employees who were content doing nothing under the old regime. Now they 
found themselves uncomfortably facing a process of accountability with regular forums 
requiring a demonstration of progress. As part of the new leadership team I began to 
 
77 
focus on performance indicators while reducing challenges associated with 
transformational leadership (Fullan, 2013). By mid-summer, as I continued to dialogue 
with external agencies, I began to hear a different message sounding. It was not the old 
message that contained a lack of trust asking, what are you guys doing for me? It was a 
message that brought confirmation that we were moving in the right direction. I began 
to hear compliments and observe positive reinforcement from subordinate leadership 
toward their employees. Fullan (2011) describes this activity as “Helping people 
accomplish something that they never accomplished before causes motivation to 
increase deeply” (p. 52). I was actually watching intrinsic motivation (Etzioni, 1975) at 
work. Through application of practice the experience resulted in what Jacobs (2010) 
describes as, “creating an environment that selects for the behavior we desire” (p. 90). 
Put another way, the lesson plan surge increased frequent interaction against desired 
results, evolving a sort of group identity. But there was no time to rest and enjoy the 
moment. The Army accreditation visit was less than four months away. 
October 2013: Army Accreditation 
 Every three years the Army requires branch/proponent schools to receive an 
accreditation visit from a composite team of evaluators (TRADOC Regulation 11-21, 
2014). The team spends a week on the ground at each branch school, inspecting 28 
categories designed to assess the quality of the institution’s ability to meet the needs of 
the operational force (Army Regulation 350-1, 2014). At the end of the site visit the 
team provides a preliminary report of findings highlighting any significant issues to the 
CoE senior leadership. The accreditation team has up to sixty days to analyze collected 
data, write formal reports and assign one of four levels of accreditation to each branch 
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school: 1) level one, candidate for accreditation, 2) level two, conditional accreditation, 
3) level three, full accreditation, 4) level four, learning institution of excellence. If a 
school receives less than a level-three rating, the school is placed on probation and gets 
to receive another visit within twelve months. 
 The accreditation site visit occurred toward the end of October, and the lesson 
plan surge naturally supported the school’s preparation. One of the by-products of the 
lesson plan surge was a stabilization of priorities from the branch/proponent generals, 
supported by the CoE commander, which allowed the branch schools to remain focused. 
Stabilized priorities encouraged the curriculum teams to progress, updating lessons 
against the Army Learning Model (ALC, 2011) while at the same time meeting AEAS 
standards. The two efforts seamlessly intertwined, resulting in both schools receiving a 
level-four rating. The Pareto analysis proved effective, resulting in unintentional 
outcomes from the lesson plan surge placing the schools in a situational advantage for 
the scheduled accreditation evaluation. The efforts of my team were mentioned in 
senior leader sessions by the accreditation evaluators, and the reputation of the 
organization was quickly turning upward. I could not have experienced a more 
triumphant moment. The hard work during my first sixty days was paying off quicker 
than I could have imagined. Without time to soak in the glory, the Army began to ramp 
up efforts on implementation of the Army Learning Model (ALC 2015). 
November 2013: Optimizing Organizational Performance 
 Over the summer I began to realize that the organizational structure was not 
optimally designed to adequately support requirements. Subordinate divisions and 
branches within the organizational structure were out of balance, and talent was either 
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misplaced, untapped, or overstretched. Despite proof in our success I had some 
subordinate leaders that were still not on board with the new direction, and I knew that I 
had to move them out quickly. Fortunately we had a new colonel in charge who shared 
my vision for driving excellence and creating accountability. He knew that he had two 
years on the ground to keep the momentum of positive change while progressing the 
organization toward greater achievement (Fullan, 2011; Kotter, 1996). Coming out of a 
successful accreditation evaluation, the director and I enjoyed a period of time where 
we had earned a strong reputation for driving and influencing positive change. This 
reputation afforded us an ability to continue improving the practice as we saw fit. 
 Before the dust even settled on the accreditation evaluation I had begun sharing 
ideas to optimize the organizational structure with the new director. Simultaneously, he 
was crafting a strategy map (Ewy, 2009), designing his vision and mission for the 
organization. He knew that although positive change was occurring, the organization 
was vulnerable to what Fullan (2011) describes as an “implementation dip” (p. 61). The 
colonel also was tracking our one “derailer” (p. 64) and was very supportive when I 
moved that individual from one of the top positions in the organization, which had the 
largest population of employees, to the least important position with the smallest group 
of employees in the organization. Reflecting back on that action I should have realized 
the individual’s true toxicity and helped him find other employment away from people, 
as he would later fester as a cancer in the organization. 
 I wasted little time after the accreditation visit at the end of October to reset my 
organizational structure. Although we had been constructing some of the ground work 
toward optimizing our structure prior to accreditation, I knew that any significant 
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structural change before the accreditation evaluation would be risky. I was not willing 
to gamble on making adjustments to structure, so I decided to be patient (Kotter, 1996). 
Gathering my front line subordinate supervisors in November, I wanted to address our 
ineffective structure with a goal of resetting before the holidays. Timing was important 
so that we would not lose the momentum gained from the lesson plan surge and the 
accreditation evaluation. Most of our civilian employee’s ratings ended in October, so 
adjusting structure now would actually facilitate changes in supervisory positions. 
Surprisingly, my subordinate leaders all agreed that the organization was not optimally 
structured and that the time to make the adjustments was now (Bolman & Deal, 2013). 
 Recalling my Pareto results, prioritization was the number one category 
followed by processes, so optimizing structure became the next effort. The lesson plan 
surge crystalized the fact that the organizational structure supporting curriculum 
development was ineffective. The employees were lumped under a single organizational 
leader who was not capable or qualified to lead such a diverse and complex 
organization. The organizational structure responsible for education and instructional 
programs was constructed around three primary divisions: 1) requirements division, 2) 
individual training division, and 3) strategies and integration division. The requirements 
division contained three branches; unit training; analysis; and new systems. The 
individual training division contained five branches; officer education; education 
technology; training requirements analysis; and two branch enlisted subdivisions. 
Strategies and integration division contained two branch lessons learned sections; and a 
strategies branch. The foundational approach was fragmented at best, causing friction 
among the division chiefs as everyone owned a portion of the process. There were no 
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clean breaks, and it was difficult placing accountability on any one part. Bolman and 
Deal (2013) suggested that “Structure needs to be designed with an eye toward desired 
ends, the nature of the environment, the talents of the workforce and the available 
resources” (p. 56). With this in mind we set our efforts toward crafting a new structure 
that would improve priorities and processes in the mix. 
 The preponderance of the workload was associated with the individual training 
division that was responsible for training requirements analysis system (TRAS), where 
they built and maintained the curriculum for 178 programs of instruction along a three 
year cyclic program. The division had one lead over three subordinate branch chiefs, 
each responsible for an entire branch/proponent POI. This is where my derailer was 
previously postured as the division chief. One branch chief was responsible for ten 
officer education POI; one branch chief was responsible for four enlisted 
branch/proponent POI; one branch chief was responsible for the other four 
branch/proponent POI. The education technology branch provided on-site video, 
individual multi-media instruction and Blackboard service. Not only was the workload 
off balance, but the grade plate did not support the level of responsibility assigned to the 
division chief nor the subordinate branch chiefs. Immediately we recognized an 
imbalance between workload, manpower, and grade. 
 The requirements division worked on training products nested within the joint 
capabilities integration development system (JCIDS) where the workload was much 
more predictable and steady. The analysis branch contained instructional systems 
designers who provided examination of individual and collective tasks and associated 
products to help the curriculum developers build programs of instruction. The unit 
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training branch provided branch/proponents collective training products. The new 
systems branch was tied to the training component of Army material development. The 
strategies and integration division was a kind of catch-all organization and provided the 
directorate a link into the Center of Excellence level governance. 
 The organization contained all of the necessary ingredients to meet Army 
requirements with adequate manpower and grade available. The problem was that key 
ingredients were separated by a stove-piped structure (Bolmann & Deal, 2013). Thus, I 
began to work designing the organization around our core functions: training 
requirements analysis system (TRAS), program evaluation, joint capabilities integration 
and development system (TRADOC Regulation, 71-20, 2013), Leader development and 
governance. After a month of deliberation with the division chiefs everyone agreed that 
what we needed was a concept built around the idea that each AOC (area of 
concentration for officers) and each military occupational skill (MOS) would comprise 
a team led by a GS-12 (military major equivalent) LPM (lead program manager). The 
rest of the team would comprise military subject matter experts, a civilian instructional 
systems design specialist, and a couple of civilian instructor writers. In order to build 
the teams we had to dismantle the requirements division as well as the strategies and 
integration division that would later become my officer education division. Now, the 
structure built upon expert teams was further refined into three divisions, each led by a 
GS-13 civilian (lieutenant colonel-equivalent), and we placed an active duty lieutenant 
colonel with each division to act as a liaison officer to the branch/proponent general. 
Now we had three balanced teams responsible for curriculum development across the 
two branch proponent schools. Remember that the previous organizational structure was 
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one GS-13 and three GS-12s responsible, where the new organizational contrast 
distributed workload and responsibility across three GS-13s, three lieutenant colonels 
and a team of GS-12s. The new Lead Project Management (LPM) individuals were each 
given responsibility for training development products for a military occupational skill 
(MOS). The training products include supporting new equipment development, 
software upgrades, force structure changes, doctrine changes, and revision to classroom 
instructional materials. The LPM teams develop training products from conception of a 
material solution as part of force modernization, and continue until the products are 
delivered and taught in the institution, the operational force or through self-development 
(ALDS, 2013). 
Conclusion 
 The new director and I spent the rest of the November and December continuing 
to improve and mature the monthly POI boards with the school commanders while 
establishing organizational priorities nesting with the commanding general’s priorities. 
Additionally, the director and I began to spend more time and energy participating in 
external governance forums covering topics along education and instructional programs 
convened by our three-star and four-star headquarters. As I reorganized the structure 
internal operations began stabilizing. I could now afford to turn my energy and attention 
toward external requirements. The timing would prove vital as the Army was 
introducing its own restructuring efforts in the creation of Army University and the 
realignment of the two-star-level Centers of Excellence directly under the three-star 





Year Two  
Evolutionary or Revolutionary: Transforming Competent Educational Leaders  
 Riding on a high from the momentum gained during my first year, I came off a 
two week holiday break the first week of January full of myself. I had big plans to get 
the new organizational structure set, mature the institutional processes, and continue 
improving the quality of lesson plans within the scope of ALM (ALC, 2011). What I 
would soon realize was that I lacked the necessary knowledge and experience to 
effectively navigate the Army education budgeting and resourcing policy and process 
beyond a beginner level (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1980). While I exploited success the 
previous year through brute force and ignorance, I did manage to gain vital experience 
in the practice. 
 Although I created new knowledge, the coming year would once again 
demonstrate there was much to learn in the profession of Army educational leadership. I 
found that I was living the perfect experiment: allowed to study educational leadership 
and policy while practicing the profession. I began to compare and contrast studied 
theories against what I was observing while following what Fullan (2011) describes as, 
“treating your own practice as your crucible for learning” (p. 150). As I increased in 
understanding, I began to critically approach problems until suddenly I progressed from 
blaming the Army leadership development model to seeing it for what it was designed 
to achieve. I knew that I had to create new knowledge if I was going to advance toward 
any level of expertise in educational leadership. Consequentially, un-forecasted 
requirements both internal and external to the Center of Excellence (CoE) became a 
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forcing function driving me deeper into learning necessary components of the practice. 
Three critical events during the second year drove astonishing change across the Center 
of Excellence and propelled my maturation as a budding educational leader (Dreyfus & 
Dreyfus, 1980). These included: the Army’s management system documenting training 
and education resourcing requirements, a complete change of CoE and 
branch/proponent-level leadership, and the creation of a CoE-level strategic plan. 
 Understanding the need to maintain a sense of stability across the workforce, I 
remained on course transforming the organizational structure to better meet workload 
requirements. I was unaware that the Army was in a struggle against other branches of 
service, which were all attempting to garner precious national-level resources as part of 
a larger budgeting and resourcing cycle called the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, 
and Execution System (PPBES) described in Army Regulation 1-1 (1994). In regards to 
budgeting and resourcing training and education the Army recognized that it could 
creatively build an argument tying people to budgeting and resourcing requirements. 
One of the projects to accomplish this included capturing the workload capacity and 
utilization from the training development capacity (TDC) data base. The thought behind 
the project suggested that the data base would capture actual workload (inputs) executed 
along cyclic requirements (outputs) demonstrating the number of people required to 
accomplish projected workload. 
 I soon realized that the second year promised to be as tumultuous as the first 
year. Ultimately, I realized that success for educational leadership relies upon building 
expert skills and knowledge which results in acquiring necessary budgeting and 
resourcing for the branch/proponent schools programs of instruction. Those 
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branch/proponent leaders who understand this vital role and leverage their educational 
experts tend to outpace their counterparts. Later in this chapter, I provide an example of 
one CoEs success on a particular program of instruction. 
January 9, 2014: Introduction to the Army Training and Education Enterprise 
 Sequestration in 2013 as a result of the Budget Control Act of 2011 created an 
environment conducive to substantial reductions across all services. While other 
services cut high-cost weapons or platform programs the Army being people centric 
focused on its human capital comprising; civilians, soldiers and officers who often bear 
the brunt of cost reductions. That said, risk in reductions usually focus toward the 
generating force structure where branch/proponent schools reside. Meaning that 
structure supporting Army schools (generating force) tends to lose people while the 
combat and combat support structures (operating force) remain at higher levels of 
manning. One way that the generating force was posturing to defend its people numbers 
was through a resourcing model which proved requirements through workload capacity. 
It was a mathematical formula calculating estimated time values assigned to specific 
categories of effort to a product. 
 Understanding the larger picture of budgeting and resourcing where the Army 
has to compete against other services for precious resources helps the reader gain an 
appreciation as to why the Army would want to demonstrate cost in terms of workload 
capacity. Thus, the Army began work in 2013 to gain resource recognition for our 
curriculum development capacity while maturing course resourcing models into the 
training development capacity (TDC) data base. On January 9, 2014 the team that built 
the program descended upon the Center of Excellence and introduced us to this new 
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management tool. The team spent a week on the ground engaging leaders demonstrating 
how the program served as a management tool and provided users hands-on training. 
The diagram below, designed by CAC-T (2013) modified by Smith (2014) presents a 
sketch explaining the complexity of process and policy faced by those “experts” 
selected to serve in positions advising branch/proponent level educational leaders. 
 
Figure 6: Curriculum Development Model (CAC-T, 2013; Smith, 2014) 
 The barrel in the upper left of the diagram represents an automation tool 
supporting the development and storage of specific products (outputs) listed in the box 
on the upper right. The outputs make up essential training and education materials 
necessary for the enterprise to function. The products capture the essential units 
measuring workload production of training and education development. The process is 
designed to capture a predictable workload based on the programs existing within the 
branch/proponent schools associated with a standardized maintenance frequency 
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outlined in Army policy documents (TP 350-70-9, 2012). Established maintenance 
cycle actions are classified as: review, revise, and new each of these categories are 
assigned an estimated time value that it would take to accomplish the work against one 
academic hour. Highlighted in the tan background, center left titled, Drivers, depicts 
those things which can influence modification to programs of instructions. For example, 
a new commandant placed in charge of a branch/proponent school may desire to change 
or add substance to a particular program of instruction. Other examples include doctrine 
changes, force structure changes, and new equipment or software development and 
fielding. These drivers result in either un-forecasted requirements or out-of-cycle 
requirements that can cause extra work that was not programmed against a predicted 
workload resulting in the creation of new products at the risk of creating a backlog. 
 Adding the new work to the programmed work produces the total requirements 
that may indicate a workload capacity shortfall. The tool provides a holistic 
understanding of the products available/required guiding appropriate prioritization 
criteria from the branch/proponent level and applied across the center level. In a perfect 
world, this should result in CoE-level guidance to branch/proponent leadership on 
where to focus efforts. The grey box at the bottom of the slide describes a planned 
workload (based on standard descriptions of work and estimated time values) 
identifying resources for completion, or as critical shortfalls. Work programmed and 
performed supports informing the Institutional Training Resource Model (ITRM), 
which provides quantifiable, verifiable, and auditable plans to aid senior leader decision 
making up through Department of the Army level (TP 350-70-9, 2012). The reporting 
and recording capabilities of the automation tools can produce quantifiable, verifiable, 
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and auditable reports for the workload completed within any given Fiscal Year, which 
began with the closeout of FY14. It would later dawn on me that part of the Army 
educational leadership gap resided within the absence of knowledge and skills 
associated with Army training and education policy and procedures driving budgeting 
and resourcing. 
 Wrestling with new information in how the Army budgets and resources 
education exposed not only a knowledge gap but an experience gap as well. I thought 
that the Army did a pretty good job preparing me to lead complex organizations by the 
time I was promoted to lieutenant colonel. As I began learning functions associated with 
managing programs of instruction along constraints established by the Army training 
and education budgeting and resourcing policy, I began defining a new role. I would 
become an effective educational leader and advisor for branch/proponent leadership 
ensuring that their programs of instruction were developed with the science behind 
learning while meeting Army requirements for resourcing. 
 Soon I realized that I was performing somewhere along Dreyfus’s (1980) five-
stage model of skill acquisition between the beginner level and the competent level in 
terms of knowledge, standard of work, and autonomy relating to the core functions of 
my job. What I began to understand was that my past experiences and education helped 
me achieve a certain level of performance, thus far, in my career. But, if I wanted to 
reach higher levels of expertise while increasing performance within the field of 
educational leadership I knew that I must commit time, effort, study, and practice with a 
willingness to accept some failures along the way (Fullan, 2011). 
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 The visit from the team left more questions than answers as is typical when 
starting up a new Army program. Building proficiency navigating the data base would 
take our users and leaders a few iterations over the course of the year. Accurate data 
input while working within established governance forums helped identify numerous 
discrepancies between inputs and outputs. Later in this chapter, I address the first results 
and implications associated with implementing this new program. We placed the 
information provided in our kitbags and began leaning forward toward our next hot 
project titled Structure Manning Decision Review (SMDR) outlined in TRADOC 
Pamphlet 350-70-7 (2012). 
March 2014: Army Training and Education Budgeting and Resourcing –  
Gaining an Appreciation for the Process 
 By early March we began gearing up to meet requirements stipulated by the 
Army’s Training Requirements Analysis System (TRAS) outlined in TRADOC 
Pamphlet 350-70-9 (2012). The goal of TRAS is that learning product development 
links with resource processes ensuring that resources meet program of instruction 
requirements at the right time and place (TRADOC Pamphlet 350-70, 2011). Army 
policy suggests that it is “critical for institutional leaders and managers to understand 
the process” (TRADOC Pamphlet 350-70, 2011, p. 30). In my tenure, only one of six 
branch/proponent leaders came into the position with some skill or knowledge related 
specifically to this process. Consequentially, branch/proponent leaders enter the 
position without fully comprehending the TRAS process and further lack understanding 
of their role as described in Army Regulation 5-22 (2015) and TRADOC Regulation 
350-70 (2012). Both publications list and describe key functions for CoE commanders 
and branch/proponent (institutional) leaders. CoE commanders are charged with 
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supervising 16 key functions ranging from manpower and budgetary resource 
acquisition, to ensuring the management of curriculum development along the analysis, 
development, design, implementation, and evaluation (ADDIE)model, to establishing 
and maintaining a staff and faculty development program. Branch/proponent leaders are 
charged with learning product requirements, implementing the Army Learning Model 
(ALC, 2011), promoting social learning through “push and reach-back” (TRADOC 
Pamphlet 350-70, 2012, p. 25), and developing career-long learning continuums and 
other learning products serving the Army’s three training domains of: institutional, 
operational and self-development. Sounds a lot like educational leadership tied to 
superintendent-like management described in Kowalski (2013). 
 Evidence discovered while exploring a sample of institutional leader biographies 
suggests that little to no relational preparation, experience or education served to inform 
the selection of branch/proponent leaders. Kowalski (2013) finds the subject of defining 
practice and discussing the requirements to enter the practice of superintendent 
important enough to place it as the beginning chapter of his book on The School 
Superintendent: Theory, Practice and Cases. It is my hope that this narrative causes 
Army leadership to address identified gaps in skills, knowledge, and competencies 
associated with educational leadership (Carter et al., 1993). Thus, providing a deliberate 
program better preparing leaders with appropriate experience, focused education, and 
formal preparation. Helping those Army leaders selected to run branch/proponent 
schools perform along the Army leader development model competencies, “leads, 
develops, achieves” (FM 6-22, 2015, pp. 1-4) adapted for educational leaders. The 
figure below adds a descriptive component adding clarity to the complexity and 
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newness associated Army training and education budgeting and resourcing 
responsibilities and scope. 
 
Figure 7. Training Analysis Requirements System, (TP 350-70-9, 2012, p. 31) 
 While writing this narrative, I cannot help but experience what Clandinin (2013) 
refers to as “entering into the midst: moving into living alongside” (p. 43). Moving 
through the commonplaces of temporality, sociality and space I relive the experiences 
from events three years ago placing the experiences into new light and perspective 
given my awakening of educational leadership. With renewed understanding I begin to 
recognize and somewhat appreciate the difficult situation in which the Army places 
these bright, energetic, and resilient leaders who become commandants running 
branch/proponent schools. The sheer complexity of policy and process fractured against 
a system building Army leaders to serve a purpose distinctly unlike an educational 
leader. It is not my aim to poke holes in the Army leaders who are selected to run 
branch/proponent schools, but simply to highlight what Clandinin (2013) explains as, 
“Our hope is to create research texts that allow audiences to engage and resonant 
remembering as they lay their experiences alongside the inquiry experiences to wonder 
 
93 
alongside participants and researchers who were part of the inquiry” (p. 51). The 
purpose of translating my field notes to this study serves to fulfill what Clandinin goes 
on to explain that they “are intended to engage audiences to rethink and reimage the 
ways in which they practice and the ways in which they relate” (p. 51). It is not my 
intent to make an audience experts or thoroughly explain the Army budgeting and 
resourcing for training and education, but merely help the reader discover the 
complexity outlining the new experiences which our branch/proponent leaders 
encounter when they step into an educational leadership position. 
April 1, 2014: Exploring the SMDR Milestone Requirements 
 The goal of the Structure Manning Decision Review (SMDR) is to shape the 
institutional Army’s annual training and education requirements within realistic 
resource projections. Each branch/proponent school participates in the SMDR process 
through the submission of TRAS products along established suspense: new programs of 
instruction no later than January 2, 2014; any program with projected growth or 
increased resources due April 1, 2014; and required cyclic reviews without growth or 
increased resources no later than May 1, 2014. In mid-July, Training Operations 
Management Activity (TOMA) provides the branch/proponent schools a summary sheet 
of submitted actions and the school has five days to identify errors and submit 
recommended corrections. The rest of the summer is spent arbitrating summary sheets 
and answering questions from TOMA. Additionally, schools must submit consolidated 
planned/programmed facility resources describing requirements in a prescribed format 




Submit a course constraint information paper for each constrained 
course to HQ TRADOC/TOMA (ATTG-TRI-MP) NLT 5 days 
after the final summary sheets are released describing the 
constraint with recommended solutions. Review training 
requirements against their equipment, facility, training device, 
range and land capabilities and prepare bottom-line information 
papers that outline the problem, analysis of options to eliminate 
the problem, and resource bills for the additional resources 
necessary to train the training requirement. When reviewing the 
training requirement impacts, plan for an uneven training flow 
during peak training periods (Summer Surge). 
 
 Although branch/proponents approve programs of instruction (POI) at their 
level, the POI is not validated and resourced by the Army until Headquarters Training 
and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and Deputy Chief of Staff for Training (DCS 
G-3/5/7) until Training Operations Management Activity (TOMA) validates the POI. 
The validated POI receives attention in the annual SMDR determining training and 
education requirements. This annual SMDR “validates proponent training and education 
requirements for the third POM [Program Objective Memorandum] year, records 
validated requirements for the second POM year (the primary focus of the SMDR), and 
fine-tunes requirements for the first POM year” (TRADOC Pamphlet, 350-70-9, 2012, 
p. 51). 
 Somehow during the first year, distracted by fixing an ineffective structure and 
establishing processes and prioritization, I missed the relevance of this thing called 
SMDR. In fact, my new boss was beginning to ask me what our organizations role was 
in the SMDR process. Frankly, I told him that we had a supporting role to the schools 
and that the TRAS products which our teams collaboratively built was our contribution 
to the process. Soon I would learn the vital role which the SMDR serves inside the 
Army training and education resourcing. Returning to the colonel’s question of our role 
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in the SMDR process, I began asking my subordinate leaders questions as to what role 
we engaged in the past or what role we should engage in the future. Surprisingly, 
everyone was quiet; you could have heard a pin drop; they were willing to leave well 
enough alone and continue to stay out of the SMDR process. Somehow this just did not 
seem to be the right answer, so two colonels and myself ordered pizza (no beer on duty) 
one evening and spent the next several hours laying out the requirement of the SMDR 
against the timeline. We gathered all of the published documents and orders relating to 
the SMDR which we could get our hands on and when we finished the evening we were 
quite proud of our work. What we produced that evening would later that summer find 
its way into part of a resourcing brief to our new commanding general. The result 
provided senior leadership with a holistic sketch of necessary products along a series of 
submission windows. At the time, I did not realize that what we were doing was 
contributing to what Kotter (1996) refers to as “anchoring a new approach” (p. 145). 
Eventually we would blast through an old culture stuck on ways of the past and began 
to demonstrate improved performance linked to the new change. People began to get 
excited about the new path to which the organization was headed. 
 The sketch we constructed became informative across the Center of Excellence 
and all of a sudden agencies who should have owned the process were trying to give it 
to us. Our contributing role in the SMDR process was finally defined providing our 
curriculum development team’s clear understanding as to the importance of timeliness 
and accuracy of their submitted products. The sketch provided a map linking multiple 
Army efforts across time allowing branch/proponent leadership to better predict and 
prioritize which programs of instruction they wanted to focus toward updating during 
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the fiscal year. Additionally the sketch linked critical forums along the year, so that 
leadership could get ahead of Army decisions. The tool was designed to provide 
branch/proponent leadership the right information, on time, to shape engagements with 
higher headquarters ensuring that the schools were postured early for resourcing future 
courses. 
May 29, 2014: Implementation Dip 
 The programmed senior leader changes during the late spring into early summer 
of 2014 would produce some unforeseen consequences. Reflecting back, I find it hard 
to believe that we did not adequately prepare for the turnover. We took for granted that 
the new leadership would adopt the action plans put in place by the previous leadership 
over the last year. Additionally, we felt like after a year of practice, the workforce 
would continue to perform at or above previous levels without a lot of attention or 
supervision. I was about to make three change leader mistakes: first, I almost declared 
victory too soon (Kotter, 2012); second, the workforce culture had not had enough time 
to mature; and I quit being an “engaged leader” (Fullan, 2011, p. 85). I let the urgency 
surrounding change push aside my inward focus toward long-term school improvement. 
I was about to experience the power behind what Fullan (2011) describes as looking 
inside oneself for thinking and action decision making. According to Fullan (2011), 
“you can’t find the answers outside yourself – you have to start inside and look for the 
best external connections to further develop your own thinking and action” (p. xii). This 
experience of inward/outward that Clandinin (2013) explains as “understanding of the 
relational between past, present, and future” (p. 23) perfectly situates my lived practice 
temporally placed alongside experience and theory. Thinking relationally allows me to 
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unfold some pivotal episodes which collectively led me to seek congruence from within 
my lived, and relived experience and change theory. 
 As I write from my current vantage point, recalling the events annotated in my 
field notes, I find it difficult to believe that those situated close to the problem failed to 
see the pending storm. With new leadership comes new priorities, but who would have 
thought that the goodness associated with the lesson plan surge would tapper off. I 
thought that we had enough evidence that the program worked that we did not need to 
socialize it completely with the new leadership. I was wrong. That is exactly what we 
should have done. We should have followed the same procedure that we charted when 
we stood the program up. We should have continued to communicate the vision with 
our workforce, while at the same time showing the new leadership that is how business 
is done. I was learning a hard lesson in what Fullan (2011) describes as “building a 
collaborative culture” (p. 91). Although the Army typically changes leadership every 
two years I could have leveraged the two components that remained in a steady state: 
the workforce and the structure. I could have sustained a “coordinated, focused 
organization” (p. 93) staying the course and adapting the plan. This might have 
achieved a more efficient and effective result from what Kotter (2012) explains as, 
“anchoring the new approach” (p. 166). Staying the course regardless of external 
distractions would have set the people at ease and kept the organization on track toward 
improving the quality of the programs of instruction. Instead, the change of top 
leadership came with a new set of priorities, and agendas supporting those priorities. In 
turn, the schools received new colonels, and generals over the summer, changing 
attention from the lesson plan surge to meet their own set of goals. This would be a 
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lesson not soon forgotten and one which would drive my focus in 2016 as a similar 
scenario began to unfold again. I will share reflections and implications in the final 
chapter in an attempt not to relive the past experience associated with previous results 
of the senior leader turnover. 
 The previous year had not been a complete loss, as I learned valuable lessons in 
driving and influencing change and learning first-hand what it took to sustain 
improvement over the long haul. During the year, time was invested through building 
capacity, earning some short-term wins, removing a few barriers, and demonstrating 
results to those operating the branch/proponent schools (Kotter, 2012). Building 
capacity came through the establishment of lead program management (LPM) teams 
and teaching these subordinate leaders about the budgeting and resourcing process. 
Earning short term wins came through the higher headquarters validation of our new 
programs of instruction. Foundationally organizing our structure along the LPM 
construct increased communication and broke through previous barriers. The teams 
were set, people were excited, more people were beginning to understand the processes 
and branch/proponent leadership began to appreciate the work involved to get their 
programs staffed, approved and resourced. Despite improvements across the content of 
the programs of instruction, late May of 2014 brought about what Fullan (2011) labels 
“a lowering of performance” where the hard work associated with pulling together the 
lesson plan surge began to dwindle, resembling an “Implementation dip” (p. 71). I was 
learning to become what Fullan (2011) refers to as a “resolute leader” (p. 46), 
continuing the course no matter what, and remembering that it takes “ten-years to 
become an expert in anything – including change management” (p. 47). 
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June 4, 2014: New Resourcing Models 
 As a result of a 2011 Government Accounting Office (GAO) workforce study on 
military training, several items were identified as needing improvement. One such area 
defined was in determining the number and type of personnel who were needed to 
conduct Army training within the branch/proponent schools (GAO-11-845, 2011). The 
report found that the model used to calculate instructor student ratios was last reviewed 
in 1998. Since that time, the Army had begun to use instructional methods aimed at 
small group instruction, therefore increasing the number of instructors required to teach 
a predicted annual student load. In June 2014, the Army began testing a series of new 
course resourcing models, one of which included the validation of the instructor 
requirements model (IRM). Once again, I was about to confirm that although I had been 
in and around Army schools for almost 30 years, even teaching in Army schools for 
over eight of those years, I still had a lot to learn when it came to Army training and 
education budgeting, and resourcing process and policy. I begin to wonder if I would 
ever learn everything that I needed to know in the area of training and education 
budgeting and resourcing. 
 Finally, the Army was ready for us to test the new resourcing model against 
three courses and gave us a short suspense, I quickly picked three quality curriculum 
developers who would serve as my front-line, testing the new models and providing me 
with candid feedback. I found myself returning to my three trusted agents who helped 
me build the lesson plan surge. I called them together and gave them the mission to 
represent our Center of Excellence among the larger Army forum. We picked three 
distinctly different programs of instruction to provide us a broad spectrum of variation 
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in hopes of putting the new model to the test. The experiment would last approximately 
six months beginning early summer and ending late fall. Eventually, the Army would 
end up constructing five resourcing categories into the course resourcing model, 
including: Instructor, Training Development, Instructional technology, Direct Support 
to Training, and Ammunition. These categories would capture the requirements for each 
program of instruction. The legacy instructor model (1998) relied upon calculating the 
number of instructors to teach an annual student load against an optimum class size. 
The model relied on inputs and assumptions rather than valid data. The old model did 
not account for indirect work associated with teaching, such as grading papers, lesson 
preparation time, throughput of particular simulations, simulators, or other training 
devices. The new Course Resourcing Model (CRM)/Instructor Resourcing Model 
(IRM) known as the IRM/CRM promised to account for direct work, such as teaching, 
as well as indirect work, such as grading papers or preparing instructional material, etc. 
It would take the Army until the spring of 2015 to let Centers of Excellence begin 
submitting programs of instruction applied against the new IRM/CRM model. 
June 18, 2014: Workload Capacity and Utilization 
 On the heels of the CRM project came more requirements from higher 
headquarters who directed Centers of Excellence to begin work capturing training 
development workload capacity and utilization. The tool utilized was a relatively new 
data base labeled Training Development Capability (TDC). The database was 
constructed to capture lesson plans and programs of instruction and served as a medium 
transferring instructional material from the branch/proponent schools to the TRADOC 
Training Operations Management Activity (TOMA) for staffing and validation. Not 
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only did we have to start trying to review and submit programs of instruction along the 
new IRM/CRM, but now we had to account for everyone’s predicted workload 
capacity, actual utilized workload, and next years predicted workload. Although work 
may be conducted at the user level in a particular fiscal year, the work is not calculated 
toward workload accomplished (utilization) until the products are staffed through 
TOMA and validated. Often times, if the employee completed work toward the middle 
or end of the fiscal year, the work would not have adequate time to staff; therefore, the 
work would not be validated. Thus, the work does not contribute toward workload 
capacity of the current fiscal year. In short, work conducted and submitted into the TDC 
from the curriculum developers may not represent true work accomplished during the 
year. Past practice demonstrates that utilizing such an approach to justify resourcing 
human capital is an inaccurate accurate account of workload accomplished (citation 
needed here). On December 9, 2014, we would experience our first report results, and 
discussion of the workload management process. I will further explain the issue in my 
final chapter while exploring a potential bridging solution. 
August-September 2014: Center of Excellence Strategic Plan 
 The summer of 2014 marked significant leadership changes across the Center of 
Excellence, starting with the top general, through both branch/proponent generals, 
following down to their respective school brigade, colonel, and commanders. Passing 
the thirty year mark as a career member of the Department of the Army, it was not until 
I began this study that I begin to question the frequency in which the Army schedules 
routine leadership changes, particularly at the Colonel through two-star General level 
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commands. Had I become so accustomed to a culture of change that I had grown numb 
toward the consequence of change on units? 
 The Army transitions colonels through two-star-general-level leadership with 
regularity every twelve months to two-years. An Army board selects those officers best 
qualified through a competitive process, selecting those best qualified based upon 
potential. Successful officers selected continue to climb the ranks gaining increased 
levels of responsibility throughout a career. The process takes into account end-state 
requirements (ceilings) by grade competing adequate numbers of officers against 
requirements so that the best candidates rise to the top (DA Memo 600-2, 2006). One of 
the ways in which senior leaders try to mitigate change is through a deliberate transition 
process which often times includes the development of a strategy to implement desired 
change. 
 By August 2014, the new commanding general was nearing his 90-day mark in 
office, and would soon deliver his overall assessment of the state of the Center of 
Excellence. During his address, he provided guidance to shape his two-year tenure, and 
charged his planners to begin development of a strategy along three lines of effort. The 
procedures actually followed close to one described by Ewy (2009), where he outlines 
strategic planning as, “The process for creating a long-range mission, vision, goals, and 
strategies” (p. 2). The three lines of effort were each comprised of a series of major 
objectives with subtasks and supporting tasks. Line of effort number one focused on the 
future force beyond 2025. Line of effort number two focused on developing leaders for 
our future force, updating our doctrine, and modernizing our schoolhouses and 
instructional components. Line of effort number three focused on management of the 
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garrison or post components associated with the senior mission commander role and 
functions. The commanding general stood up a tiger team (select group of planners) to 
develop major objectives for each line of effort which he would approve in early 
October. Line of effort number two would end up with five major objectives, and my 
team would spend much of October and November gathering stakeholders to construct 
subtasks, and supporting tasks for each of the five major objectives. 
October 6, 2014: Trip to Fort Benning 
 The Commanding General had a son who was attending an officer course at Fort 
Benning, GA, where the general would occasionally drop in, and visit when the general 
was in the vicinity. While visiting with his son, the Commanding General would also 
find time to socialize with leadership at the post. During one of his visits, he became 
intrigued with how Fort Benning was delivering small group instruction. The Fort 
brought together two distinct branch/proponent schools for deliberate learning 
opportunities. Additionally, he was interested in how the schools at Fort Benning were 
organizationally structured to support the students, faculty, and two branch/proponent 
commandants. The Generals enthusiasm would translate into me and my boss boarding 
a plane in early October to visit Fort Benning. 
 Being a former Infantry Officer, and Career Course Instructor at Fort Benning in 
the mid-1990s, I was looking forward to reconnecting with some old friends. The 
Infantry School and Center had gone through Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) 
procedures in 2010 bringing the Armor School from Fort Knox to co-reside with the 
Infantry school at Fort Benning. Fort Benning, like many other Army centers and 
schools, became a Center of Excellence comprised of two branch/proponent schools. I 
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made some phone calls to set up the trip, and my boss and I would spend two-days on 
the ground at Fort Benning learning what we could to answer the General’s questions. 
Despite a very hectic schedule with a visit from the Chief of Staff of the Army, my 
friends at Fort Benning constructed an agenda to meet our request. 
 Arriving mid-morning at Fort Benning, we began immediately receiving 
briefings on how the Infantry school had gained some growth in their Infantry Officer 
Basic Leader Course to better align with the Armor Basic Leader Course. The purpose 
of the alignment of the two courses was aimed at combining the end of course exercises 
together. They described the process where their general officers had socialized the 
change with the higher headquarters generals, gaining approval before following the 
routine bottom up staffing required by the Training and Doctrine Command’s 
(TRADOC) Training Operations Management Activity (TOMA). The Infantry school 
was able to work smartly within the system by circumventing the rigid policy and 
process which bottlenecks branch/proponents’ ability to create agile/adaptive 
curriculum. 
 Next on the agenda, we traveled to a couple of organizations where we received 
excellent presentations on how they were staffed, how they scheduled courses, and how 
instructors fit into the process. For example, they described the relationship between the 
command structure and the Director of Training structure. The captains teaching at Fort 
Benning belonged to the Director of Training not the brigade-level command structure. 
After a long day we headed back to the headquarters for a couple more briefs. As we 
began discussing our two organizational similarities and differences, the door opened 
and a familiar looking face, with colonel’s rank on his uniform, came strolling in the 
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door. I could not help myself, but to call the colonel by name, and ask how he’d been. 
Looking at me with a somewhat puzzled face, he grinned and said, “You were my small 
group instructor back in the late 1990s.” I replied, “Yes, and I guess that I did not mess 
it up too bad if the Army promoted you to colonel!” Everyone around the table got a big 
laugh out of the exchange, and I enjoyed seeing a former student who had experienced 
such a successful career. 
 The next morning we sat through a video teleconference with the higher 
headquarters, and it was fun to sit with our Fort Benning friends. Usually, my boss and I 
would have joined the video teleconference from our own location, so it was real treat 
to have two Centers of Excellence in the same room sharing conversation. After the 
morning video teleconference, we met a few more folks and finished gathering what we 
needed to answer the Generals questions. We headed back to the Atlanta Airport, where 
our flight was delayed, putting us home well after midnight. My boss and I considered 
the trip a success, and had more than enough information to share when we got back to 
work. 
 The following week we got to provide the General with a trip report, and I found 
the discussion refreshing as the General demonstrated a genuine curiosity toward 
improving instruction. He was actually exhibiting growth across leadership levels 
described by the Army Field Manual 6.0 (2015). I was surprised because most of my 
experiences around general officers resulted in their demonstrating what Dreyfus and 
Dreyfus (1980) would refer to as overconfidence in their abilities because of a lack of 
expert knowledge. This relates back to the purpose of the Army leadership development 
model which prepares leaders to supervise and operate organizations in combat. Expert 
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knowledge also relates back to how the Army selects, educates, prepares, and trains its 
future leaders for assignments. The Army Leader Development doctrine describes a 
fifth transition level where leaders of large organizations are no longer the expert, but 
must rely upon experts for sound advice. The discussion with the General peaked his 
interest toward improving instruction, and would eventually center on improving one 
particular course which becomes a critical event that I will describe in chapter seven. 
October 15, 2014: Establishing the Workgroup and Weekly Forums 
 The standard weekly forum was established as a result of coordination amongst 
stakeholders and various other schedules. We met every Wednesday afternoon from 
1430 to 1600. To our surprise the first meeting was well attended with members from 
each of our stakeholders. During the first session, my aim was two-fold: establish core 
team membership and convey to them what I knew about the task ahead. I explained to 
the group that the tiger team had built a foundation of the commander’s strategy by 
describing the general’s vision along four themes, overlaying three lines of effort geared 
toward achieving an end-state. I explained that our project was to construct subtasks, 
supporting tasks, recommend lead, and supporting agencies to each of the categories. 
Additionally, we had to determine and make a recommendation to the commanding 
general in terms of the frequency of the board. Our first board to the commanding 
general was already set for January 28, 2015. That gave us little more than two months 
with two holidays in between. Almost immediately the group began trying to place the 
brunt of the work on my organization. I knew that I would have my hands full spreading 
the balance of work across all of the participants. As a former Army strategist I couldn’t 
help but be excited with the opportunity to apply my old craft coupled with theory that I 
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was learning in graduate school. I would find myself leveraging both while steering this 
motley crew. I politely reminded the group that they were the ones at the point of 
impact where the rubber meets the road. This was their opportunity to shape their 
organizations priorities and highlight their success to the top levels. Also the work that 
they would provide would keep their bosses efforts routinely in front of the general. The 
governance board allowed branch/proponents to demonstrate how well things are going 
or to ask for help where they needed flag officer assistance. The rest of the first meeting 
was spent outlining three to four broad subtasks against each major objective, and we 
set the goal for the next meeting to finish the subtask work and come prepared to 
discuss lead and supporting agency relationships. 
October 22, 2014: Creating Subtasks Supporting the Major Objectives 
 The second meeting, a week later, I was pleased to see a return of all of the 
members from the first meeting, and they came prepared to discuss and finish work on 
the subtasks. Each member had developed a list of lead and supporting agencies. By the 
end of an hour and a half we had structured 22 subtasks, roughly three to four for each 
major objective. As we worked through the assignment of lead agencies and supporting 
agencies it became clear that we had to go back and better define the subtasks. The 
homework for the next meeting was to finish the assignment of lead and supporting 
agencies and begin working on crafting the supporting tasks for each of the 22 subtasks. 
I asked that each member keep their leadership informed of our progress and for the 
members to bring any concerns or questions from their leadership back to the group for 
discussion. During the early stages of the process, communication vertically and 
horizontally proved invaluable as members brought valid concerns back from their 
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leadership. The group’s collective ability to handle objections and clarify meaning to 
the stakeholders early in the process kept our group on a straight and narrow azimuth 
(Kotter, 2012, Ewy, 2009). This early work to keep lines of communication open would 
result in collective pay off down the road. Being the first line of effort scheduled to 
brief the Executive level board meant that we did not have time to waste nor did we 
have the luxury of learning from other’s mistakes. We had to get it right the first time, 
and so we set our goal to establish the standard for others to follow. 
October 29, 2014: Assigning Lead and Supporting Agencies 
 The third meeting brought the core members back with renewed interest and 
enthusiasm about the project. People were beginning to get excited about showing the 
executive-level board how far we had come and the results accomplished in such a short 
period. We set to work finishing the assignment of leads and supporting agencies to 
subtasks and began work on the supporting tasks when an interesting note of debate 
started within the group regarding lead assignment to a couple of subtasks. Two 
individuals, each representing their respective branch/proponent, clearly, in their own 
minds, felt one agency should lead two of the subtasks in lieu of their branch/proponent. 
Although this was not the general consensus of the group writ large, it was a good point, 
so the group tabled the decision. 
 Over the course of the next several weeks we would experience a few more 
episodes where one or two of the members would strongly argue what organization 
should lead the work or want to debate defining a particular task. However, the group as 
a whole remained strongly committed to finalizing the structural content of the 
presentation material. The aim was to create presentation material which would provide 
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executive-level leadership a tool demonstrating progress along our line of effort. The 
group’s commitment would later prove invaluable as the products and processes 
matured through business process management (Spanyi, 2010). To keep the meeting in 
order and move along, the group reached consensus with a decision that we would let 
them present their arguments to the council of colonels for a decision before going to a 
higher board. It was during this meeting that we realized we needed to formally 
construct a charter, validate council members, list board members, and establish the 
governance along a routine schedule. With work still needed to shape the supporting 
tasks, we adjourned until the next week when we intended to finish the supporting task 
work and begin building the governance. 
November 5, 2014: Constructing the Framework and Content 
 When the new general came on board he began a practice of bi-monthly updates 
with his subordinate directorates. The purpose was two-fold; first, it allowed him to 
gain understanding of the roles, and functions of the subordinate organizations, and 
second, it provided him necessary information as he built his assessment of the larger 
organization. Our bi-monthly updates had been useful in building a foundational 
relationship with the new general. We used the forum to show the general projects that 
we were working, and where we needed his assistance with higher headquarters. We 
had been conducting these routine updates since early summer, and had placed a lot of 
effort into making continuous improvements in the construct and content of packaging 
and delivering information. By early fall our products had evolved into the generals 
most favored format, and soon the format became the standard that other agencies 
would have to follow. 
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 By November the group was settling into their respective roles as process 
owners representing the interests and equities in which their respective organizations 
would serve within the larger strategy (McCoy, 2011). We worked surprisingly 
efficiently through the construction of 45 supporting tasks, and with a few minutes to 
spare we began discussion on writing the charter. The charter would need to describe 
the purpose of the board, list executive-level membership, and the council-of-colonel-
level membership. Additionally, we wanted the charter to include inputs, throughputs, 
and outputs relational to the general’s objectives and end state. As the time wound 
down, we closed our fourth workgroup session. I reminded everyone that our timeline 
was closing in on the first board date, January 28th, 2015. Staying on course, we all 
knew that we would need to finish the charter and begin work on the governance of it 
all during the following four sessions. 
November 12 & 19, 2014: The Charter and Board Framework 
 The charter was sketched into a single presentable chart built around a simple 
structural concept that would be easy to communicate. I would actually present the 
sketch in the first board to gain consensus and drive the process. Components of the 
charter were orchestrated from the top, starting with the title where we added a 
frequency in parenthesis. Below the title, a single sentence defined the purpose. Below 
the purpose was a list, by title, of the executive board membership. The council 
membership (at large) was listed just below the executive board members. Below the 
members, a red line bordered a box which outlined the parts required to make the board 
work. Starting at the upper center, on the left side of the box was a smaller red box 
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labeled input moving to the right were listed three titles in order, higher headquarters 
meetings, internal meetings, and organizational objectives. 
 We outlined these forums populating topics in a manner in which they would 
demonstrate contributions, as well as surface friction. For example, if a 
branch/proponent wanted to increase resources in a particular course but did not have 
the internal means they would have to ask the executive board for assistance. I 
remember stressing to the group that the executive-level board exists to address critical 
issues affecting our branch/proponent schools. It was the charter of the board’s 
executive-level leadership to give guidance to shape the future, and make important 
decisions along resourcing streams. The anticipated contributions from multiple forums 
as well as surfaced friction would ultimately feed the output mechanism through a lens 
situated along the two branch/proponent schools priorities. As the process matured it 
would result in critical Center-of-Excellence-level feedback to inform and improve our 
practice. The charter would become the foundational document driving change and 
influencing stakeholders (Kotter, 2012; Fullan, 2011). 
 My team had cracked the code on packaging information for the general, and we 
capitalized on that knowledge, building a set of standard chart templates that would be 
used by presenters during the board. Presenting the templates during this meeting, I met 
very little resistance, and the templates were approved. I had learned earlier with this 
group that if I provided a clear format that was easy to fill out they would use it. 
December 3 & 10, 2014: Final Preparations 
 The first order of business for December was to nominate five to six topics for 
presentation. This included laying out the recommended frequency for the executive 
 
112 
board meetings within the larger governance structure. One constraint that we were up 
against was a time limit for the executive board. We were told that the general did not 
like sitting through meetings that lasted longer than one and one half hours. As we 
began constructing the frequency, we took into account the vast number of topics 
associated with five major objectives, 22 subtasks, and 45 supporting tasks. Our goal 
was to show the executive board progress, providing touch-points across of all five 
objectives over the course of a year. Knowing that we only had an hour and a half, we 
decided that five topics would be optimal, with six maximum. Five topics allowed a 
presenter fifteen minutes each, followed by fifteen minutes at the end for guidance and 
discussion. The short presentation time caused me to dictate the number of slides at 
three to no more than five. 
 I began to lay out the requirements described above when it dawned on me that 
we needed to orchestrate a trial run of a compressed implementation schedule in 
January 2015. I had to set up and schedule the first action officer workgroup, followed 
by a council of colonels, and finally host the executive board. That meant coming off of 
a two week vacation around the 5th of January 2015 and gathering the action officer 
workgroup on January 14, 2015. Next we had to schedule the council of Colonels on 
January 21, 2015 to allow the group some time to make any final product adjustments 
before the executive-level board. The executive board was scheduled for January 28th, 
2015. I had to get the group re-organized and moving to wrap up the work by December 
17th, 2014. Not only did I have to finalize the list of topics, draft products, and set the 
three boards, but I had to plan for pre-briefs to the executive-level leadership as well. 
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 The urgency of the project actually caused me to realize that a routine of 
monthly meetings would become unmanageable besides, no one wanted to repeat this 
effort every month. A frequency of quarterly board meetings was established with the 
first month comprising the action officer level. The second monthly meeting comprised 
the council of Colonels. The third monthly meeting would host the executive-level 
board. Setting the frequency of executive board meetings quarterly, we devised a chart 
depicting all of the major objectives, subtasks, and supporting tasks over the course of 
the General’s two-year tenure. The goal underlying the methodology was to provide 
touch-points along every major objective and all supporting tasks at least once annually. 
The chart depicted all of the major objectives down the left hand side with time 
depicted by quarter across the top. The quarters were depicted by columns containing 
proposed supporting tasks that would be presented in the future. The chart became a 
map by which we could show progress of each major objective over time. 
 Finally, before taking a much needed vacation, the workgroup came to 
agreement on five topics for the first board. The lead presenters prepared their material 
and submitted them to my lead action officer. I verified appointments made with 
executive-level leaders for the new-year and made final adjustments to the presentation. 







January 22, 2015: Final Preparation for the Board 
 The meetings and pre-briefs leading up to the executive board went without a 
hitch. Everyone had provided excellent products on time with everyone pulling together 
to make this maiden voyage successful. As I made final coordination with the presenters 
and was reviewing the read ahead packets for the executive board members, my Colonel 
delivered me a bit of shocking news. He told me that he was really pleased and had 
already received laudatory comments from the executive-level leadership on our efforts 
thus far. He further explained that everyone was excited to get this first forum off the 
ground and that expectations were running high that we would hit the ball out of the 
park. By this time, I could tell that he was up to something because we had discussed 
these topics several times before, and he was delighted in how I had progressed on the 
project. 
 I decided to ask him what was up, and he told me that he had to go on a trip. He 
could not say where or for what but that he would be gone for about a month or so. I 
remember that I quickly replied, “Great! You are going to be gone for the first board so 
the success or failure rests entirely upon my shoulders?” My boss said something to the 
effect of, essentially yes, and you’ll do great. He further explained that since I was the 
one that put it all together, it was actually fitting that I run the first board and receive 
credit where credit was due. I asked one more time, “Okay, where are you going on 
such short notice?” He really could not tell me, but I quickly figured out that he had 
been nominated to sit on an Army promotion board. His trip was legitimate, and I had to 
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get on my ‘A’ game quickly as I had less than five business days to make final 
preparations. 
January 28, 2015: The First Executive Board, On My Own? 
 The time leading up to the board seemed like a blur, and there never is enough 
time to get everything done, and in perfect order. The room was set; the slides were 
loaded on the media projection device; we had binders containing hard copies of the 
presentations set out on the conference table for the executive board members; and the 
presenters were all gathered and ready to go. We were about eight minutes out from the 
start time when the General’s aide-de-camp came in to verify that we were ready to go. 
I told him that we were waiting on a couple of the colonels who we expected to arrive 
anytime. The aide-de-camp departed and we anxiously awaited executive board 
members arrival. At five minutes till the hour, the aide-de-camp appeared and 
announced the Commanding Generals arrival followed by the remaining executive 
board members. As they filed into the conference room with everyone at the position of 
attention the Commanding General told everyone to have a seat. 
 As the General sat down he looked around the room and noticed that some of 
the colonel-level commanders were missing. He made a comment to his Chief of Staff 
who made a quick note. I welcomed the General and board members to the first line of 
effort number two executive board reminding the general that my boss was on a 
temporary duty assignment out of town, and that I would host the forum. I began the 
forum by bringing the general’s attention toward his overall strategy map focusing him 
on line of effort number two. I had learned from years of briefing executive-level 
leaders that they always appreciated an upfront orientation bringing them back to 
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previous guidance that they issued or a plan which they approved. In this case it was 
taking the general back to his strategy and demonstrating how this forum would provide 
routine updates, specifically along line of effort number two. Once he saw his strategy 
map on the projection screen, his posture eased; he sat back and listened intently. 
 I followed the strategy map orientation with a slide showing our proposed 
charter, where I spent about seven minutes walking the general through the sketch 
explaining the recommended frequency, purpose, members, and paused for discussion 
before moving to the process piece. A small discussion surrounding the membership 
ensued, and it was clearly noted that some of the key members were not present. Next I 
moved to describe how this governance forum would migrate inputs through a variety 
of external and internal processes through the governing body resulting in outputs 
leading to center-level feedback to inform improved practice (Markus & Jacobson, 
2010). Next I showed the board a proposed cycle of governance which laid out an 
action officer workgroup the first month, followed the next month by a council of 
Colonels, and in the third month conduct the executive-level board. 
 The General made one minor note of concern with the recommended frequency 
where he asked why he couldn’t receive more frequent touch-points. I reminded the 
General that we already conducted bi-monthly forums covering associated topics which 
would continue. I further explained that during this particular cycle, we had conducted 
all three levels of forums in a single month, and that it caused the group to continuously 
work the six topics without rest. I convinced the General that the tempo would be too 
hectic trying to conduct monthly executive board engagements. He asked the leadership 
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at the table what they thought, and everyone agreed that a quarterly board would offer a 
good start point. 
 Next, I covered the agenda items for the current meeting and proceeded to show 
the board members our single chart which mapped the objectives down the left hand 
side; moving across time to the right were listed projected subtasks within columns by 
quarter. The chart showed the board a long-term plan to touch each subtask over the 
course of the year. I explained that this was a projection based upon current priorities 
with those highest receiving attention first. The chart also provided the group an ability 
to check the pulse of each major objective every quarter. The board approved the 
charter, frequency, and proposed mapping of topics; and with that, I introduced the first 
presenter. 
 Each presenter stayed on que, and tried hard to follow the 15-minute rule, but 
the General was so enthusiastic with questions that the meeting lasted over two hours. 
When the last presenter was finished, I quickly reviewed due-outs captured during the 
discussions and proposed a way ahead for the next quarter. The General gave some final 
thoughts and paused looking intently around the room; he finally spoke, saying, “Well 
done, team. You have hit the ball out of the park and set the standard for others to 
follow.” We had accomplished what we set out to do and we did it with style. Our 
forum became the model which the General would refer to over the next three iterations 
during the year. Our line of effort board process is to this day recognized among 
executive-level leaders as the standard of excellence. My team continues to make 
improvements to the process and products with each delivery moving past what 
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Hammer and Champy (1993) refer to as “analysis paralysis” (p. 109). We plowed 
through hard topics keeping the process simple and content relevant to the audience. 
April 15, 2015: Outcomes-Based Approach 
 The work which started with the trip to Fort Benning in the fall of 2013 finally 
began to take shape into the form of major project that would become one of many 
pivotal episodes in my current position. Although the Army began demonstrating 
interest modernizing its instructional approach at the CoE levels in 2011, we had not 
completed implementation of the concepts described in the Army Learning Concepts 
(ALC) 2015 (ALC, 2011). On short notice, the General called one of his two 
branch/proponent leaders and subordinate school leaders along with myself to discuss 
how to modernize one of the captain’s career courses. The meeting took only an hour 
and basically consisted of the General asking a few questions that we would have to 
come back and answer in a week. The General told us that he wanted to increase the 
rigor and make the instruction relevant to the officer’s next assignment while 
capitalizing on the officer’s field experience. He wanted to track talent and place those 
officers demonstrating the most potential into a specially tracked course. He wanted to 
increase the officer’s ability to think critically, and he wanted instructors and lesson 
plans that would support the desired outcomes. 
 I remember walking out of the meeting not believing what I had just heard, 
finally a senior officer who appreciated quality learning. We had a week to get back to 
the General and give him a plan of what it would take to achieve success. I gathered a 
small team of my best curriculum developers, my staff, and faculty chief along with the 
course manager, and a couple of instructors. I explained to the group that we were about 
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to venture into new territory where no other Center of Excellence had traveled. We 
were about to completely revamp 10 weeks of a 20 week course comprising of over 400 
hours of instruction. I knew that to establish realistic expectations with the General, we 
had to sketch out the details step-by-step demonstrating how we were going to re-
construct the course along tracked venues, capture all resourcing requirements, and 
show a timeline of how long it would take the team to develop the program of 
instruction with quality lesson plans. 
 New course content comprised 401 academic hours. The Army’s estimated time 
value (ETV) to construct a new academic hour was 17 hours of work to one academic 
hour. With 401 hours, we estimated the work at 4 person-years to complete. Basically 
the math was telling us that it would take four people and one year to construct the 401 
academic hours. Next, we took a look at what courses would be starting within that 
timeframe that we could recommend as piloting the new material. We found a course 
starting in late November 2015 with the tracks containing the content of the new 
courseware in late February 2016. That would give the team only ten months to 
construct the material for the new course. Next, we had to revise the existing course 
map and reconstruct it along an outcomes-based approach (Senge, 1990). Beginning 
with the end in mind we crafted a course outcome to get the general to focus on the 
product (the graduates) that he wanted to produce. The team packaged all of the 
products into a well-designed presentation where we explained the products and 
processes to the general the following week. He approved our methodology and told us 
to keep up the good work. In the meantime, he would start to discuss this new approach 
with the Generals in charge of our higher headquarters. We would spend the rest of the 
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summer analyzing and designing the curriculum from an approved course outcome and 
nested learning objectives that sequentially connected lessons to the larger course. 
Within the lesson plan construct, we followed the Experiential Learning Model (Kolb, 
1984) that the Army had adopted as its preferred learning framework. 
April 28, 2015: Training and Education Enterprise Conference 
 Two weeks following the session with the General, I headed to Fort 
Leavenworth, Kansas, where I had been invited to participate in an education 
conference. The conference pulled together members like those responsible for 
education and instructional programs from each Center-of-Excellence-level for a first-
time-ever conference. The purpose of the three-day event was to bring stakeholders 
together, identify problem areas experienced within the educational and the educational 
policies and processes, and work toward determining viable solutions which could be 
presented to executive-level leadership (Kohlbacher & Reijers, 2013). Finally, the 
higher headquarters was going to entertain subordinate criticisms relating to the rigidity 
of the Army’s educational and instructional practice. 
 A shift in organizational relationships in 2014 caused the Centers of Excellence 
to change direct reporting from the four-star headquarters (TRADOC) to our three-star 
headquarters, Combined Arms Center (CAC). As part of this relational change, the 
three-star headquarters began a monthly forum with the Centers of Excellence labeled 
the Policy and Guidance Oversight Committee (PGOC). The forum’s charter was to 
begin revising the education and instructional policies and find workable solutions to 
problems identified in the practice. The forums over time began to resemble what 
Wenger and Snyder (1999) described as Communities of Practice. Each month we had 
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the same “group of people informally bound together by shared expertise and passion 
for a joint enterprise” (Wenger & Snyder, 1999, p. 139). I was actually experiencing a 
management theory in practice, and it appeared to be working! The monthly sessions 
were scheduled for two-hours, and an agenda was published leaving some open space 
for anyone to propose a topic. Soon there was so much demand for topics that the group 
had to devise a system to vet and limit the number of topics that could be addressed in a 
particular session. 
 Over time, group members raised attention to several user-level issues. Finally 
the CoEs were gaining some traction toward improving the process. Policy, on the other 
hand was, and still is, slower to evolve as approval of new policy requires more 
agencies to agree. For example, resourcing and budgeting policy remains structured 
along a very rigid system following a timeline mandated by federal law. Policy is a hard 
nut to crack, and I will address some implications in the final chapter. Changing policy 
will require senior leaders with sustainability who clearly understand how policy 
interacts and affects educational transformation in order to begin an evolutionary 
change toward an adaptive, agile policy environment. The difficulty associated with 
policy change is explained by Pierson (2000) as “path dependent where institutions are 
sticky and actors protect the existing model” (p. 4). In the meantime, I must do my best 
to maneuver within the constraints of policy finding loopholes and work-arounds within 
the system to provide our students the best possible learning experience. 
 The conference began Phase Two of a Five-Phase process where five groups 
were built and populated with members from across the seven Centers of Excellence 
and two higher headquarters organizations. Each group was aligned with a topic 
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previously chosen from the stakeholders. I had volunteered for group one and the 
conference organizer accommodated my request. The group demographics included a 
balance of key members from the Centers of Excellence, and key staffers from our 
three-star and four-star-level headquarters. Thus, the groups comprised both the user-
level product design and input leadership, and the oversight output key staffers. The 
topic of my group was to determine if schools had the human capital required to 
perform the curriculum development process consisting of Analysis, Design, 
Development, Implementation, and Evaluation (ADDIE) model. I was teamed up with 
my colleagues from Fort Benning and a couple of other schools. The group members 
included a couple of budget people from the four-star headquarters and the top civilian 
representing the Training Operations Management Activity (TOMA). TOMA is the 
agency which is responsible for staffing schools programs of instruction for validation 
of resources. 
 Through video teleconference and other technology platforms the group had 
conducted multiple sessions in March 2015 and early April 2015 crafting a problem 
statement and eight guiding questions in preparation for the conference. On the first 
morning, it took the group about two hours to re-acquaint themselves to the problem 
statement, make adjustments to the guiding questions, and outline our project for the 
next couple of days. Next, the group began working down the list of questions with the 
first question addressing the number of assigned people to perform curriculum 
development. Immediately two issues surfaced: one included defining the expertise 
required to perform the Army’s curriculum development process of ADDIE; second, a 
suggestion by TOMA to simply throw more experts at the problem. This was the first 
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indicator that the people working at the higher level did not understand what it took to 
really perform ADDIE at the branch/proponent schools. 
 The Army has a professional training and education career program field 
(CP-32) consisting of seven skill series with each series containing designated 
competencies to perform their job (CP-32 ACTEDS Plan, 2014). The series responsible 
for curriculum development along the Army model is GS-1750, which is a general 
schedule (GS) Department of the Army Civilian assigned to the professional series of 
1750, Instructional Systems Specialist. The 1750 series is considered a professional 
educational series and requires specific educational requirements to serve in the series. 
For example, a minimum of “full four-year course of study leading to a bachelor’s 
degree or higher which included or is supplemented by at least 24 hours appropriate to 
the work of the position to be filled” (CP-32 ACTEDS Plan, 2014, p. 26). The 
coursework must include four out of five specific categories associated with learning 
theory, psychology of learning, educational psychology, instructional design, education 
evaluation, instructional product development, and computers in education. The 1750 
series civilians are critical to the branch/proponent schools in the construction of quality 
learning products. Those of us who work every day with this professional series 
appreciate the value which they bring to the process and understand the time it takes to 
build quality curriculum. Those who are not as closely associated with the day-to-day 
work of the 1750 careerist rarely possess the requisite understanding of what it takes to 
build quality curriculum. Corroboration of this issue was recently cited in a TRADOC 
study utilizing both a survey and numerous focus group sessions with leadership, as 
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well as instructors at the branch/proponent schools and those involved with instructional 
systems (Hicks, 2015). 
 The TOMA representative would quickly find the conversation difficult to 
follow because he was not familiar with the user-level problems associated with the 
policy and process experienced at the branch/proponent level. The group, supported by 
representatives from three Centers of Excellence, tried to further explain the rigidity of 
the system and the friction caused by trying to accommodate a system that was not agile 
or adaptive in nature. By the middle of the first morning, the TOMA representative and 
my friend from Fort Benning were exchanging some strong words, resulting in the 
facilitator’s boss asking the TOMA representative to ease up. The TOMA representative 
departed the work group and would not return until the next morning. The argument 
stemmed from my colleague describing a particular problem with the Training 
Development Capability (TDC) tool and the TOMA representative refusing to 
understand the problem. The TOMA representative could not understand the problem 
because he did not use TDC as a development tool, but relied on the output of data that 
the tool provided. The TOMA representative, being an end user, did not care about the 
effort it took a training developer to manipulate and find work arounds to input required 
documents into the system. He was simply stuck on process supporting policy. 
 The group was assigned a facilitator from the Army’s esteemed Asymmetric 
Warfare Group (AWG). The AWG is a group designed to “identify, and develop Army 
solutions for capability gaps” (Loos, 2016, “United States Army Asymmetric Warfare 
Group,” para. 4). The facilitator from AWG provided the group an unbiased 
representative who would help guide the group through the development of a 
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constructive solution set supporting the identified problem area. The next day our group 
would spend all day, and half of the next day building a blueprint addressing the 
problem so that we could gain the three-stars approval to proceed along a proof of 
principle (PoP). By the end of day two, the group had crafted a problem statement, a 
proposed solution, a timeline, and a set of metrics to measure our progress. We 
packaged the information in a quad chart for presentation to the three-star. My friend 
was designated to present the groups information to the three-star. 
 On day three, group one was first to present its plan to the three-star. Starting in 
the upper left quadrant of the slide, my friend clearly articulated the problem statement: 
“The Army’s educational and instructional processes exceed TRADOC’s human 
resource capacity to efficiently execute to standard.”  Next, he presented the two 
proposed solutions, describing how we would optimize current human capital and 
identify unnecessary elimination requirements caused by the rigidity associated with 
current policy and requirements driven by the Training Development Capacity (TDC) 
tool. The first objective, was to address mandated standardization of lesson plan 
development requirements against unique lessons that are branch/proponent specific, 
and shareable lessons which other schools could use. Second objective was to 
streamline lesson plan development, determining which of the 27 steps within the TDC 
tool is really required. That is, we do not want to lose resources or compromise quality. 
Moving to the upper right quadrant the presenter laid out the timeline of major 
milestones. The presenter moved to the lower left quadrant and explained four metrics 
we would use to measure our progress. The general applauded the groups’ work, asked 
if any of his staff had questions, and approved the proof of concept for group one. The 
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rest of the four briefing concluded, and we all adjourned with a feeling of 
accomplishment. Our group would follow up in the next two weeks with the higher 
headquarters staffers to flush out the details of the plan. 
 In May of 2015, our group hosted two teleconferences with the higher 
headquarters specifically addressing the second requirement of our pilot. TDC as the 
tool was identified as too cumbersome and too complex for our training developers. The 
TDC contained 27 major steps with over 100 minor steps associated with inputting a 
single lesson. The group had determined that to maintain lesson plan quality and not 
lose resources, we had to utilize three of the 27 steps. Almost immediately we received 
pushback from the TDC owners as if they were protecting their own fiefdom. They 
argued that each step was necessary and that it did not take that long to input the data. 
Because the server was situated at their location, of course they had fewer delays with 
the system; however, they would not even entertain a compromise. They simply told us 
that they could not overwrite the software to allow us to work around the 27 steps. 
Although we had received permission from the three-star general, his own staff became 
a major obstacle to our proof of principle. 
 By the end of June 2015, I had my team disregard TDC requirements, building 
lesson plans without the constraint of TDC. My team had never done this, so it took me 
a couple of weeks to walk them through building a lesson plan from scratch along an 
outcomes-based approach. The instructional design team immediately endorsed the new 
instructional design methodology and asked why we had not been doing it this way as it 
supported the Army’s Learning Model (ALC 2015). I explained that the Army wants 
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and agile/adaptive curriculum but fails to adjust its policy and systems to support such 
an agile/adaptive instructional model. 
July 10, 2015: Another Crack at the Workload Capacity Model 
 As previously discussed in chapter six, one of the most complex components 
associated with the Army’s programs of instruction (POI) is understanding all of the 
moving parts encompassing how the Army resources the branch/proponent instructional 
programs. The resourcing and budgeting includes: facilities, equipment, instructors, 
material, ammunition, and the workforce who is responsible for creating and sustaining 
the products required to teach the programs of instruction. In 2014, a group of staffers at 
Fort Leavenworth got the brilliant idea to leverage the Training Development 
Capability (TDC) as a tool to demonstrate resourced workload, identify critical 
shortfall, fiscal year workload completed, and capacity utilization. The first outcome of 
the process demonstrated a workload capacity utilization of 145 percent. The model was 
demonstrating that we were far exceeding expected output. The model was showing that 
we had 138 people performing 167 peoples worth of work. I suspected that meant that 
we produced a lot of products resulting in a lower quality. It turned out that there was a 
little bit of truth to my suspicion. Prior to my graduate studies I would not have 
questioned data, but now going into a second iteration of capturing workload capacity 
against workload utilization I was better informed about quantitative methods. I had 
learned some things to watch for like validity, reliability, sample size, population, and 
data analysis and interpretation (Creswell, 2014). The first year I was exposed to this 
process I was awed by the large amount of data. Besides, it looked like we were 
performing really well, working hard to produce a lot of products. At 145 percent 
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capacity utilized, the data was showing the Army that we had more than adequate 
people assigned to perform the required work. The data was demonstrating that we had 
surplus people who could be assigned elsewhere. The data was beginning to paint a 
false picture of work accomplished against number of people assigned. As I began to 
get familiar with the program capabilities, I asked our higher headquarters to query 
some reports to demonstrate the quality of products produced. What I found out was 
that we had a lot of products submitted, and they contained a lot of mistakes. 
 I was beginning to question the higher headquarters motives:  Did they have a 
specific purpose or research design in mind? Were they were simply collecting data to 
fill out neat looking pie charts, and graphs to satisfy their own desires? The perception 
among Center of Excellence peers was that the higher headquarters was pulling data 
from the data base that resembled more of a pseudo-study than a non-experimental 
study (Ravid, 2011). This was the first flag that the data pulled was not providing good 
evidence of work accomplished. Another interesting fact was when I asked if I could 
pull the same reports at my level, I was told “no”, only the higher headquarters had the 
privileges to pull the data in such a manner. Now I was really beginning to get 
suspicious with the data and what the higher headquarters were trying to use it to prove. 
 Going into the second evolution of the workload management process, I was 
now better equipped with information that I learned in courses from Dr. Urick, Dr. 
Frick, and Dr. Crowson. Through their coursework, projects, and discussion, they had 
taught me to be a better consumer of data, and how data is used to demonstrate results 
with various confidence levels. This time I was prepared to challenge the team of 
staffers with some hard questions about the relevance behind what they were utilizing 
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the data to demonstrate. The higher headquarters produced a how to guide explaining 
six required reports and the submission process of each. The collective reports were 
then submitted through multiple staff agencies resulting in validation of human capital 
requirements against required and predicted end products. The Army utilizes an Army 
availability factor (AAF) of 1,740 man-hours per authorization described in Army 
Regulation 570-4 (Manpower Management, 2011). In the absence of a descriptive 
research study (Ravid, 2011) to explain the logic behind their work, I constructed an 
evaluation critique of their project based upon documented evidence, and my 
experience as a participant in the process. The outline I chose to critique the workload 
management study was provided in Dr. Frick’s Policy Evaluation Course, in the spring 
of 2015. My purpose here was to apply gained knowledge and understanding of theory-
based evaluation to uncover strengths and weaknesses and to explore a path for 
articulating better approaches in capturing workload capacity and utilization. 
Mini Program Evaluation Critique 
 In lieu of a descriptive research design, the staffers wrote a tasking order and a 
how to guide describing six reports and the process for submitting the reports. A tasking 
order is a recognized document that the Army uses to direct organizations to perform 
prescribed tasks. The contents of the tasking order followed a loose arrangement of 
goals to define the training development functions against requirements to determine 
the workload. The absence of a formal design predicates that the desired results would 
follow what Ravid (2011) suggests as “action research conducted by practitioner-
researchers in their own settings to solve a problem by studying it, proposing solutions, 
implementing the solutions, and assessing the effectiveness of these solutions” (p. 4). 
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The workload management study examined differences between total work years 
reported complete, capacity (people hired), and capacity utilization (products 
completed) within the current fiscal year, against projected workload, projected 
capacity, and any predicted shortfalls forecasted out to three fiscal years. The staffers 
who created the workload management study claimed that their collective data would 
provide an accurate account of human capital expenditures against products produced to 
justify resourcing the associated workforce producing training development products. 
Sample 
 A Center of Excellence comprised of two branch/proponent schools situated in a 
middle-sized community with 205 employee authorizations represented the human 
capital selected for the study. Fourteen products comprised the workload requirements; 
four tools were utilized to create, staff, and manage the products. Ten of the products 
utilized one tool labeled the Training Development Capacity (TDC). Lesson plans and 
programs of instruction represented 115 person-years of work, which comprised the 
majority of products produced. The remaining 25 person-years calculated produced the 
remaining twelve products. The vacancies (33), and misalignments (32) comprised the 
remaining 65 person-years represented. A total of 140 person-years represented the 
workload capacity population for the study at n = 140. 
Validity and Reliability of Measures/Dependability and 
Conformability of Accounts 
 Staffers performing as researchers utilized a variety of reports with the data from 
those reports placed into Microsoft Excel or Access type instruments to measure work 
plans completed, capacity utilization, and critical shortfalls. Both quantitative and 
qualitative data were represented through three sources: training development capacity 
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(TDC), focused interviews, and surveys. The quantitative data represented a 
mathematical model supporting the logic of the training and education development 
program objective memorandum (TED-POM) requirements. The TED-POM model was 
explained as: total requirement = end product + non end product adjustment + indirect 
work adjustment. The data was collected through the Training Development Capability 
(TDC) data base and various surveys designed along a mathematical scale looking 
toward confirmability rather than objectivity in establishing the value of the data. 
 Further investigation proved noteworthy as I began to look at the data to support 
various types of validity such as; multiple data sources, methods, and theoretical 
schemes (Lather, 1991). The study failed to demonstrate credibility, transferability, 
dependability, and confirmability along trustworthiness and authenticity discussed by 
Lincoln & Guba (1985). For example, response bias was not accounted for in the survey 
data which asked employees to fill out their own workload accomplished. Employees, 
based upon their own memory, filled out an excel spreadsheet with their accomplished 
workload against a list of specific products. When I asked employees and their 
supervisors how they accounted for their accomplished workload, they told me that they 
recorded a best guess. Employees also knew that an annual individual workload equated 
to 1,740 hours. Knowing the annual workload the employees would try to balance the 
total available hours against the number of products that they were responsible to 
produce. 
 The instruments utilized in the study were not described in detail nor supported 
through accounts found within scholarly literature. The collection of data also included 
site assistance visits conducted at the beginning of the collection process, followed by 
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another visit in the middle of the reporting period, and finally an out brief at the end to 
the reporting period. Instrumentation that was applied to measure the workload 
accomplished was lower than the previous year, indicating a lower worker performance. 
The existing model does not calculate work performed. Rather the model calculates 
work against end products which may take more than one fiscal year to complete. The 
current business rules lack adaptive, agile models which can calculate work 
accomplished during the fiscal year in the absence an end product (Ravid, 2011). 
Internal and External Validity of Study/Credibility and 
Transferability of Study 
 The study was administered over a twelve-month period with untrained research 
technicians unfamiliar with employee and leadership work requirements which 
competed against the end products recognized by the model. The model did not 
adequately capture work performed if the product produced was not listed as a product 
in the models output. Employees were told that they were participating in a project 
about their work experience, workload, and capacity utilization. Uniqueness of the 
setting, and the timing of the experiment were not considered to raise concern of 
quantitative external threats described by Creswell (2014), such as generalizing beyond 
the group at our Center of Excellence to groups located at other Centers of Excellence. 
Internal validity was threatened by both the selection of participants and the 
instrumentation which evolved during the twelve-month period. The population 
sampled represented seven job series who were all lumped into a single workload 
category. The categories of work are measured against an estimated time value (ETV). 
Work involved with the construction of programs of instruction, and lesson plans are 
well described in the workload management process. For example, creating new 
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curriculum accounts for 17 hours of work for every one academic hour; revising new 
curriculum accounts for ten hours of work for every one academic hour; reviewing 
curriculum accounts for eight hours of work for every academic hour. The mathematical 
formula calculating the remaining twelve types of products are the same as the 
curriculum, yet writing a doctrinal manual is not equal in terms of work required to 
produce a product. The study did not reference technical tools (Davis, 1983) or sources 
of literature supporting the science. The nature of independent and dependent variables 
were not described, therefore accurate accounting of work performed lacked further 
support by descriptive statistics delivered in an analytical table. External validity was 
threatened by people knowing that they were part of the study as well as the ability to 
record their own workload accomplished. Additionally employees recorded their own 
projected workload for the next fiscal year. No specific cause and effect relationships 
were established. 
Results 
 The staffers failed to acknowledge that the study they conducted did not account 
for all variables, different population demographics, and a single workload calculation 
applied against all fourteen products. Another highlight is the fact that workload 
accomplished was not calculated in the model until the product was validated at TOMA. 
This meant that tens of hours or more could have been spent on a product, but because 
the product was not finished in the fiscal year, that product did not count as workload 
accomplished. Reviewing the last two years of data confirmed the gap caused by the 
manner in which workload was calculated as workload accomplished. In first fiscal 
year, 2013, in which the Army ran the program, our organization only produced a 
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workload capacity utilization of 56 percent. During the second fiscal year, 2014, our 
record books indicated a tremendous workload capacity increase, particularly in our 
lesson plans and programs of instruction. Our organization workload capacity yielded 
an amazing 145 percent. In the third year, the focus of this study, the workload capacity 
utilization yielded a lowly 76 percent when the models were run at the higher 
headquarters. 
 With two years under my belt, I decided to keep my own data of work 
performed, and was prepared to argue our numbers with the higher headquarters. When 
we received our out brief in December of 2015 demonstrating a 76 percent yield, I had 
enough. When I challenged the data in terms of reliability, validity, and inquired as to 
the standard calculation across the products, the higher headquarters told me that we 
had a 23 person-year short fall. They even indicated that since we weren’t using 
everybody that we could utilize some of the extra people to perform some of our un-
resourced requirements. The staffers proposed that their efforts and data demonstrated 
promise, despite shallow empirical evidence supporting the study’s findings. I beg to 
differ, and will explore some of the issues in my discussion of limitations. 
Limitations 
 Although no limitations are offered from the people comprising the study, I will 
offer four of my own identified limitations of the study. First, analysis at the individual 
employee level even though all employees were selected, conditions surrounding work 
required of a particular product as well as the skillset of the employee were not taken 
into account. This limits causal inferences to be drawn from the initial study. The 
simple mathematical calculation of the model does not adequately account for all types 
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of products. Second, despite a one-size fits all model, significant differences between 
work accomplished on-site versus work, recognized as accomplished at the higher 
headquarters causes false reports. The problem is that work accomplished does not 
count at the higher headquarters until the product is validated. Third, with regard to the 
model algorithm, because of its rigidity the model fails to account for all categories of 
work associated with each individual product. Additionally, it does not account for 
indirect work. For example, support to training development, administrative work, 
supervising projects, a new branch/proponent requirement, or a commanding general 
requirement, and mandatory employee training just to name a few. Fourth, the system 
itself continues to change and receive updates to the software, changing procedures, and 
adding requirements, yet failing to provide an agile, and adaptive tool to meet the needs 
of the user while providing valuable resourcing data for those who stand before Army 
leadership trying to acquire educational and instructional resources. 
September 21, 2015: Formally Withdrawing from the Proof of Principle 
 My instructional design team along with a select group of instructors were 
making wonderful progress on the course we had chosen as a pilot earlier in the spring. 
I did, however, want to receive confirmation from the higher headquarters that we 
would receive full support for our project. I contacted a different agency at Fort 
Leavenworth where a former colleague and close friend of mine worked. His agency 
would actually staff our finished products later in the process. I set up a teleconference 
between him and my curriculum development team to discuss our project. As we laid 
out our project, my friend at Fort Leavenworth expressed full support of what we 
wanted to achieve. He told me that if we were able to get the project done, that we 
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would be the first branch/proponent school to construct and teach a tracked curriculum. 
He said that what we were doing was what was described in the Army Learning 
Concepts (ALC 2015) and that all CoEs should be creating such projects. I talked to 
him about the obstacles encountered with another agency on his post and he said that he 
would champion our effort with the higher headquarters. This was great news and really 
lifted the spirits of the design team, who had been receiving a lot of negative feedback 
from both within and without to the CoE. The support of my friend located with the 
outside agency, as well as my colleague at Fort Benning enabled us to tell the other 
organization at Fort Leavenworth that we were going to pull the plug on the proof of 
principle. 
 The three-star headquarters was in transition, organizing into a University-like 
structure titled Army University. The change meant that over 100 people would be 
moved to new locations, under a new structure, with new bosses, and a new approach to 
business processes…or so we hoped. With the looming change, the staffer who had 
hosted the TED-E conference in the spring of 2015 was getting anxious about the 
progress of the work groups. Although my colleague from Fort Benning and I had 
already told the forum organizer that we were going to stop further work on our project, 
the leadership at the higher headquarters somehow failed to hear what we had been 
telling them all summer. The higher headquarters refused to help us work around the 
rigidity of the TDC tool, so we did not see any use in continuing the study. 
 In anticipation of the higher headquarters receiving the first ever Provost, the 
staffers wanted to ensure that the subordinate organizations were put on the hook to 
present their work group proof of principle projects. The word on the street was that the 
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new Provost would be on the ground and ready to take presentations by November 
2015. Concentrating on the present, I built and presented a brief to the higher 
headquarters, demonstrating that we had conquered the enemy, and the enemy was 
them. Actually, I constructed a single slide sketching our revised project with a timeline 
of our key events listed in the center of the chart. Highlighted in the upper left corner 
was a revised set of proofs of principle questions, and labeled TDC input as streamlined 
versus 23 steps. In the upper right of the chart I laid out the estimated time values 
(ETVs) against the total number of academic hours which we were creating. Eight 
minutes into my presentation I asked if there were any questions. There was a long 
pause, no questions, only a small compliment from the staffers, and they proceeded to 
the next presenter. I had gotten through the first gate. 
 The presentation of the workgroups to the new Provost would end up being 
postponed until February 2016. On February 16, 2016, I was asked to present our 
group’s findings to the Army Learning Coordination Council (ALCC). The ALCC 
members included all seventeen branch/proponent school leadership and all seven 
Centers of Excellence Commanders. When I connected to the forum utilizing a video 
teleconference, I introduced myself and presented our group’s findings and 
recommendations to the ALCC forum. In an effort to be polite, I began by thanking the 
team at Fort Leavenworth for their patience while our group worked through our 
desired path to fix the data collection tool. Next, I took the group back in time to the 
April 2015 conference and reiterated our group’s established problem statement, 
recommended solutions, timeline, and metrics. I paused for just a moment to let the 
audience soak up the information which was supported in my presentation chart then 
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began talking again gently adding that this was our delivered contract with the three-star 
who had approved us to move forward. I concluded with the number of person-years 
spent between two of the Centers of Excellence teams and told the forum that due to the 
constraints associated with TDC, we would no longer pursue the project. 
 There was a moment of silence before the Provost asked the larger audience if 
anyone had any questions for me. With no questions from the audience, the Provost 
thanked me for the presentation and our team for the work performed. Later in the 
presentations I was delighted to see that the staffers responsible for TDC had a 
presentation in which they had been directed to resolve the rigidity of TDC and make it 
more user friendly. The staffers presented their case as trying to achieve a balance 
between usefulness to the user and it’s adaptability as a tool for capturing resources for 
programs of instruction. The staffers appeared bent on keeping the status quo despite all 
of the users demanding change. It will be interesting to see how the project turns out 
over the next several months; it will be one in which all of the CoEs will remain heavily 
engaged in order to resolve. Fullan (2011) explains this situation wonderfully in his 
sixth chapter, Know Your Impact. He suggests that “learning confidently requires 
knowing what is going on, and what impact you are having” (p. 127). This is an item 





Reflections and Implications 
 This chapter represents my own explanation of personal and professional 
development as an emerging scholar and educational leader. The paths I pursued were 
not always clear and often I encountered obstacles. Early in my career I learned to 
overcome challenges with brute force and ignorance. In my continued service as an 
Army leader, I was exposed to higher levels of education. With time, my own reliance 
on brute force and ignorance was conquered by learning and improved practice. I 
started to think differently and approach situations with a more mature, reasoned 
purpose. My mind wrestled with theory while observing the day-to-day practice 
demonstrated by our Army school leaders. I began to wonder why there was such a 
discrepancy between theory and practice. Why were these leaders not acting like 
educational leaders? How could my lived experience provide insight into the ways in 
which Army school leadership might better meet the goals associated with 
implementing educational change? 
 I knew that I had to write my story, one which I hope captures the interest of 
senior Army leaders. I also understood that I had to gain attention and demonstrate my 
value both at the local CoE-level as well as the enterprise-level. By enterprise level, I 
mean the organizational headquarters comprising the three star, four star headquarters, 
and the Army. The enterprise level contained several forums which offered me a 
platform to present exemplars of practice. I quickly re-established former relationships 
while building new ones vertically and horizontally, both internally and externally to 
the Center of Excellence. During the first year, I earned a strong reputation within a 
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core group of practitioners participating in the enterprise-level forums, where I was 
often asked to present my work. The experience opened a door, and exposed me to 
higher levels of the enterprise, and helped me to establish a voice for our local Army 
schools. 
 Three years ago, when I began my tenure at the Center of Excellence as deputy 
director of education and instructional programs, I was asked to assess the current state 
of instructional programs in the two branch/proponent schools and provide CoE leaders 
with a plan for improvement. I began by looking for data points, evidence of 
measurable results that would demonstrate the quality of our instructional products, 
student benchmarks, and teacher effectiveness. What I discovered was an absence of 
business process management (BPM) which I explained at some length in chapter six. 
No evidence of metrics could be found, which contributed to leadership making 
uninformed decisions, such as random changes in the curriculum. Initially, the data 
collected would serve to build a phased strategy, driving and influencing educational 
change across the Center of excellence over the next three to five years. 
 In Chapter five I explained phase one, beginning with the lesson plan surge with 
a transition into phase two, organizing around lead program management teams. The 
project immediately resembled scattered pieces of a complex puzzle where even the 
picture on the puzzle container was so distorted you could not tell what the assembled 
pieces would sketch. The absence of any source of data points caused me to spend the 
first 30 days exploring multiple avenues to collect information and build my own 
database. I started my exploration with the employees, where I found myself engaged in 
wonderful conversations and both collecting information while at the same time 
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building collective trust (Forsyth, et al., 2010). Eventually, I discovered that the total 
number of programs of instruction during fiscal year 2013 was 178. The lesson plans 
contained in those programs of instruction (POI) accounted for over 30,000 academic 
hours of classroom instruction. Now that I knew how many POIs existed, I devised a 
way to determine the quality of each POI. Next, I determined the workload associated 
with reviewing, revising, and creating new material from each program of instruction. 
 Anecdotally, I received some feedback: most POI issues centered on poor 
management, lack of trust, and the fact that there were no accountability measures in 
place. No one was keeping the branch/proponent leadership informed on the status of 
programs of instruction. Therefore, branch/proponent leaders lacked good visibility on 
their programs and were not tracking the requirement to implement tenets of the Army 
Learning Model 2015 (ALC, 2011). Priorities were not clear and the organization 
lacked direction from both branch/proponents as well as the person in charge of 
managing the cyclic maintenance of the programs of instruction. I had walked into a 
real mess that would take a lot of time and effort to correct. 
 The Army’s policy established a POI cyclic maintenance schedule which 
directed that branch/proponents review each POI once every three years. Changes or 
maintenance to the programs of instruction fall within three categories of work: Review, 
Revise, and New. Each category of work is assigned work hours following an estimated 
time value. Naturally, I wanted to know what the forecasted cyclic schedule would look 
like against each category for both branch/proponent schools. Once I could see the 
cyclic maintenance schedule sketched against each category I could accurately 
determine the workload against the required review of POI. As I write this final chapter, 
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my team is still working to create a cyclic POI maintenance schedule. The products 
resulting from this effort will form the foundational products used to inform the newly 
assigned Center of excellence and branch/proponent leadership in the summer of 2016. 
 Studies of successful school leadership such as those done by Carter, et al. 
(1992) support sustainability as one of the key ingredients that drive successful 
educational change. A survey of current literature indicates that the Army policy 
surrounding the tenure of Center of excellence and branch/proponent leaders will 
remain status quo. Since leadership turnover is predicted to remain frequent, one way to 
mitigate instability across the branch/proponent programs of instruction is to enforce the 
Army’s prescribed cyclic maintenance schedule. This is easier said than done, as 
anyone familiar with Army generals knows; they cannot simply come in and leave well 
enough alone. The Army is rich in tradition and one of those unwritten traditions, until 
recently, included making the unit better and leaving it in good shape for the next 
person. 
 In 2009 the Combined Arms Center located at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 
published a “Leadership Transition Handbook” which describes a standard procedure 
for leaders to follow when they assume a leadership role in an organization. The 
transition model comprises four distinct phases: 1) preparation to assume the leadership 
position, 2) conducting a 30-day initial assessment during the first month in the 
position, 3) alignment and team building during the second month, 4) the third month 
consists of socializing, forming the new vision, and goals. During this study, two new 
Center of Excellence leaders and five branch/proponent leaders have come and gone, all 
of whom applied portions of the prescribed transition model. 
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 The two Center of Excellence leaders, at the end of their 90-day assessment, 
gathered a group of their local colonels and conducted an off-site to formulate a strategy 
framework consisting of a vision statement, mission, and end-state. The strategy 
framework was handed off to a group of planners who formed an operational planning 
team (OPT). The planning team generally followed procedures described in Field 
Manual 6-0 (Commander and Staff Organization and Operations, 2014). Details of the 
process and results were previously described in chapter six of this study. Although the 
strategy explained the new leadership’s direction for the next two years, it did little to 
alleviate the turmoil felt deeper in the organization (Forsyth et al., 2011). 
 Organizationally, the employees were dealing with multiple tasks driven by 
Army requirements, branch/proponent leadership desires, and a new Center of 
Excellence strategy. Numerous priorities emerged and began stacking up and overriding 
core requirements, creating a backlog against our primary products. The ingredients of 
change driven from the top without the top understanding the consequences in relation 
to how programs of instruction are built, staffed, resourced, and implemented, can cause 
long-lasting effects. Some of the evidence discovered from those effects can be found in 
thousands of backlogged curriculum products; curriculum that cannot be worked on 
because of competing demands against dwindling recourses. 
 In 2014 senior leaders began inquiring into the CoEs product backlog, going as 
far as outsourcing to reduce the backlog. The effort had good intentions but was not 
getting at the root cause of backlogged products. Next, the leadership attempted to tie 
backlog to training gaps, quality of products, and the numbers of people assigned to do 
the work. Leadership either failed to recognize or elected to ignore the competing effect 
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of their priorities against cyclic requirements. The cyclic management of required 
products is designed to facilitate the routine updates and maintenance of 
branch/proponents programs of instruction. When demand exceeds capability, only a 
select number of programs of instruction receive the requisite attention to meet ALM 
2015 standards, incorporate new doctrines, account for new equipment, or integrate new 
interactive multimedia instruction. Those programs that fall outside of the priorities tend 
to stagnate and become backlogged curriculum. Over time this translates to poor quality 
lesson plans and outdated facilities, which could result in a downward turn of 
performance in the field. If we could only produce some real data to demonstrate the 
connections between good curriculum, great delivery, and state-of-the art facilities! 
 Efforts beginning in 2014 and continuing into the present find branch/proponent 
leaders continuing to seek ways to be more efficient while failing to see the problem 
before their very eyes. Fullan (2011) describes one theme in his research using this 
comparison, “we don’t see the obvious things unless we are looking for them. That’s 
why we run over bicycles and cut off motorcycles, more than cars” (p. 128). Fullan 
(2011) further described the famous experiment by Chabris and Simons (2010) where 
they filmed two teams, one dressed in white the other in black, passing a basketball. 
They asked participants to count the number of passes. Most participants guessed the 
number of passes yet they failed to notice a girl dressed in a gorilla suit pass through the 
middle of the two teams. Too many things were competing for their attention. Fullan 
(2011) refers to this as the “disease of distraction” (p. 131) suggesting that leaders focus 
on fewer measures of impact as they craft strategies to move their organizations 
forward. As I stated earlier in this study, the Center of Excellence and branch/proponent 
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leaders only remain in their positons from twelve to twenty four months. The short 
tenure leaves very little time for these leaders to drive or influence educational change 
on their watch. This is where good data could help inform the leadership as they 
develop their priorities and determine places where their influence is critical. 
 When I arrived on this job, measuring student performance in the classroom was 
haphazard at best with some data collected by instructors and course managers who 
were not formally trained. The instruments they used included after action reviews 
which mirrored focus group techniques, and surveys. A training and analysis branch 
(TAB) was working for me, and they conducted a few quasi-studies from 2009 to 2011. 
Their efforts attempted to measure recent graduates and determine how well they were 
performing in the field. The instruments that they employed were web-based surveys 
constructed along a Likert type scale. The team had good intent, but like the Quality 
Assurance Office (QAO) team, were not formally trained in conducting research 
studies. What was missing was the science behind genuine research design. People were 
trying to do the right thing, but the efforts were fragmented at best. No standard survey 
tool existed, and no formal design or method guiding evaluation existed. Course 
authors, those responsible for programs of instruction, maintained student test scores on 
every student and subject, yet the data was not analyzed to improve learning. As part of 
a continuing effort to produce evidence and raise the awareness of branch/proponent 
school performance, I decided to run a multiple regression test during the fall of 2014 as 
a project for Dr. Urick’s Applied Quant course assignment to run a multiple regression 
test. The test would determine success factors for predicting the pass rates of one of our 
toughest branch/proponent courses. I pulled a sample of data from one course to 
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determine x controlling for student background; x does academic engagement 
(module/block), race, gender, college degree, or commissioning source predict 
[influence] named module achievement, Hyde, J. S., Fennema, E. H., and Lamon, S. J. 
(1990)? The Null [H0]: suggested that there is no influence and does not predict 
academic engagement on named module scores. H1: There is a positive influence of 
academic engagement on named module scores. 
 The study utilized multiple variables to predict one criterion variable to 
determine if significance existed among the variables. The statistics were collected from 
an archived data-base maintained by named school (Montoya, 2014). Independent 
variables included; gender, race, commissioning source, college degree, module test 3. 
Since the named module recently changed in both content and structure starting with 
class 6-14 it was deemed necessary to study the five preceding classes. Therefore, 
classes 1-14 to 5-14 served as a foundational sample for future comparison with the 
implemented change of structure and content in class 6-14. Included in the study was a 
short descriptive of the necessary steps utilized to clean the data prior to running the 
multiple regression test. The purpose of the study was on lieutenant achievement in a 
specific named module to demonstrate value as a foundational study relating variable 
effects which contributed to pass rates and improved achievement of the specific named 
module. Subsequent studies focused on improving course design and content could 
benefit knowing which variables best predict improved student achievement. This is 
another area where those selected to supervise Centers of Excellence and operate 
branch/proponent schools could benefit from understanding responsibilities inherent 
within educational leadership. 
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 The final area that leadership asked me to study surrounded instructor 
certification which, at the time, fell under the CoE quality assurance office (QAO). The 
QAO programs were recognized as strong programs, but had some room for 
improvement. The director was narrowly focused on an upcoming Army accreditation 
visit while ignoring the absence of rubrics associated with implementing the new Army 
Learning Model 2015. The Army did not develop rubrics to measure how well Centers 
of Excellence would implement ALM 2015; instead they left that task to the 
subordinate CoEs to wrestle with. The Army stipulates that each QAO office evaluates 
branch/proponent school courses in accordance with accreditation standards described 
in the Army Enterprise Accreditation Standards (TRADOC Regulation 11-21, 2014). 
The AEAS contained 28 standards which included areas surrounding implementation of 
ALM 2015 principles. The absence of rubrics to measure the implementation progress 
of ALM 2015 would continue to cause friction between the CoEs and the higher 
headquarters. The QAO director refused to take on the role of developing the metrics, 
so I added the task of building rubrics for ALM 2015 implementation to my team of 
curriculum developers who were involved in my lesson plan surge. 
 In the second year at the situated CoE, I could not get any traction with the new 
leadership to regain efforts toward accomplishing ALM 2015 goals. The new leadership 
began their tenure seemingly unfamiliar with the Army’s transformation efforts 
following ALM 2015. We were not the only Center of Excellence struggling to fully 
implement ALM 2015, and the higher headquarters finally recognized that numerous 
friction points were slowing down progress across the six Centers of Excellence. The 
higher headquarters initiated three efforts to determine why CoEs were struggling to 
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fully implement ALM 2015. The first included two separate Army Research Institute 
(ARI) studies and nominated an ALM task force, from its own staff, to explore ALM 
implementation accomplishment across all CoEs. The ARI team designed two research 
studies with both collecting data in 2014 producing a final report in late 2015. One 
study focused on collecting data to identify the accomplishments and challenges of 
employing technology to meet the goals of the Army Learning Model (ALM) 2015. The 
second study focused on determining factors which contributed to pockets of successful 
ALM 2015 implementation at the branch/proponent level. Both studies identified 
pockets of success across the Centers of Excellence and described familiar gaps. The 
studies did not reveal any new evidence. I already knew that we did not fully perform 
ADDIE in our curriculum development. I was tracking resource constraints in both 
people and money; I was fully aware of the lack of formal evaluation programs and, of 
course, the turnover of key individuals was no surprise. I found it interesting that the 
ARI studies seamlessly skipped over what I had discovered as a root cause in the 
struggle to implement ALM 2015. 
 One of the gaps discovered was the absence of any program evaluation plan 
exploring strengths, weaknesses or limitations within the Army’s leadership 
development model. Therefore, a study structured to investigate Center of Excellence 
and branch/proponent leadership’s relational and consequential role implementing 
educational change should occur. Such a study could offer new insights into 
preparation, education, selection, and sustainability of leaders supervising Centers of 
Excellence or operating branch/proponent schools. Literature supporting assessment of 
education is described as systematic gathering and review of information concerning 
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educational programs in order to improve learning and development (Palomba & Banta, 
1999). Surprisingly, a common thread found among assessment literature describes the 
single notion that, to know how well and to what extent something is occurring, there 
must be a metric. The metric then demonstrates a measured level of output comprising 
tasks that generate reliable assessment of a student’s knowledge, skills, and abilities to 
demonstrate mastery (Pearson, 2014). Interestingly, studies from higher education, 
training communities such as Vo-Tech and Army sanctioned research institutes provide 
a cross-fertilization of ideas well suited to evaluate and assess Army education. 
 Literature stemming from the education community generally comprises 
collecting, synthesizing, and interpreting of data whose findings aid instructional 
decision making. The collection of data typically describes six different assessment 
types: diagnostic (assesses a student’s strengths, weaknesses, knowledge, and skills 
prior to instruction), formative (assesses a student’s performance during instruction and 
usually occurs regularly throughout the instruction process), summative (measures the 
student’s achievement at the end of instruction), norm–referenced (compares a student’s 
performance against a national or other “norm” group), criterion–referenced (measures 
a student’s performance against a goal, specific objective, or standard) and interim 
benchmark (evaluates student performance at periodic intervals, frequently at the end of 
a grading period; can predict student performance on end–of–year summative tests) 
(Lepi, 2013). 
 Literature discovered from the training community demonstrate evaluation 
models moving from intellectual learning measured in the classroom toward evaluation 
of individual performance of those competencies demonstrated on the job. The 
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individual performance is then measured against impact on the organization 
(Kirkpatrick, 1994). This training evaluation methodology includes assessment of 
individual performance, yet focuses on the bottom line of accomplishment and its 
relevance to organizational output. The ultimate outcome for training evaluation is to 
measure the return on investment. That means how much revenue is spent training the 
workforce relative to the profit demonstrated from increasing knowledge or skills 
(Kirkpatrick, 1994). Although such a model includes the human dimension, it also 
connects the organization making this an ideal concept when assessing professional 
military education. The institution is concerned with both genuine learning and 
increasing organizational effectiveness. 
 Material garnered from the senior officer orientation course demonstrates that 
executive-level leadership recognizes that those leaders, newly assigned to supervise, 
Centers of Excellence or operate branch/proponent schools are not fully equipped to 
perform educational leadership functions. Currently the Army is working to restructure 
and improve the weeklong course called the Senior Officer Orientation Program 
(SOOP). Numerous engagements from the higher headquarters continue asking, “What 
can be done to improve leadership understanding of the Analysis, Design, 
Development, Implementation, Evaluation (ADDIE) approach associated with the 
curriculum development process?” Given the current environment we would be better 
served by constraining the designated leadership to a proven model which they would 
not be allowed to disrupt. Instead, make the new leadership work within the model and 
rely upon the educational experts in the organization. Current Army practice does not 
leverage the knowledge, experience, education, and certification of civilians assigned to 
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the organization. The civilian workforce also provides continuity of effort as most 
civilian employees serve for many years in the same position. It is time for the Army to 
take a hard look at its current policy and practice of selecting those leaders to supervise 
CoEs and operate branch/proponent schools. The ARI or RAND Corporation could 
conduct a research study in this area, evaluating the Army leader development model 
and requirements against successful K-12 leadership development programs and 
studies. 
 This year, my third year in position at the Center of Excellence, we continued 
refining previously established structures and processes and focused more on instructor, 
and student performance. We felt that we had found a way to assess the delivery of 
instruction and improve student learning. I hand-picked a gifted team from within my 
organization and by summer they were in place. We began to formulate a program 
evaluation study based upon Kirkpatrick’s four levels of training and evaluation 
(Kirkpatrick, 2006). We identified one of our officer courses which was going through a 
complete redesign allowing us to start on the ground floor. Focusing on a single course 
also allowed us to start evaluation on a small scale, where we hope to demonstrate the 
value of such a program to both Center of Excellence and branch/proponent leadership 
as well as the stakeholders positioned in the operational units. Proving the value behind 
such a program remains paramount in sustaining a workforce in the years to come. With 
success hinging on the hope that, after a year of implementation, we may be able to use 
the model to reach a broader array of courses at the CoE while proving value to the 
Army writ  large and ultimately demonstrating a “return on expectations” as described 
by Dr. Jim Kirkpatrick (2010). 
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 Fortunately, the director of QAO resigned in the late spring of 2014, bringing 
the program under my direction in the fall of 2014. I was delighted that my colleague 
and mentor, Dr. Casey Blaine, would join my team, where he would find a new freedom 
to finally move his program forward. Instructor certification included a basic instructor 
course (ABIC) for general instructors, a small group course for those selected to teach 
small group, and a unit certification requirement for all instructors. The basic instructor 
course focuses on creating a foundational understanding of the experiential learning 
model (Kolb, 1984), classroom management, student assessment, an introduction to 
instructional technology, and facilitation skills. Next, the small group instructor’s 
course teaches more andragogy, an introduction to developing and writing lesson plans. 
With the departure of the CoE quality assurance director, our staff and faculty 
professional development division, led by Dr. Casey Blaine, is recognized by top Army 
leadership as representing the Army’s ‘gold standard’ for like programs. 
 In the fall of 2015, we hosted Dr. Kirkpatrick for a two-day seminar, and to our 
delight it was attended by our top civilian, a two-star equivalent. Other attendees 
included one colonel, four colonel-equivalent civilians, the deputy to the chief of staff, a 
hand-picked team of top curriculum developers, and a representative from both 
branch/proponent schools. In January 2016, we hosted Dr. Kirkpatrick for an advanced 
application of his training and evaluation program. Our project now is to develop an 
implementation plan to ultimately demonstrate the return on expectations. We will 
finish and deliver a plan in early June 2016 focused on the program evaluation of one 
course over the next year. Following the Kirkpatrick model, we will also employ sound 
approaches to educational research such as those described by Ravid (2011), Creswell 
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(2014), and Maxwell (2013). Finally, as the CoE allowed us to continue to implement 
new accountability measures with little or no cost to support these new control 
mechanisms, we have gained tremendous traction for a more thorough way to analyze 
student learning and performance. In the summer of 2016, I intend to unveil a program 
evaluation plan to demonstrate how well our schools are preparing students to perform 
in their jobs. 
 For the first time in thirty years associated with Army training and education I 
began to appreciate the foundational architecture underlying the Army’s leadership 
development model, and understand the purpose it was designed to serve. In my search 
for answers as to why the Army seems to struggle with transforming education my third 
year in the job, finishing my graduate-level coursework, the pieces of the puzzle began 
to come together leading to an increased understanding. Attending and participating in a 
variety of events from the classroom to the board room, observing various training and 
educational forums, I began to connect a list of skills and competencies required of 
successful school leaders. The experiential and theoretical connections began to 
resonate in my daily practice as I recognized actions or the absence of actions which 
helped me to frame gaps in the Army leader development model. 
 Army regulation and policy clearly establishes roles and functions for those 
supervising Centers of Excellence and operating branch/proponent schools. So why is 
educational transformation so hard for the Army to implement at the CoE, and 
branch/proponent levels? The answer may lie within a study created by Dreyfus and 
Dreyfus (1980) demonstrating “A five-stage model of the mental activities involved in 
directed skill acquisition” (p. 1). The researchers describe the evolution of skill levels 
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from novice to expert, where at each stage of training the learner must acquire 
knowledge related to the tasks involved in enabling advancement. Studies relating to 
successful institutional leadership demonstrate the validity behind the Dreyfus skill 
acquisition model. Further details explaining school leadership theory may be found in 
the literature review of this study located in Appendix 1. A. 
 With the combination of forces in my professional life spanning 30-years in the 
practice and almost four-years in graduate school, I found myself growing in 
understanding through experiential learning (Clandinin, 2013). I quit blaming leaders 
for not knowing or understanding educational and instructional programs. I began to 
open my own eyes toward the complexity of Army education and training budgeting, 
resourcing policy, and process. I began to appreciate the Army’s Leadership 
Development Model (FM 6-22, 2015) for what purpose it serves, and not for the gaps 
created in how the Army selects and prepares those senior leaders to supervise CoEs 
and operate branch/proponent schools. I discovered how exposed I was placed into the 
unfamiliar territory of Army training, education budgeting, and resourcing. Despite 
having over twelve of my 30 years serving in the Army’s school system from captain to 
lieutenant colonel, and senior civilian, it was not until I began deliberately exploring the 
practice and studying the theory that my eyes were opened as to why the Army seems to 
struggle with transforming education. 
 The concept of Army education reform can be traced back to Elihu Root, 
Secretary of War from 1899 to 1904; “Roots formula for officer development called for 
rotation of duty assignments and intermittent periods of professional schooling” 
(Coumbe, 2010, p. 2). History paints a very successful Army in its ability to perform 
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traditional Army missions, as is evident from its conception on June 14, 1775. As I 
began to understand Army education budgeting and resourcing policy and process, it 
became clear that I must become the subject matter expert who guides the 
branch/proponent-level leadership. I must play an instrumental role providing them the 
right information to manage their programs of instruction. Advising the 
branch/proponent leadership along informed recommendations empowers them to fulfill 
their office responsibilities. I must be the resolute leader who knows what matters most, 
which Fullan (2011) described as the practitioner who over time, and with continuous 
learning, becomes the expert. 
Conclusion 
 Change in a large organization takes time and persistence neither of which the 
uniformed leadership has. Leveraging my increased knowledge and earned relationships 
I have influenced small changes, thus far, to a few of the branch/proponent programs 
resulting in local policy change, improved management of courses, and improved 
administration of budgeting and resourcing. Through partnerships with colleagues 
situated at other Centers of Excellence throughout the Army, the Army University staff, 
and local community we will continue to share a vision aimed at improving our 
products and processes leading to enhanced student performance. In order to 
accomplish these goals, those supervising the Centers of Excellence and operating the 
branch/proponent schools must learn to rely upon their educational leaders. Those few 
educational leaders must expertly navigate Army leaders through the Army training and 
education budgeting, and resourcing policy, and systems. A relationship of collective 
trust (Forsyth, Adams, & Hoy, 2010) jointly places transformational leadership, and 
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educational experts in a better position to maintain the operational needs of the schools, 
meet the demands directed by Army policy, and improve accountability requirements. 
Army regulation 600-20 stipulates that “commanders are responsible for everything that 
their command does or fails to do” (Command Policy, 2014, p. 6). Yet there remains an 
absence of deliberate preparation, education, and selection, resulting in a fractured 
purpose of the Army leadership development model. The Army should take a measured 
approach to better prepare, educate, and select CoE, and branch/proponent leaders. For 
example, programs focused toward building specific skills that could help better prepare 
those Army leaders selected to supervise Centers of Excellence or operation 
branch/proponent schools to navigate the hurdles involving educational leadership 
skills, and competencies (Fullan, 2011; Kowalski, 2013). 
 It is important to note that the stories that make up a narrative inquiry are just 
that. They are stories; they are not the actual event. The stories stand as virtual realities, 
metaphors for the real thing (Clandinin & Connelly, 2000; Leavy, 2009). Leaders 
supervising Centers of Excellence or running branch/proponent schools face data on a 
daily basis in the form of charts, spreadsheets, and graphs demonstrating results in 
numbers. Taken independently, this data could influence decisions affecting change in 
the schools. Exploring the relationships among the various data points and explaining 
the connections narratively provides a more comprehensive sketch of what the data 
collectively means. The clue to the struggle may be found within the Army’s own 
prescribed formula for command and supported in its own policy and programs. 
 My experience through the narrative continues to demonstrate that the path is 
always open and I am free to walk knowing that I have made meaning from experience 
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having traveled the backroads of my mind. The reflection and implications in this 
chapter refer to what Clandinin (2013) discusses as “making meaning through 
experience” (p. 46). “In narrative inquiry, the story itself stands, shifting the focus of the 
inquiry to understand the many stories it stands on, beside or among, to render an 
account of life as it is lived” (Downey & Clandinin, 2010, p. 387).. The clue to the 
struggle may be found within the Army’s own prescribed formula for command and 
supported in its own policy and programs. Thus, the time might be appropriate to again 
state: For it is not in how the Army develops leaders, it is to what purpose the Army 
develops leaders, which provides a common place to explore new knowledge. Standing 
on a new frontier shaped by my previous experiences and knowledge gained through an 
incredible graduate program led by exemplar faculty, I better understand what Fullan 
(2011) described as the “most effective leaders use practice as their fertile learning 
ground” (p. xii). The results of these efforts will be fulfilled when the stakeholders 
embrace the value of a training and evaluation program that ultimately improves student 
performance. The Army should seek a more agile, adaptive approach in its command 
and key billet policies and processes, and at a minimum, stabilize those who supervise 
Centers of Excellence and operate branch/proponent schools beyond the typical one- or 
two-year term. There is a need to build a stronger leader preparation course that exceeds 
the current one-week senior officer orientation program. Finally, the Army should 
establish a superintendent-like certification process, require a degree in education, and 
seek those who have demonstrated success serving in Army schools and Centers 
(TRADOC). Adopting the Be, Know, Do model will better support the achievement of 
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Appendix 1.A. Literature Review 
 The concept of school leadership development can be traced back to the early 
1900s as school superintendents began to transform from an instructional focused role 
toward a more administrative focused role (Kowalski & Brunner, 2011). Although 
numerous studies exist on the topic of school leadership development, it was not until 
superintendents began to come under scrutiny in the 1980s that caused experts to 
examine the practice more closely (Carter, Glass, & Hord, 1993). In their research they 
present data specifically on selecting, preparing, and developing those who serve as a 
school superintendent. Interestingly, chapter nine is dedicated to describing the 
“changing role requirements and new demands placed upon the shoulders of those who 
are to spearhead necessary restructure and reform” (Carter, Glass, & Hord, 1993, p. 
132). Army leader development on the other hand, has a much longer history born out 
of tradition and the necessity to develop people to lead large and small organizations 
into harm’s way. A review of scholarly literature grounding the practice of school 
leadership provided a foundational base for this study. Literature surrounding the Army 
leadership requirements and development model, exposes gaps in Army leadership 
practice for those Army leaders who find themselves, out of the norm, supervising 
Centers of Excellence and running branch/proponent schools. It is here where my study 
examines new territory situating Army leaders in charge of schools. 
 Army leaders who assume responsibilities to supervise Centers of Excellence 
(CoE) and run branch proponent/schools enter unfamiliar territory. Leader Development 
(Department of the Army, 2015a) suggest that leadership at this level operates outside 
of their practiced experience leading subordinates operating outside of their past 
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practice, as well. The Army relies upon leadership to provide the organization a 
competitive advantage over its adversaries (Department of the Army, 2015a), yet the 
very essence of a leadership’s role directing and influencing school change continues to 
escape a measureable study. Despite various executive-level efforts to determine why 
the Army is struggling to implement the Army Learning Model (Department of the 
Army, 2011b), none to date have tackled relational and consequential effects 
associating leadership development as a variable linked toward implementation.  
 Studies surrounding successful public school leadership development trend 
toward a central theme suggesting leadership as the critical component driving and 
influencing positive change (Leithwood, Day, Sammons, Harris, & Hopkins, 2006). 
Teachers contribute to students’ learning by sharing what they know and believe while 
district leadership supports student learning enforced through what leadership knows 
and believes about teaching (Knapp, Copland, & Talbert, 2003). Army leaders chosen 
to supervise CoEs and run branch proponent/schools represent a very elite group of 
selected senior officers who demonstrate the capability to supervise and run large 
complex organizations (Department of the Army, 2015a). Army schools resemble large 
complex organizations, suggesting that the Army leader development model adequately 
supports leader development and preparation to supervise a Center of Excellence and 
run a branch proponent/school. However, transformational school leadership depends 
largely upon the understanding and appreciation of learning. Slayton and Mathis (2010) 
contend, 
The leader is the authority in the school system or school. If he or she is intent 
on facilitating significant change or transformation within his or her 
organization, he or she must be knowledgeable about and be able to foster 
positive learning conditions that will facilitate the learning of adults (p. 36). 
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Therefore, a study designed to inform improved practice along selection, 
preparation, training and stabilization of Army leaders who supervise CoEs and 
run branch proponent/schools could bridge a gap between research and practice. 
 
 Today, the Army desires to develop agile, adaptive leaders who can win in a 
complex environment (Department of the Army, 2011a). Successful education reform 
rests upon effective leadership and the capacity to understand how to create the 
conditions to promote student learning (Hallinger & Heck, 1998). Strategic planning 
formulation and implementation requires competent leadership. Strategic planning 
simply serves leadership as a mechanism to create and drive a long-range mission, 
vision, and goals within a framework to reach a desired end state (Ewy, 2009). It is 
through comprehensive leader development programs where aspiring candidates get 
exposed to concepts of mission, vision, goal setting, and relationship building that form 
a foundation upon which to practice effective school reform (Leithwood, Seashore, 
Anderson, & Wahlstrom, 2004). A thematic analysis exploring theoretical concepts 
around the triad of: 1) school leadership, 2) policy, and 3) strategic planning provides a 
foundational approach to uncover successful school leadership practice. A review of 
leader development programs synthesized these three basic concepts which appear both 
valuable and consistent while illustrating a distinctiveness in purpose between public 
schools and the Army. Uncovering the complexity associated with implementing 
educational transformation once again distinguishes professional practice. 
School Leadership 
 For the purpose of this study school leadership includes the principal (school 
level) and superintendent (district level) of public schools with equivalent positions 
situated on the Army side comprising a branch school (principal) run by a colonel, 
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commander; a branch proponent (district) run by a brigadier general, commandant; a 
Center of Excellence (state superintendent) overseeing multiple branch 
proponent/schools, run by a major general, senior mission commander. Army school 
commandants serve as a branch proponent/school leaders responsible for 
implementation of leader development, training, and education for their designated 
branch (Department of the Army, 2009). Commandants hold the rank of brigadier 
general with a time in service computation at around 28 years. A branch comprises both 
areas of concentration (AOC) for officers and military occupational skills (MOS) for 
enlisted. When referring to an Army branch proponent/school in this study it represents 
leadership and administrative responsibilities for both officer, enlisted training and 
education representing one Army branch. 
 Much of the literature surrounding successful school leadership does not focus 
on practice rather it studies leader’s values, beliefs, skills or knowledge in relation to 
what is understood for leaders to act in an effective manner (Liethwood, Day, 
Sammons, Harris, & Hopkins, 2006). School reform efforts generally focus toward 
improved learning and teaching along some innovative instructional methodology or 
new curricula, “However they all depend for their success on the motivation and 
capacities of local leadership” (Leithwood et al., 2014, p. 2). The Army leader 
development model (Department of the Army, 2015a) reflects a single purpose formed 
along a progressive and sequential program of experience, training and education with 
one end in mind; developing leaders who can successfully navigate the security 
challenges of tomorrow (Department of the Army, 2013). 
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 While the Army leader development model may prove sufficient for those 
leading both small and large organizations into armed conflict, keeping the peace, or 
humanitarian assistance, there is very little evidence that it is designed to improve 
schools and student learning. Recent Army studies fail to show more than a few small 
pockets of limited success implementing education reform (Department of the Army, 
2015b). As of this study, no branch proponent/school has yet to achieve the Army’s 
goal to fully implement the 2015 Army Learning Model (Department of the Army, 
2011a). It appears timely that a study exploring effective school leadership may 
contribute ideas toward improved Army school leadership and implementing successful 
education reform implementation. Understanding education professional standards and 
role conceptualizations (Kowalski, 2013) may provide a key ingredient missing from 
Army leader development programs. However, potential enhancements may exist 
through adopting elements explaining “role conceptualization and defining the practice 
of learning” (Kowalski, 2013, p. 26-27). Education, training, and experience forms a 
shared common thread recognized in both school/district leader development and Army 
leader development. Therefore, an explanation surveying differences across education, 
training and experience suggests the Army’s leader development model adequately 
prepares Army leaders to run large complex organizations to face uncertainty. Yet, the 
model may not adequately prepare the same leaders to run schools. Thus, begins a 
journey exploring differences between leader development serving leaders who 
successfully spend a career running educational organizations versus those who 
successfully serve in assignments leading large organizations to preserve the peace 
(Department of the Army, 2015c). 
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 The body of literature associated with leader development is extensive, complex 
and controversial with many forms described using adjectives which can often mask the 
generic functions associated with leadership (Leithwood et al., 2004). Persuasive 
evidence suggests many professions share a basic set of practices supporting leader 
development models and “rarely are such practices sufficient for leaders aiming to 
significantly improve student learning” (Leithwood et al., 2004, p. 8). Army leaders 
often face and successfully navigate complexity while overcoming tremendous odds as 
was recently recognized by President Obama (2015) when speaking of General Martin 
Dempsey, stating, “Over the last four years, Marty’s wisdom, his vision and his 
character have helped lead the greatest fighting force the world has ever known.” 
Sufficient evidence exists supporting the process by which the Army builds leaders. The 
Army’s leadership model is not in question or on trial as it serves a very specific 
purpose. However, Army leaders charged with running Army schools who mature in an 
Army environment focused on warfighting could benefit from supplemental education, 
training, and experience practices found among successful school leaders. 
 The Army leader development strategy describes three pillars; training, 
education, and experience as the means associated with career-long leader development 
(Department of the Army, 2013). A comparable construct is suggested in chapter one, 
defining the practice (Kowalski, 2013), where requirements for entering the practice 
include academic preparation, certification, and experience. It is within this conceptual 
framework where, although similar, in nature a difference reflecting the purpose 
between Army leadership development and successful school leadership models begin 
to emerge. Two additional contributing factors worthy of study include: how school 
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leaders are selected for the position and how long a successful school leader remains in 
the selected position, demonstrating stability. Thus, leveraging Army Leader 
Development Strategy (2013) and Kowalski’s (2013) narrative of role conceptualization 
and requirements for entering the practice, five leader development descriptive 
components emerge: 1) education, 2) preparation, 3) experience, 4) selection, and 5) 
sustainability (Kowalski, 2013; Department of the Army, 2015a). 
 Although each domain serves both professions each remain quite unique in their 
intended purpose. Mixing the five ingredients builds and integrates particular skills, 
knowledges, and attributes associated with leading along increased levels of 
responsibility. Describing each individual element followed by relational examples to 
school leadership combines the necessary ingredients into formulating successful school 
leader requirements and roles, which demonstrate exemplary practice. 
Education 
 Kowalski et al. found in his 2010 Decennial Study that most superintendents 
continued to follow a typical professional path of teaching, building principal, and 
superintendent. All states require a bachelor’s degree to teach following a traditional 
subject area study or through an alternative certification. Many state programs follow a 
state-approved college or university teacher training program. National Council for 
Accreditation of Teacher Education (NCATE) reports thirty-nine states adopted 
NCATE standards with twenty eight states receiving accreditation by the Council for 
the Accreditation of Educator Preparation (CAPE) (NCATE, 2015) and twenty-two 
states conducting their own program accreditation. Slayton and Mathis (2010), suggest 
that leader development programs for school leaders must focus on very specific skill 
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sets that go beyond the basic attributes of good leaders and effective school leaders. 
They continue to posit that a leader development program surround “three core ideas of 
presence, create positive learning conditions and having the skills necessary to teach 
adults” (Slayton & Mathis, 2010, p. 26). This is particularly interesting for the Army 
since no such documented requirements or practices exist for those running Army 
schools. 
 Instructional improvement demands that school leadership understands learning 
and can guide performance along learning strategies (Guthrie & Schuerman, 2010). 
Considering the school leader as educator, Murphy (2002) states that leaders “will need 
to be more broadly educated in general and much more knowledgeable about the core 
technology of education in particular” (p. 187). Reading the words Dempsey crafted in 
the forward of Army Learning Concept 2015 he states, “We live in a much more 
competitive security environment. This means that we have to learn faster and better 
than our adversaries. Stated a bit differently, we must prevail in the competitive 
learning environment” (Department of the Army 2011a, p. i.). The Army suggests 
education primarily occurs at the professional military education (PME) level which 
begins with the captain’s career course and courses serving higher ranks on the officer 
side and sergeant first class rank and above on the noncommissioned officer side 
(Department of the Army, 2014b). Education defined within Commissioned Officer 
Professional Development and Career Management (DA Pam 600-3, 2010), “is the 
process of imparting knowledge and developing competencies and attributes Army 
professional need to accomplish any mission the future may present” (DA Pam 600-3, 
2010, p. 5). 
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 Learning is vital to the very success of the Army’s ability to prevail in war, 
sustain the peace and provide services such as humanitarian assistance across the globe. 
How can the Army ignore such a critical role which the public school leaders already 
know and practice? Slaton and Mathis (2010) agree that, “It is the leader who has the 
primary responsibility for creating conditions for the adults in any organization. The 
leader is the authority in the school system or school” (p. 36). Clearly it is the school 
leader who is instrumental in facilitating change and who must be practiced and capable 
of fostering positive learning conditions (Slaton & Mathis, 2010). Unmistakably, 
learning educational subjects plays a vital role associated with successful school/district 
leadership. 
Preparation/Certification/Training 
 Professional preparation programs provide another realm distinguishing Army 
leader preparation from that practiced in public school leader programs. The Army’s 
agenda remains focused on a history marked by a wide array of missions, from small 
wars, regular wars, humanitarian assistance, and support to civil authority (Department 
of the Army, 2012). Training to build skills and capacity improving individual’s 
abilities to perform in operational situations (Department of the Army, 2013) is a 
respectable order; however it does little to match the preparation and certification rigor 
found within many of the formal school leader preparation programs across the country 
(Carter & Loredo, 1994). The Army simply does not focus time, money, and other 
resources preparing its leaders for assignments to run a school (Department of the 
Army, 2014a; Department of the Army, 2014b). Other than a handful of Army career 
fields, most follow a very distinct path closely associated to the operational 
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environment in which they will serve; For example, professional credentialing such as 
doctors, lawyers, and engineers (Department of the Army, 2014b). The Army differs 
from a public school approach where advanced degrees and certification form a 
foundational platform on which aspiring education administrators progressively 
advance along a professional career, from teaching to building principal and beyond 
(Glass, 1994). The Army’s absence of an instructional leadership preparation and 
certification program distinguished a key difference from public school practice. 
 Preparation of school leaders includes standards established by The American 
Association of School Administrators (AASA), which provides general professional 
standards for superintendents guiding preparation programs (Kowalski, 2013). Another 
contributor to the knowledge base is the Educational Leadership Constituent Council 
(ELCC) (2011), providing scholarly studies standards in empirical research contributing 
to the body of knowledge. In spite of good education administration programs, the 
environment continues to place burdensome requirements upon the profession. The 
learning environment in the Army is changing; demanding that students know more 
than in the past. Army officers and soldiers are expected to act more critically than 
before. These expectations have significant implications for those supervising Centers 
of Excellence or operating branch/proponent schools. In an analysis of leadership 
standards report, the Council of Chief State School Officers (CCSSO) describes a 
transformation in framework for school leaders: “Mounting demands are rewriting 
administrator’s job descriptions every year, making them more complex than ever” 
(CCSSO, 2008, p. 3). Leading change requires hard work, persistence, a willingness to 
improve yourself, and most of all, takes time. Fullan (2011) suggests that “it requires 
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ten years of deep development to become an expert at anything – including change 
management” (p. 47). The advantage of public school leadership goes to the people that 
gain experience practicing leadership theory within the school environment. 
Experience 
 Examination of professional experience which contributes toward a leader’s 
successful performance must consider the environment in which the practice occurs. 
Army leaders and school/district leaders practice their professions in very different 
environments. The Army leader development model describes experience coming from 
time spent performing a variety of missions in ambiguous, global security environments 
that cross borders (Department of the Army, 2013a). The Army Field Manual on 
leadership describes tough conditions awaiting to challenge maturing leaders along their 
careers. 
The Army depends upon itself to develop adaptable leaders able to 
achieve mission accomplishment in a dynamic, unstable, and complex 
environments. A robust, holistic leader development program is 
essential. Through a mix of education, training, and experience, Army 
leader development processes produce and sustain agile, adaptive, and 
innovative leaders who act with boldness and initiative in dynamic, 
complex situations to execute missions according to doctrine, orders, 
and training. Furthermore, it also produces leaders that possess the 
integrity and willingness to act in the absence of orders. (Department 
of the Army, 2015a, p. 1-1) 
 
 The Army actually publishes a Department of the Army Pamphlet (Department 
of the Army, 2014b) which describes typical career paths for each area of concentration 
(AOC) or branch in which an officer serves. School administrators, on the other hand, 
face a very complex environment that can situate their school/district anywhere from a 
large metropolitan district to a small rural district. Each environment contains its own 
challenges, but the fact remains that the school leader grows, matures and is nurtured in 
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a school environment where the Army leader is not. Department of the Army (2014b) 
states that “Experienced gained through on-the-job training in a variety of challenging 
assignments and additional duties prepare officers to lead and train soldiers, both in 
garrison and ultimately combat” (p. 6). No reference was discovered demonstrating any 
path available for officers to serve in a typical school career route such as teaching, 
leading or serving in school administration. 
 In a study to identify exemplary superintendents, Glass (1992) pulled data from 
a 1992 American Association of School Administrators (AASA) survey of 2,500 
superintendents out of a population estimated around 15,500 and identified 410 
exemplary superintendents. Some of the measured characteristics from the 1992 survey 
included: 1) preparation, 2) training, and 3) experience (p. 71). Earlier studies included 
successful traits such as a vision to guide the school as well as solutions aimed at 
reaching the goals (Glass, 1987). School administrators are expected to lead by relying 
on professional knowledge to make school-improvement recommendations (Marzano, 
2005), but they are at the mercy of their higher headquarters and the operational force 
requirements. When the school leadership is competent teachers are affective and 
parents take an interest in the school. Leadership requires engaging the community, 
civic meetings and is further described by the National Board for Professional Teaching 
Standards (2010) as “Leadership is complex. Teaching and learning take place in the 
context of complex interdependent human organizations, requiring a leader who 
possesses deep knowledge of education and sophisticated relationship skills” (National 
Board for Professional Teaching Standards, 2010, p. 13). The Decennial 2010 Study 
indicated that teaching experience of surveyed superintendents averaged around six to 
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ten years (Kowalski, McCord, Peterson, Young, & Ellerson, 2011). Those leaders 
serving in public school positions average two to five times longer tenure than their 
Army counterparts. 
Selection 
 Although both Army school leaders and public school leaders get selected for 
their position by a board, the selection, like the previously discussed categories, 
provides an interesting contrast between the professions. The Army officer promotion 
selection system is governed by statute (Title 10, United States Code), Army regulation 
(AR 600-8-29) and policy established by the Secretary of the Army (Department of the 
Army G1, 2015) to select those officers who demonstrate the professional and moral 
qualifications to serve at the next higher grade  (Department of the Army, 2014b). 
Memo 600-2, “Policies and Procedures for Active-Duty List Officer Selection Boards” 
(Department of the Army, 2006) describes a centralized selection list of key 
billets/positions by type or position that fall into four categories for lieutenant- and 
colonel-level commands (leadership positions). General officer selection is a bit more 
rigorous, political, and secretive. Army branch school leaders, colonels, fall into the 
recruiting and training command category. Typically, this category does not attract the 
Army’s most competitive officers, commonly attracting those officers who do not think 
they are competitive for field commands or may be looking for an assignment that will 
help them after their service ends. Essentially, selection as a branch school commander 
withers any hope of reaching flag officer-level (Department of the Army, HRC, 2014). 
 The Human Resources Command (HRC) presentation to Chief of Staff of the 
Army, General Odierno, shows that promotion to colonel in 2014 from the Army 
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competitive category (ACC) shows a 40-percent-selection-rate to colonel (p. 8). That 
said DA Pam 600-3 (Department of the Army, 2014b), table 5-2 depicts promotion 
opportunity to colonel represents 50 percent best qualified with the potential to serve in 
the higher grade and the whole person concept (p. 37). Of those selected for promotion 
to colonel, less than 1 percent get selected to command (Department of the Army, HRC, 
2014). Needless to say, the selection to command at the colonel-level is very 
competitive. Neither the branch school commander nor the branch proponent 
commandant requires certification or formal preparation to lead a branch school 
(Department of the Army, 2014b). Despite argument that those selected for command at 
the colonel-level are proven leaders chosen for their demonstrated ability to lead large 
complex organizations, they do not receive formal preparation nor certification, raising 
questions as to their qualifications to run a branch school. 
 Carter et al. (1993) presents a combined effort of several researchers describing 
the preparation, selection, and development of school superintendents. Glass describes 
responses from superintendents surveyed explaining why the school board hired them. 
One of the principle reasons they were selected was their proven ability as an 
instructional leader. Another trait was the right chemistry and personal characteristics. 
Interestingly, the selected exemplary superintendents were active in state- and national-
level organizations, providing a familiarity with higher level policy and process, which 
made the school board comfortable. 
Sustainability 
 The Army branch school commander will serve a two year tour and the 
branch/proponent commandant will serve anywhere from 12 to 24 months. The senior 
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mission commander serves a standard two year tour (Department of the Army, 2014b). 
No wonder implementing educational change proves difficult for the Army. Statistics 
from the 2010 Decennial study indicate superintendents serve an average of five to ten 
years. In a 1992 study of twenty four Oklahoma superintendents, the noted national 
average was around five years with some successful Oklahoma superintendents in the 
study averaging eighteen years (Chance, 1992). Studies suggest that school leader’s 
sustainability rests upon their ability to perform, allowing them to stay the course of 
educational change. 
Strategic Planning 
 Categorizing strategy up front affords common understanding, providing focus 
on educational strategic planning as developing a plan toward school improvement 
(Ewy, 2009). Grand or national strategy is defined by the Army as: “A countries 
broadest approach to the pursuit of its national objectives in the international system” 
(Dorff, 2001). Army strategic planning falls within operational art, where consideration 
of future military action is designed to support national-level objectives (Bartholomees, 
2014). Military strategy when thought in the context of grand strategic follows a very 
complicated path described by Clausewitz as “continuation of policy by other means” 
(Howard & Peret, 1976). The Army represents merely one of many elements of power 
which the President may employ in the interest of executing policy (National Security 
Strategy, 2015). As the Army develops education and training strategy (concepts), the 
construction follows an “ends, ways, means” framework taught at the Army’s Senior 
Service College (Yarger, 2014). The ends, ways, means model easily supports 
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components described by Ewy (2011) in his explanation of a long-range plan construct 
of education strategy development. 
 Much like strategy creation, education reform begins with a long range mission, 
vision and goals to achieve the end state. Comparing Army strategy creation and leader 
development against public school strategy construction and leader development further 
provides a foundational platform upon which to explore the Army’s struggle 
implementing education reform. This review begins with a comparison of how two very 
distinct professions, public schools/Army create and implement education strategy. 
Conclusion 
 Leadership remains at the core of debate and research determining what makes a 
successful school/district leader. Much of the research focuses on “internal states,” 
values, beliefs, knowledge or skills rather than observed practice (Leithwood et al., 
2006). Narrowing the scope toward leadership practice while exploring key ideas and 
best practices in comparing leadership studies and literature from both civilian and 
Army leadership development programs offers a bridge between the two professions. 
The importance of the study is to contribute to my experiential knowledge providing a 
lived story for Army leadership to consider as a benchmark toward improved 
branch/proponent school leadership practice. Therefore, addressing a gap in literature 
surrounding how the Army prepares, educates, trains, and stabilizes those selected to 
supervise Centers of Excellence and operate branch/proponent schools seems timely. 
 Supervising a Center of Excellence or running a branch proponent/school poses 
a different organizational experience for those few Army leaders who are selected on 
their potential to lead large, complex, Army organizations (Department of the Army, 
 
184 
2014b; Department of the Army, 2005). Unlike their civilian counterparts, Army school 
leaders do not gain experience and get promoted within a school centric environment. 
So, in a sense, these senior leaders begin their journey at the colonel- and general 
officer-level at a significant disadvantage. Informing a broader audience of what 
successful school leadership looks like and how such a model could apply to Army 
leadership practice may provide some answers to the Army’s struggle implementing a 




Appendix 1.B. Theoretical Lens 
 Multiple theoretical frameworks will be woven into my story as part of the 
narrative inquiry exploring Army leadership’s relational and consequential role in the 
struggle to fully implement ALM 2015. For the purpose of this study, I will abridge two 
theories which may contribute to the proposed study: 1) collective trust and 2) 
compliance theory. Part of the gap in studies about successful school leadership is due 
to the fact that literature does not focus on the actual practice of leadership (Leithwood, 
Day, Sammons, Harris, & Hopkins, 2006). Leithwood et al. (2006) suggest that: 
[Leadership practice] It is all about leader’s values, beliefs, skills or knowledge 
that someone thinks leaders need in order to act in an effective manner, which 
may be inferred from observation of leader’s work, or which may be reputed as 
contributing to leader effectiveness by a range of people who experience 
leadership. (p. 8) 
The theories of collective trust and compliance were chosen because each one uniquely 
contributes toward building a collective description of Army leadership’s unique 
contribution associated with implementing school change. A study exploring Army 
leadership’s relational and consequential practice toward running a school begins a 
journey into uncharted territory. Therefore, theoretical approaches supporting cognitive, 
interpersonal, and organizational interactions provides a natural direction supporting a 
story following Army leadership through narrative inquiry. 
Collective Trust Theory 
 Collective Trust Theory contributes toward understanding phenomena beyond 
simply interpersonal trust; providing predictors of organizational outcomes, and 
forming along existing social property (Lewis & Weigert, 1985). In other words when 
organizations acting with and among interdependent groups which collectively 
determine the success of the larger organization. Scholars suggest that trust plays a role 
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in how organizations function, demonstrating that individual transactions become 
something that is, to some degree, a social phenomenon. Collective Trust depicts a logic 
model displaying the very nexus of individual influence during repeated exchanges 
amongst group members enveloped in the core of shared trust beliefs within 
interdependent groups of an organization (Forsyth, Adams, & Hoy, 2011). Additionally, 
it is the shared trust belief that defines the group’s disposition vulnerability to others. 
The theory describes how collective trust can vary according to strength related to 
interpersonal trust. 
 Individual beliefs can reflect a more normative facet (understood preference of 
action rewarded if followed, punished if not followed). For example, listening to what 
people say they like and do not like about a principal is normative. Socialization 
towards normative behaviors influences action so people do not need to experience it 
personally. For example, some teachers may offer what they think about the principal to 
their colleagues, which may or may not reflect the truth of the situation. This stems 
from the socialization of the group whose norms a person adopts if they want to be part 
of the group. Individuals tend to become more like those who they associate with, thus, 
they could be labeled an institutional property. 
 Indications toward a degree of trust and the level of agreement between group 
members provide a level of measure connecting trust and the cohesion of that group. 
The indicator must have a measure demonstrating teacher perception of dependence. 
Strong school communities rely on strong relational bonds that embrace similar values. 
Trust is a socialization process where individuals see the group norm in relation to trust, 
against the potential to sanction and punish. Collective Trust, therefore, describes a 
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theory of groups which although are measured individually reflect a larger composite of 
trust. Forsyth et al. (2011) explains, “Trust enables cohesion to form through its effects 
on interactions and the flow of communication within all structures of the relational 
network” (Forsyth et al., 2011, p. 129). For example, the reflection of trust from the 
group itself sets up a normative understanding of whether the principal is trustworthy. 
Schools will have principals who have different relational trusts from the teacher norm 
group as a unit of analysis. This means that a new teacher may have a positive 
experience with a principal which does not reflect the teacher group norm. Forsyth et al 
(2011) discuss the following three facets that shape trust: 
First are items that shape and/or constrain, items that people bring in with them, 
such as a set of beliefs or values reflecting the environment from which they derive. In a 
rural setting, people generally tend to understand with a degree of certainty that they 
know what other people in the community think. A newcomer to this rural environment 
will have to adjust to the group norm if they want to reach an amount of acceptance 
within the group structure. 
Second are those contexts internal to the institution. Various groups are led from 
a different collection of teachers and students. Experiences may reflect social exchanges 
within the group or observed behavior of group members. Trust criteria forms a 
collective comparison between expected and observed behavior. The teacher’s 
perspective determines the structure. For example, are rules viewed as suggestions 
rather than absolute? 
Third is the complexity of the task, those non-standard inputs and outputs, that 
increase the complexity of an assignment possibly resulting in constraint on the level of 
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autonomy. If autonomy is constrained beyond the point where one can act 
independently, then the ability to be successful may be limited. Autonomy may reside 
in the group, not in the individual. For example, a new teacher may have a very positive 
experience with the principal, yet, the positive experience may be found contrary to the 
group norm where the group experience is not a positive one. 
Theoretical Map 
 Bryk and Schneider (2002) describe a collective trust theory from the 
perspective of relational trust as a foundational component supporting the social 
organization of schools. The authors introduce relational connections among teachers, 
students, parents, and principals where they describe interdependent actions occurring 
along levels of conceptualization; cognitive, interpersonal, and organizational. 
Cognitive actions explain a complex domain with an origin of perceiving others 
intentions. Interpersonal actions relate how judgements play out within a set of role 
relations. Organizational actions are where the other two levels climax in significant 
effects. Positive interactions from the various levels formulate a constructive 
demonstration of respect, competence, personal regard and integrity. 
 Disruptions within the various levels can result in unmet conditions and can 
undermine a discernment for the overall relationship between group members (Bryk & 
Schneider, 2002). Increased relational trust plays a positive role resulting in improved 
consequences such as reduced cost, clear understanding of roles and a clear ethical 
imperative to advance the best interest of children. Implementation of the model causes 
a continuous calculation of risk and vulnerability which plays a pivotal role in the 
success or defeat of relational trust. The figure below was derived through small group 
 
189 
discussion from assigned readings. The box on the left side of the figure demonstrates 
possible relationships between characters. Moving to the right those relationships filter 
through met or unmet components of respect, competence, personal regard, and 
integrity. Unmet components drive back to the levels of cognitive, interpersonal or 
organizational relationships. Met components flow result in reduced costs, clear 
understanding of role obligations, and advancing in the best interest of children. 
 
Figure 8. Sketching Collective Trust Theory 
Relevance Toward Army School Policy & Practice 
 Studying a theory of Collective Trust continues to reinforce the importance that 
motivation plays in the quality of an organization’s output. Change is no stranger to the 
military and fostering innovative change is something that Army leadership often 
wrestles with. Army organizations seem to take people for granted while assuming that 
people will optimally perform because motivation is inherent within the intrinsic values 
shared by the collective group. Thus, people responsible for projects or programs, 
sometimes, fail to take into account the factors that motivate people. Senior leaders get 
so consumed with the urgency of the present that they fail to recognize people are the 
organization’s greatest asset. Unfortunately, leadership often miss opportunities to raise 
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the bar along innovative practices which could optimize the people factor.  Army level 
policy supporting an enterprise approach tends to support a system constrained by 
projected resources. In its various publications and policies, the Army mentions the 
importance of human capital on one hand, yet fails to recognize the importance of 
individual relational ties. However, it is the individual relational ties that comprise the 
social network necessary to build trust. Interestingly, the Army values contain 
descriptions of character similarly listed in the readings with regard to: respect, 
competence, personal regard and integrity. Although the Army recognizes these values, 
it is difficult in the current environment to find evidence of personal regard. The Army 
has an interesting saying: “mission first, people always.” The saying implies that the 
mission must be accomplished and to the best possible means consider people also. Of 
course, people come at the expense of accomplishing the mission. The current school 
environment places work accomplishment at a higher priority than the human capital 
performing the tasks. The Army is beginning to demonstrate improved practice 
investing in its human capital through certification programs, educational opportunities 
and improved job recognition. Time will tell whether an institution built upon a 
hierarchical structure can really invest in its people while building strong social ties and 
trust. 
Compliance Theory 
 Etzioni (1975) selects compliance for his comparative study because it 
represents a fundamental element of organizational structure related to numerous 
essential organizational variables. Utilizing the organizational structure as a central hub, 
Etzioni (1975) outlines a methodical taxonomy of organizations based upon the 
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distinctive compliance of lower participants. He then classifies organizations into three 
major categories of compliance; arranged according to the prominence given to the 
principal pattern (Etzioni, 1975). He also suggested that compliance associates 
behaviors between actors and shares power among the actors relational to compliance 
patterns. Three categories of compliance (coercive, utilitarian, and normative) were 
labeled. Typical organizations were assigned within each category: 1) coercive 
organizations included concentration camps, prisons, correctional facilities, custodial 
mental hospitals, prisoner–of–war camps, relocation centers, and coercive unions; 2) 
utilitarian organizations included blue-collar and white-collar business unions, farmers’ 
organizations, and peacetime military; and 3) normative organizations included 
religious groups (churches, monasteries, orders, and convents), ideological and political 
societies, hospitals, universities, social unions, and voluntary associations. 
 Three styles of power discussed include: coercive power where the threat of 
physical infliction of pain or denying basic human needs. Remunerative power 
addresses the control of material items such as salaries, rewards and services. 
Normative power is explained as manipulative power. Associated with these kinds of 
power, Etzioni (1975) suggests three types of involvement: enlisted men in basic 
training experience an alienative involvement. Inmates in prison demonstrate a 
calculative assertiveness toward those in authority. Moral involvement such as a 
parishioner in his church and loyalist. Etzioni (1975) packaged a relational diagram 
along each of the three types of involvement connecting the type to the style of power. 
Connecting these variables, he described nine possible variations of compliance and 
three congruent types which proved more effective than the other six. One limitation 
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offered in the categorization of each organization is that the sheer number of possible 
variances makes it difficult in such a study to list them all. The author also states that a 
common – sense approach to classification of organizations are of little use, the 
example offered is the military where he distinguishes between combat units and peace-
time units. He spends a couple of pages each describing coercive and utilitarian 
organizations in a more detailed analytical classification. Here, he discussed blue-collar 
and white-collar workers and some of the distinguishing rationales along variations in 
morale. For example, he disproves previous social science beliefs which advocated 
increased output with higher incentives was not valid. 
 Etzioni indicates tasks and people are important if you want an effective 
organization. While making a comparative study of relationships among ideas, his 
theory suggested that several critical acts could explain the phenomenon. To be able to 
determine the connections, he demonstrated the requirement to have some comparative 
basis which led him to say that we need to understand how some people talk about 
organizations naturally, but not necessarily matched. For example, trying to mix 
different boxes with content that is different does not work. Each box has to have some 
content that are the same. Many dimensions are different, like peace-time and war-time 
armies. Compliance is essential to any organization, so Etzioni begins to think about 
this and evolve his theory. He was able to classify organizations in such a way that they 
are stable, so that knowledge was generalized. 
 Compliance theory helps us think about by providing three systems of 
knowledge: personal from experience; technical; relevance of a general theory to 
negotiate a real world problem. One could start with the technical, then migrate to self- 
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experience, then to gut feeling. Conceptual lenses can inform us. When people suggest 
irrational requirements your ability to argue against those is stronger the higher up you 
go from personal knowledge to the technical with evidence against what they are 
suggesting. Etzioni attempted to bring sociology out of the Ivory tower and into the 
wider arena of politics, policy and social reform (Forsyth, 2015). 
Theoretical Map 
 Compliance theory delineates the classifications of organizations into three 
primary categories of compliance. Associations and systematic within each grouping 
according to the prominence given the principal pattern (Etzioni, 1975, p. 65). The first 
task is to define an analytical base to classify the organizations. In order to do this, 
Etzioni (1975) describes three kinds of power, followed by three kinds of involvement, 
culminating in a relational aspect between the kinds of power and the types of 
involvement which organize compliance relationships. The powers represented include: 
1) Coercive power reposes on the application or the intimidation of application of 
physical sanctions such as pain, or death; generation of frustration associated in 
depriving one of basic needs. 2) Remunerative power derives control from material 
resources and rewards through allocation of salaries, wages, commissions or fringe 
benefits. 3) Normative power associates manipulation of symbolic awards such as titles, 
prestige, and esteem. 
 The three types of involvement include: 1) Moral which represents a high force 
and devoted member such as typically found in a church leader. Two types of moral are 
described: first, pure moral with a foci along norms and authority; second, social moral 
relies upon commitments and pressure of primary groups and their members. 2) 
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Calculative involvement encompasses either a positive or negative aspect of low 
intensity resulting from a steady business contact or permanent customers. 3) Alienative 
involvement prescribes an intense negative orientation where competition is high 
between traders who seek optimum results for their organization at the expense of the 
others. 
 Etzioni (1975) describes a complex environment encompassing relationships 
associated with recruitment to compliance. Variations in organizational size and 
classification combine to provide disparities. Small recruit populations provide 
management less choice to hire talent. Whereas larger recruit populations result in 
fewer constraints or restrictions allowing a broader selection of applicants which could 
result in increased talent. Figure 9, below, describes the types of organizations along the 
left side of the chart and flows along lanes associated to each organizational type. The 
lanes depict key items related to recruitment, from initial entry to established entry 
within the organization type along a continuum of socialization. Normative 
organizations tend to attain particularly high commitments that stress both selectivity 
and socialization. For example, when a higher degree of selectivity is achieved the 
result is high compliance. On the other hand, when a lower selectivity is achieved, then 
the organization must rely more on socialization to attain compliance. Coercive 
organizations with little commitment require neither selectivity nor socialization. 
Utilitarian organizations undergo a lot of pressure due to expectations and, therefore, 
depend upon efficient matching of individual characteristics to role requirements to 
attain and retain a high quality workforce. 
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 Scope refers to the “number of activities the participants carry out in groups 
composed of participants. Pervasiveness is defined as the number of activities inside or 
outside the organization for which the organization sets its norms” (Etzioni, 1975, p. 
277). 
 
Figure 9. Organizational Environment 
 The relationships between scope and pervasiveness vary by type of organization. 
Pervasiveness includes activities inside or outside of the organization that resemble the 
norm (Etzioni, 1975). Utilitarian organizations tend to be narrow in scope and low in 
pervasiveness; coercive organizations resemble broad in scope, low in pervasiveness; 
normative organizations demonstrate high in pervasiveness combined with board or 
narrow scope. 
Relevance Toward Army School Policy and Practice 
 Compliance theory in its description along three classification types of 
organizations resembles much of the human capital process found within the policy and 
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practice of the current peacetime Army. Thus, Etzioni (1975) provides a strong 
foundational environment from which to explore current Army practice. Through a 
generalization of experience, I will provide short narratives of practice supporting each 
of the organizational classifications. First, normative practice is demonstrated in the fact 
that large sums of money and resources are invested to attract and recruit young men 
and women into the officer and enlisted ranks. Further supporting the normative 
organization is the socialization of Army members once they join the ranks. The 
concept of team, buddy, and the mere strength found within the Army structure 
formulates strong social ties among the members. Second, coercive organizations also 
exist within the Army, particularly at the initial entry of enlisted soldiers. New studies 
should evolve addressing potential changes in initial recruitment where selectivity is 
growing. As the Army downsizes, it can be more selective in who it wants to join the 
ranks. 
 Army systems are becoming more technical and complicated, requiring new 
skill sets and more intellect to operate and manage. Yet, the current recruiting model 
casts a broad net aimed at gross total numbers in the hope that a few good ones will be 
caught. Special-forces on the other hand applies a highly selective screening process 
followed by intensive training that washes out many candidates, so, the commitment 
remains extremely high unlike an older, outdated model which Etzioni suggested. 
Finally, utilitarian traits resemble many of the characteristics found within the highly 
competitive nature of officer recruiting, selection and commissioning followed by 
competitive promotions, career paths as well as those recruiting and selection processes 




 The significance of this study rests upon a clearly articulated story, connecting 
theory alongside practice exploring Army leadership’s consequential and relational role 
in the struggle to fully implement a new learning concept with a particular focus on one 
Center of Excellence containing two branch proponent/schools. Requirements placed 
upon leadership supervising Centers of Excellence and running branch 
proponent/schools today are pushing the envelope beyond reasonable expectations. 
Comparing civilian school Leadership capacity framed in terms of education, 
preparation, training, selection and sustainability may provide a valuable framework in 
which to link shared experiences to bridge obstacles constraining professional practice. 
People know or understand what to do, yet fail to apply it broadly simply because 
change in organizational practice requires both will and skill (Levin & Fullan, 2008). 
 
